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httpd: make it possible to use system passwords for auth

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function                                             old     new   delta
check_user_passwd                                    320     467    +147
httpd_main                                           760     757      -3

Signed-off-by: Pascal Bellard <pascal.bellard@ads-lu.com>
Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux@googlemail.com>
This commit is contained in:
Pascal Bellard 2011-11-29 13:51:11 +01:00 committed by Denys Vlasenko
parent 901365fcff
commit 7291755439
1 changed files with 145 additions and 26 deletions
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171
networking/httpd.c
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@ -54,6 +54,8 @@
* /cgi-bin:foo:bar # Require user foo, pwd bar on urls starting with /cgi-bin/
* /adm:admin:setup # Require user admin, pwd setup on urls starting with /adm/
* /adm:toor:PaSsWd # or user toor, pwd PaSsWd on urls starting with /adm/
* /adm:root:* # or user root, pwd from /etc/passwd on urls starting with /adm/
* /wiki:*:* # or any user from /etc/passwd with according pwd on urls starting with /wiki/
* .au:audio/basic # additional mime type for audio.au files
* *.php:/path/php # run xxx.php through an interpreter
*
@ -123,6 +125,14 @@
//usage: "\n -d STRING URL decode STRING"
#include "libbb.h"
#if ENABLE_PAM
/* PAM may include <locale.h>. We may need to undefine bbox's stub define: */
# undef setlocale
/* For some obscure reason, PAM is not in pam/xxx, but in security/xxx.
* Apparently they like to confuse people. */
# include <security/pam_appl.h>
# include <security/pam_misc.h>
#endif
#if ENABLE_FEATURE_HTTPD_USE_SENDFILE
# include <sys/sendfile.h>
#endif
@ -1658,6 +1668,56 @@ static int checkPermIP(void)
}
#if ENABLE_FEATURE_HTTPD_BASIC_AUTH
# if ENABLE_FEATURE_HTTPD_AUTH_MD5 && ENABLE_PAM
struct pam_userinfo {
const char *name;
const char *pw;
};
static int pam_talker(int num_msg,
const struct pam_message **msg,
struct pam_response **resp,
void *appdata_ptr)
{
int i;
struct pam_userinfo *userinfo = (struct pam_userinfo *) appdata_ptr;
struct pam_response *response;
if (!resp || !msg || !userinfo)
return PAM_CONV_ERR;
/* allocate memory to store response */
response = xzalloc(num_msg * sizeof(*response));
/* copy values */
for (i = 0; i < num_msg; i++) {
const char *s;
switch (msg[i]->msg_style) {
case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON:
s = userinfo->name;
break;
case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF:
s = userinfo->pw;
break;
case PAM_ERROR_MSG:
case PAM_TEXT_INFO:
s = "";
break;
default:
free(response);
return PAM_CONV_ERR;
}
response[i].resp = xstrdup(s);
if (PAM_SUCCESS != 0)
response[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
}
*resp = response;
return PAM_SUCCESS;
}
# endif
/*
* Config file entries are of the form "/<path>:<user>:<passwd>".
* If config file has no prefix match for path, access is allowed.
@ -1667,7 +1727,7 @@ static int checkPermIP(void)
*
* Returns 1 if user_and_passwd is OK.
*/
static int check_user_passwd(const char *path, const char *user_and_passwd)
static int check_user_passwd(const char *path, char *user_and_passwd)
{
Htaccess *cur;
const char *prev = NULL;
@ -1675,6 +1735,7 @@ static int check_user_passwd(const char *path, const char *user_and_passwd)
for (cur = g_auth; cur; cur = cur->next) {
const char *dir_prefix;
size_t len;
int r;
dir_prefix = cur->before_colon;
@ -1690,7 +1751,8 @@ static int check_user_passwd(const char *path, const char *user_and_passwd)
len = strlen(dir_prefix);
if (len != 1 /* dir_prefix "/" matches all, don't need to check */
&& (strncmp(dir_prefix, path, len) != 0
|| (path[len] != '/' && path[len] != '\0'))
|| (path[len] != '/' && path[len] != '\0')
)
) {
continue;
}
@ -1699,38 +1761,95 @@ static int check_user_passwd(const char *path, const char *user_and_passwd)
prev = dir_prefix;
if (ENABLE_FEATURE_HTTPD_AUTH_MD5) {
char *md5_passwd;
char *colon_after_user;
const char *passwd;
md5_passwd = strchr(cur->after_colon, ':');
if (md5_passwd && md5_passwd[1] == '$' && md5_passwd[2] == '1'
&& md5_passwd[3] == '$' && md5_passwd[4]
) {
char *encrypted;
int r, user_len_p1;
colon_after_user = strchr(user_and_passwd, ':');
if (!colon_after_user)
goto bad_input;
passwd = strchr(cur->after_colon, ':');
if (!passwd)
goto bad_input;
passwd++;
if (passwd[0] == '*') {
# if ENABLE_PAM
struct pam_userinfo userinfo;
struct pam_conv conv_info = { &pam_talker, (void *) &userinfo };
pam_handle_t *pamh;
md5_passwd++;
user_len_p1 = md5_passwd - cur->after_colon;
/* comparing "user:" */
if (strncmp(cur->after_colon, user_and_passwd, user_len_p1) != 0) {
/* compare "user:" */
if (cur->after_colon[0] != '*'
&& strncmp(cur->after_colon, user_and_passwd, colon_after_user - user_and_passwd + 1) != 0
) {
continue;
}
/* this cfg entry is '*' or matches username from peer */
*colon_after_user = '\0';
userinfo.name = user_and_passwd;
userinfo.pw = colon_after_user + 1;
r = pam_start("httpd", user_and_passwd, &conv_info, &pamh) != PAM_SUCCESS
|| pam_authenticate(pamh, PAM_DISALLOW_NULL_AUTHTOK) != PAM_SUCCESS
|| pam_acct_mgmt(pamh, PAM_DISALLOW_NULL_AUTHTOK) != PAM_SUCCESS
;
pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS);
*colon_after_user = ':';
goto end_check_passwd;
# else
# if ENABLE_FEATURE_SHADOWPASSWDS
/* Using _r function to avoid pulling in static buffers */
struct spwd spw;
char buffer[256];
# endif
struct passwd *pw;
encrypted = pw_encrypt(
user_and_passwd + user_len_p1 /* cleartext pwd from user */,
md5_passwd /*salt */, 1 /* cleanup */);
r = strcmp(encrypted, md5_passwd);
free(encrypted);
if (r == 0)
goto set_remoteuser_var; /* Ok */
*colon_after_user = '\0';
pw = getpwnam(user_and_passwd);
*colon_after_user = ':';
if (!pw || !pw->pw_passwd)
continue;
passwd = pw->pw_passwd;
# if ENABLE_FEATURE_SHADOWPASSWDS
if ((passwd[0] == 'x' || passwd[0] == '*') && !passwd[1]) {
/* getspnam_r may return 0 yet set result to NULL.
* At least glibc 2.4 does this. Be extra paranoid here. */
struct spwd *result = NULL;
r = getspnam_r(pw->pw_name, &spw, buffer, sizeof(buffer), &result);
if (r == 0 && result)
passwd = result->sp_pwdp;
}
# endif
# endif /* ENABLE_PAM */
}
/* compare "user:" */
if (cur->after_colon[0] != '*'
&& strncmp(cur->after_colon, user_and_passwd, colon_after_user - user_and_passwd + 1) != 0
) {
continue;
}
/* this cfg entry is '*' or matches username from peer */
/* encrypt pwd from peer and check match with local one */
{
char *encrypted = pw_encrypt(
/* pwd: */ colon_after_user + 1,
/* salt: */ passwd,
/* cleanup: */ 0
);
r = strcmp(encrypted, passwd);
free(encrypted);
goto end_check_passwd;
}
bad_input: ;
}
/* Comparing plaintext "user:pass" in one go */
if (strcmp(cur->after_colon, user_and_passwd) == 0) {
set_remoteuser_var:
r = strcmp(cur->after_colon, user_and_passwd);
end_check_passwd:
if (r == 0) {
remoteuser = xstrndup(user_and_passwd,
strchrnul(user_and_passwd, ':') - user_and_passwd);
strchrnul(user_and_passwd, ':') - user_and_passwd
);
return 1; /* Ok */
}
} /* for */
@ -2067,10 +2186,10 @@ static void handle_incoming_and_exit(const len_and_sockaddr *fromAddr)
}
#if ENABLE_FEATURE_HTTPD_BASIC_AUTH
/* Case: no "Authorization:" was seen, but page does require passwd.
/* Case: no "Authorization:" was seen, but page might require passwd.
* Check that with dummy user:pass */
if (authorized < 0)
authorized = check_user_passwd(urlcopy, ":");
authorized = check_user_passwd(urlcopy, (char *) "");
if (!authorized)
send_headers_and_exit(HTTP_UNAUTHORIZED);
#endif
@ -2353,7 +2472,7 @@ int httpd_main(int argc UNUSED_PARAM, char **argv)
salt[1] = '1';
salt[2] = '$';
crypt_make_salt(salt + 3, 4);
puts(pw_encrypt(pass, salt, 1));
puts(pw_encrypt(pass, salt, /*cleanup:*/ 0));
return 0;
}
#endif