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tls: reorder tls_handshake_data fields for smaller size, tweak comments

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Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux@googlemail.com>
This commit is contained in:
Denys Vlasenko 2017-01-23 16:37:04 +01:00
parent b5bf1913d3
commit 7a18b9502a
1 changed files with 9 additions and 16 deletions
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25
networking/tls.c
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@ -112,7 +112,7 @@
#define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC029 /* 49193 */
#define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC02A /* 49194 */
// RFC 5288 "AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM) Cipher Suites for TLS"
/* RFC 5288 "AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM) Cipher Suites for TLS" */
#define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0x009C /* 156 */
#define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0x009D /* 157 */
#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC02B /* 49195 */
@ -125,16 +125,13 @@
#define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC032 /* 49202 */
//Tested against kernel.org:
//TLS 1.1
//#define TLS_MAJ 3
//#define TLS_MIN 2
//#define CIPHER_ID TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA // ok, recvs SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
//TLS 1.2
#define TLS_MAJ 3
#define TLS_MIN 3
//#define CIPHER_ID TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA // ok, recvs SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE *** matrixssl uses this on my box
//#define CIPHER_ID TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 // ok, no SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
// All GCMs:
//#define CIPHER_ID TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA // SSL_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
//^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ (tested b/c this one doesn't req server certs... no luck, server refuses it)
//#define CIPHER_ID TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 // SSL_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
//#define CIPHER_ID TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 // SSL_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
//#define CIPHER_ID TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 // ok, recvs SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
@ -145,9 +142,6 @@
//#define CIPHER_ID TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 // SSL_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
//#define CIPHER_ID TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 // ok, no SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
//#define CIPHER_ID TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 // ok, no SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE *** select this?
//#define CIPHER_ID TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA // SSL_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
//^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ (tested b/c this one doesn't req server certs... no luck)
//test TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, in TLS 1.2 it's mandated to be always supported
// works against "openssl s_server -cipher NULL"
// and against wolfssl-3.9.10-stable/examples/server/server.c:
@ -163,6 +157,7 @@
// fail: openssl s_client -connect cdn.kernel.org:443 -debug -tls1_2 -no_tls1 -no_tls1_1 -cipher AES128-SHA256
// ok: openssl s_client -connect cdn.kernel.org:443 -debug -tls1_2 -no_tls1 -no_tls1_1 -cipher AES128-GCM-SHA256
// ok: openssl s_client -connect cdn.kernel.org:443 -debug -tls1_2 -no_tls1 -no_tls1_1 -cipher AES128-SHA
// (TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA - in TLS 1.2 it's mandated to be always supported)
#define CIPHER_ID TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 // no SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE from peer
enum {
@ -220,14 +215,12 @@ struct record_hdr {
};
struct tls_handshake_data {
sha256_ctx_t handshake_sha256_ctx;
uint8_t client_and_server_rand32[2 * 32];
uint8_t master_secret[48];
//TODO: store just the DER key here, parse/use/delete it when sending client key
//this way it will stay key type agnostic here.
psRsaKey_t server_rsa_pub_key;
// this is also unused after client key is sent
uint8_t client_and_server_rand32[2 * 32];
// these two are unused after finished messages are exchanged:
sha256_ctx_t handshake_sha256_ctx;
uint8_t master_secret[48];
};
@ -612,8 +605,8 @@ static void xwrite_encrypted(tls_state_t *tls, unsigned size, unsigned type)
tls_get_random(buf - AES_BLOCKSIZE, AES_BLOCKSIZE); /* IV */
dbg("before crypt: 5 hdr + %u data + %u hash bytes\n", size, SHA256_OUTSIZE);
// RFC is talking nonsense:
// Padding that is added to force the length of the plaintext to be
// an integral multiple of the block cipher's block length.
// "Padding that is added to force the length of the plaintext to be
// an integral multiple of the block cipher's block length."
// WRONG. _padding+padding_length_, not just _padding_,
// pads the data.
// IOW: padding_length is the last byte of padding[] array,