hush/libbb/obscure.c
Bartosz Golaszewski 3ed81cf052 unit-tests: implement the unit-testing framework
This set of patches adds a simple unit-testing framework to Busybox

unit-tests: add some helper macros for unit-test framework implementation
unit-tests: implement the unit-testing framework
unit-tests: add basic documentation on writing the unit test cases
unit-tests: modify the Makefile 'test' target to run unit-tests too
unit-tests: add two example test cases
unit-tests: modify the existing strrstr test code to use the unit-test framework

Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartekgola@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux@googlemail.com>
2014-06-22 16:30:41 +02:00

223 lines
5.6 KiB
C

/* vi: set sw=4 ts=4: */
/*
* Mini weak password checker implementation for busybox
*
* Copyright (C) 2006 Tito Ragusa <farmatito@tiscali.it>
*
* Licensed under GPLv2 or later, see file LICENSE in this source tree.
*/
/* A good password:
1) should contain at least six characters (man passwd);
2) empty passwords are not permitted;
3) should contain a mix of four different types of characters
upper case letters,
lower case letters,
numbers,
special characters such as !@#$%^&*,;".
This password types should not be permitted:
a) pure numbers: birthdates, social security number, license plate, phone numbers;
b) words and all letters only passwords (uppercase, lowercase or mixed)
as palindromes, consecutive or repetitive letters
or adjacent letters on your keyboard;
c) username, real name, company name or (e-mail?) address
in any form (as-is, reversed, capitalized, doubled, etc.).
(we can check only against username, gecos and hostname)
d) common and obvious letter-number replacements
(e.g. replace the letter O with number 0)
such as "M1cr0$0ft" or "P@ssw0rd" (CAVEAT: we cannot check for them
without the use of a dictionary).
For each missing type of characters an increase of password length is
requested.
If user is root we warn only.
CAVEAT: some older versions of crypt() truncates passwords to 8 chars,
so that aaaaaaaa1Q$ is equal to aaaaaaaa making it possible to fool
some of our checks. We don't test for this special case as newer versions
of crypt do not truncate passwords.
*/
#include "libbb.h"
static int string_checker_helper(const char *p1, const char *p2) __attribute__ ((__pure__));
static int string_checker_helper(const char *p1, const char *p2)
{
/* as sub-string */
if (strcasestr(p2, p1) != NULL
/* invert in case haystack is shorter than needle */
|| strcasestr(p1, p2) != NULL
/* as-is or capitalized */
/* || strcasecmp(p1, p2) == 0 - 1st strcasestr should catch this too */
) {
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
static int string_checker(const char *p1, const char *p2)
{
int size, i;
/* check string */
int ret = string_checker_helper(p1, p2);
/* make our own copy */
char *p = xstrdup(p1);
/* reverse string */
i = size = strlen(p1);
while (--i >= 0) {
*p++ = p1[i];
}
p -= size; /* restore pointer */
/* check reversed string */
ret |= string_checker_helper(p, p2);
/* clean up */
nuke_str(p);
free(p);
return ret;
}
#define CATEGORIES 4
#define LOWERCASE 1
#define UPPERCASE 2
#define NUMBERS 4
#define SPECIAL 8
#define LAST_CAT 8
static const char *obscure_msg(const char *old_p, const char *new_p, const struct passwd *pw)
{
unsigned length;
unsigned size;
unsigned mixed;
unsigned c;
unsigned i;
const char *p;
char *hostname;
/* size */
if (!new_p || (length = strlen(new_p)) < CONFIG_PASSWORD_MINLEN)
return "too short";
/* no username as-is, as sub-string, reversed, capitalized, doubled */
if (string_checker(new_p, pw->pw_name)) {
return "similar to username";
}
#ifndef __BIONIC__
/* no gecos as-is, as sub-string, reversed, capitalized, doubled */
if (pw->pw_gecos[0] && string_checker(new_p, pw->pw_gecos)) {
return "similar to gecos";
}
#endif
/* hostname as-is, as sub-string, reversed, capitalized, doubled */
hostname = safe_gethostname();
i = string_checker(new_p, hostname);
free(hostname);
if (i)
return "similar to hostname";
/* Should / Must contain a mix of: */
mixed = 0;
for (i = 0; i < length; i++) {
if (islower(new_p[i])) { /* a-z */
mixed |= LOWERCASE;
} else if (isupper(new_p[i])) { /* A-Z */
mixed |= UPPERCASE;
} else if (isdigit(new_p[i])) { /* 0-9 */
mixed |= NUMBERS;
} else { /* special characters */
mixed |= SPECIAL;
}
/* Count i'th char */
c = 0;
p = new_p;
while (1) {
p = strchr(p, new_p[i]);
if (p == NULL) {
break;
}
c++;
p++;
if (!*p) {
break;
}
}
/* More than 50% similar characters ? */
if (c*2 >= length) {
return "too many similar characters";
}
}
size = CONFIG_PASSWORD_MINLEN + 2*CATEGORIES;
for (i = 1; i <= LAST_CAT; i <<= 1)
if (mixed & i)
size -= 2;
if (length < size)
return "too weak";
if (old_p && old_p[0]) {
/* check vs. old password */
if (string_checker(new_p, old_p)) {
return "similar to old password";
}
}
return NULL;
}
int FAST_FUNC obscure(const char *old, const char *newval, const struct passwd *pw)
{
const char *msg;
msg = obscure_msg(old, newval, pw);
if (msg) {
printf("Bad password: %s\n", msg);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
#if ENABLE_UNIT_TEST
/* Test obscure_msg() instead of obscure() in order not to print anything. */
static const struct passwd pw = {
.pw_name = (char *)"johndoe",
.pw_gecos = (char *)"John Doe",
};
BBUNIT_DEFINE_TEST(obscure_weak_pass)
{
/* Empty password */
BBUNIT_ASSERT_NOTNULL(obscure_msg("Ad4#21?'S|", "", &pw));
/* Pure numbers */
BBUNIT_ASSERT_NOTNULL(obscure_msg("Ad4#21?'S|", "23577315", &pw));
/* Similar to pw_name */
BBUNIT_ASSERT_NOTNULL(obscure_msg("Ad4#21?'S|", "johndoe123%", &pw));
/* Similar to pw_gecos, reversed */
BBUNIT_ASSERT_NOTNULL(obscure_msg("Ad4#21?'S|", "eoD nhoJ^44@", &pw));
/* Similar to the old password */
BBUNIT_ASSERT_NOTNULL(obscure_msg("Ad4#21?'S|", "d4#21?'S", &pw));
/* adjacent letters */
BBUNIT_ASSERT_NOTNULL(obscure_msg("Ad4#21?'S|", "qwerty123", &pw));
/* Many similar chars */
BBUNIT_ASSERT_NOTNULL(obscure_msg("Ad4#21?'S|", "^33Daaaaaa1", &pw));
BBUNIT_ENDTEST;
}
BBUNIT_DEFINE_TEST(obscure_strong_pass)
{
BBUNIT_ASSERT_NULL(obscure_msg("Rt4##2&:'|", "}(^#rrSX3S*22", &pw));
BBUNIT_ENDTEST;
}
#endif /* ENABLE_UNIT_TEST */