Macintosh-SW
/
tenfourfox
mirror of https://github.com/classilla/tenfourfox.git
1
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Projects Releases Wiki Activity
tenfourfox/security/apps/AppSignatureVerification.cpp

1537 lines
47 KiB
C++
Raw Permalink Blame History

/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
/* vim: set ts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
#include "nsNSSCertificateDB.h"
#include "AppTrustDomain.h"
#include "base64.h"
#include "certdb.h"
#include "CryptoTask.h"
#include "mozilla/RefPtr.h"
#include "mozilla/UniquePtr.h"
#include "nsComponentManagerUtils.h"
#include "nsCOMPtr.h"
#include "nsDataSignatureVerifier.h"
#include "nsHashKeys.h"
#include "nsIFile.h"
#include "nsIFileStreams.h"
#include "nsIInputStream.h"
#include "nsIStringEnumerator.h"
#include "nsIDirectoryEnumerator.h"
#include "nsIZipReader.h"
#include "nsNetUtil.h"
#include "nsNSSCertificate.h"
#include "nsProxyRelease.h"
#include "nssb64.h"
#include "NSSCertDBTrustDomain.h"
#include "nsString.h"
#include "nsTHashtable.h"
#include "plstr.h"
#include "mozilla/Logging.h"
#include "pkix/pkix.h"
#include "pkix/pkixnss.h"
#include "secmime.h"
using namespace mozilla::pkix;
using namespace mozilla;
using namespace mozilla::psm;
extern PRLogModuleInfo* gPIPNSSLog;
namespace {
// Reads a maximum of 1MB from a stream into the supplied buffer.
// The reason for the 1MB limit is because this function is used to read
// signature-related files and we want to avoid OOM. The uncompressed length of
// an entry can be hundreds of times larger than the compressed version,
// especially if someone has specifically crafted the entry to cause OOM or to
// consume massive amounts of disk space.
//
// @param stream The input stream to read from.
// @param buf The buffer that we read the stream into, which must have
// already been allocated.
nsresult
ReadStream(const nsCOMPtr<nsIInputStream>& stream, /*out*/ SECItem& buf)
{
// The size returned by Available() might be inaccurate so we need
// to check that Available() matches up with the actual length of
// the file.
uint64_t length;
nsresult rv = stream->Available(&length);
if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
return rv;
}
// Cap the maximum accepted size of signature-related files at 1MB (which is
// still crazily huge) to avoid OOM. The uncompressed length of an entry can be
// hundreds of times larger than the compressed version, especially if
// someone has speifically crafted the entry to cause OOM or to consume
// massive amounts of disk space.
static const uint32_t MAX_LENGTH = 1024 * 1024;
if (length > MAX_LENGTH) {
return NS_ERROR_FILE_TOO_BIG;
}
// With bug 164695 in mind we +1 to leave room for null-terminating
// the buffer.
SECITEM_AllocItem(buf, static_cast<uint32_t>(length + 1));
// buf.len == length + 1. We attempt to read length + 1 bytes
// instead of length, so that we can check whether the metadata for
// the entry is incorrect.
uint32_t bytesRead;
rv = stream->Read(char_ptr_cast(buf.data), buf.len, &bytesRead);
if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
return rv;
}
if (bytesRead != length) {
return NS_ERROR_FILE_CORRUPTED;
}
buf.data[buf.len - 1] = 0; // null-terminate
return NS_OK;
}
// Finds exactly one (signature metadata) JAR entry that matches the given
// search pattern, and then load it. Fails if there are no matches or if
// there is more than one match. If bugDigest is not null then on success
// bufDigest will contain the SHA-1 digeset of the entry.
nsresult
FindAndLoadOneEntry(nsIZipReader * zip,
const nsACString & searchPattern,
/*out*/ nsACString & filename,
/*out*/ SECItem & buf,
/*optional, out*/ Digest * bufDigest)
{
nsCOMPtr<nsIUTF8StringEnumerator> files;
nsresult rv = zip->FindEntries(searchPattern, getter_AddRefs(files));
if (NS_FAILED(rv) || !files) {
return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
}
bool more;
rv = files->HasMore(&more);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
if (!more) {
return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
}
rv = files->GetNext(filename);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
// Check if there is more than one match, if so then error!
rv = files->HasMore(&more);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
if (more) {
return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
}
nsCOMPtr<nsIInputStream> stream;
rv = zip->GetInputStream(filename, getter_AddRefs(stream));
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
rv = ReadStream(stream, buf);
if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_ENTRY_INVALID;
}
if (bufDigest) {
rv = bufDigest->DigestBuf(SEC_OID_SHA1, buf.data, buf.len - 1);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
}
return NS_OK;
}
// Verify the digest of an entry. We avoid loading the entire entry into memory
// at once, which would require memory in proportion to the size of the largest
// entry. Instead, we require only a small, fixed amount of memory.
//
// @param stream an input stream from a JAR entry or file depending on whether
// it is from a signed archive or unpacked into a directory
// @param digestFromManifest The digest that we're supposed to check the file's
// contents against, from the manifest
// @param buf A scratch buffer that we use for doing the I/O, which must have
// already been allocated. The size of this buffer is the unit
// size of our I/O.
nsresult
VerifyStreamContentDigest(nsIInputStream* stream,
const SECItem& digestFromManifest, SECItem& buf)
{
MOZ_ASSERT(buf.len > 0);
if (digestFromManifest.len != SHA1_LENGTH)
return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
nsresult rv;
uint64_t len64;
rv = stream->Available(&len64);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
if (len64 > UINT32_MAX) {
return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_ENTRY_TOO_LARGE;
}
ScopedPK11Context digestContext(PK11_CreateDigestContext(SEC_OID_SHA1));
if (!digestContext) {
return mozilla::psm::GetXPCOMFromNSSError(PR_GetError());
}
rv = MapSECStatus(PK11_DigestBegin(digestContext));
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
uint64_t totalBytesRead = 0;
for (;;) {
uint32_t bytesRead;
rv = stream->Read(char_ptr_cast(buf.data), buf.len, &bytesRead);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
if (bytesRead == 0) {
break; // EOF
}
totalBytesRead += bytesRead;
if (totalBytesRead >= UINT32_MAX) {
return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_ENTRY_TOO_LARGE;
}
rv = MapSECStatus(PK11_DigestOp(digestContext, buf.data, bytesRead));
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
}
if (totalBytesRead != len64) {
// The metadata we used for Available() doesn't match the actual size of
// the entry.
return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_ENTRY_INVALID;
}
// Verify that the digests match.
Digest digest;
rv = digest.End(SEC_OID_SHA1, digestContext);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
if (SECITEM_CompareItem(&digestFromManifest, &digest.get()) != SECEqual) {
return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MODIFIED_ENTRY;
}
return NS_OK;
}
nsresult
VerifyEntryContentDigest(nsIZipReader* zip, const nsACString& aFilename,
const SECItem& digestFromManifest, SECItem& buf)
{
nsCOMPtr<nsIInputStream> stream;
nsresult rv = zip->GetInputStream(aFilename, getter_AddRefs(stream));
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_ENTRY_MISSING;
}
return VerifyStreamContentDigest(stream, digestFromManifest, buf);
}
// @oaram aDir directory containing the unpacked signed archive
// @param aFilename path of the target file relative to aDir
// @param digestFromManifest The digest that we're supposed to check the file's
// contents against, from the manifest
// @param buf A scratch buffer that we use for doing the I/O
nsresult
VerifyFileContentDigest(nsIFile* aDir, const nsAString& aFilename,
const SECItem& digestFromManifest, SECItem& buf)
{
// Find the file corresponding to the manifest path
nsCOMPtr<nsIFile> file;
nsresult rv = aDir->Clone(getter_AddRefs(file));
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
// We don't know how to handle JARs with signed directory entries.
// It's technically possible in the manifest but makes no sense on disk.
// Inside an archive we just ignore them, but here we have to treat it
// as an error because the signed bytes never got unpacked.
int32_t pos = 0;
int32_t slash;
int32_t namelen = aFilename.Length();
if (namelen == 0 || aFilename[namelen - 1] == '/') {
return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_ENTRY_INVALID;
}
// Append path segments one by one
do {
slash = aFilename.FindChar('/', pos);
int32_t segend = (slash == kNotFound) ? namelen : slash;
rv = file->Append(Substring(aFilename, pos, (segend - pos)));
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_ENTRY_INVALID;
}
pos = slash + 1;
} while (pos < namelen && slash != kNotFound);
bool exists;
rv = file->Exists(&exists);
if (NS_FAILED(rv) || !exists) {
return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_ENTRY_MISSING;
}
bool isDir;
rv = file->IsDirectory(&isDir);
if (NS_FAILED(rv) || isDir) {
// We only support signed files, not directory entries
return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_ENTRY_INVALID;
}
// Open an input stream for that file and verify it.
nsCOMPtr<nsIInputStream> stream;
rv = NS_NewLocalFileInputStream(getter_AddRefs(stream), file, -1, -1,
nsIFileInputStream::CLOSE_ON_EOF);
if (NS_FAILED(rv) || !stream) {
return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_ENTRY_MISSING;
}
return VerifyStreamContentDigest(stream, digestFromManifest, buf);
}
// On input, nextLineStart is the start of the current line. On output,
// nextLineStart is the start of the next line.
nsresult
ReadLine(/*in/out*/ const char* & nextLineStart, /*out*/ nsCString & line,
bool allowContinuations = true)
{
line.Truncate();
size_t previousLength = 0;
size_t currentLength = 0;
for (;;) {
const char* eol = PL_strpbrk(nextLineStart, "\r\n");
if (!eol) { // Reached end of file before newline
eol = nextLineStart + strlen(nextLineStart);
}
previousLength = currentLength;
line.Append(nextLineStart, eol - nextLineStart);
currentLength = line.Length();
// The spec says "No line may be longer than 72 bytes (not characters)"
// in its UTF8-encoded form.
static const size_t lineLimit = 72;
if (currentLength - previousLength > lineLimit) {
return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
}
// The spec says: "Implementations should support 65535-byte
// (not character) header values..."
if (currentLength > 65535) {
return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
}
if (*eol == '\r') {
++eol;
}
if (*eol == '\n') {
++eol;
}
nextLineStart = eol;
if (*eol != ' ') {
// not a continuation
return NS_OK;
}
// continuation
if (!allowContinuations) {
return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
}
++nextLineStart; // skip space and keep appending
}
}
// The header strings are defined in the JAR specification.
#define JAR_MF_SEARCH_STRING "(M|/M)ETA-INF/(M|m)(ANIFEST|anifest).(MF|mf)$"
#define JAR_SF_SEARCH_STRING "(M|/M)ETA-INF/*.(SF|sf)$"
#define JAR_RSA_SEARCH_STRING "(M|/M)ETA-INF/*.(RSA|rsa)$"
#define JAR_META_DIR "META-INF"
#define JAR_MF_HEADER "Manifest-Version: 1.0"
#define JAR_SF_HEADER "Signature-Version: 1.0"
nsresult
ParseAttribute(const nsAutoCString & curLine,
/*out*/ nsAutoCString & attrName,
/*out*/ nsAutoCString & attrValue)
{
// Find the colon that separates the name from the value.
int32_t colonPos = curLine.FindChar(':');
if (colonPos == kNotFound) {
return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
}
// set attrName to the name, skipping spaces between the name and colon
int32_t nameEnd = colonPos;
for (;;) {
if (nameEnd == 0) {
return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID; // colon with no name
}
if (curLine[nameEnd - 1] != ' ')
break;
--nameEnd;
}
curLine.Left(attrName, nameEnd);
// Set attrValue to the value, skipping spaces between the colon and the
// value. The value may be empty.
int32_t valueStart = colonPos + 1;
int32_t curLineLength = curLine.Length();
while (valueStart != curLineLength && curLine[valueStart] == ' ') {
++valueStart;
}
curLine.Right(attrValue, curLineLength - valueStart);
return NS_OK;
}
// Parses the version line of the MF or SF header.
nsresult
CheckManifestVersion(const char* & nextLineStart,
const nsACString & expectedHeader)
{
// The JAR spec says: "Manifest-Version and Signature-Version must be first,
// and in exactly that case (so that they can be recognized easily as magic
// strings)."
nsAutoCString curLine;
nsresult rv = ReadLine(nextLineStart, curLine, false);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
if (!curLine.Equals(expectedHeader)) {
return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
}
return NS_OK;
}
// Parses a signature file (SF) as defined in the JDK 8 JAR Specification.
//
// The SF file *must* contain exactly one SHA1-Digest-Manifest attribute in
// the main section. All other sections are ignored. This means that this will
// NOT parse old-style signature files that have separate digests per entry.
// The JDK8 x-Digest-Manifest variant is better because:
//
// (1) It allows us to follow the principle that we should minimize the
// processing of data that we do before we verify its signature. In
// particular, with the x-Digest-Manifest style, we can verify the digest
// of MANIFEST.MF before we parse it, which prevents malicious JARs
// exploiting our MANIFEST.MF parser.
// (2) It is more time-efficient and space-efficient to have one
// x-Digest-Manifest instead of multiple x-Digest values.
//
// In order to get benefit (1), we do NOT implement the fallback to the older
// mechanism as the spec requires/suggests. Also, for simplity's sake, we only
// support exactly one SHA1-Digest-Manifest attribute, and no other
// algorithms.
//
// filebuf must be null-terminated. On output, mfDigest will contain the
// decoded value of SHA1-Digest-Manifest.
nsresult
ParseSF(const char* filebuf, /*out*/ SECItem & mfDigest)
{
nsresult rv;
const char* nextLineStart = filebuf;
rv = CheckManifestVersion(nextLineStart, NS_LITERAL_CSTRING(JAR_SF_HEADER));
if (NS_FAILED(rv))
return rv;
// Find SHA1-Digest-Manifest
for (;;) {
nsAutoCString curLine;
rv = ReadLine(nextLineStart, curLine);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
if (curLine.Length() == 0) {
// End of main section (blank line or end-of-file), and no
// SHA1-Digest-Manifest found.
return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
}
nsAutoCString attrName;
nsAutoCString attrValue;
rv = ParseAttribute(curLine, attrName, attrValue);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
if (attrName.LowerCaseEqualsLiteral("sha1-digest-manifest")) {
rv = MapSECStatus(ATOB_ConvertAsciiToItem(&mfDigest, attrValue.get()));
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
// There could be multiple SHA1-Digest-Manifest attributes, which
// would be an error, but it's better to just skip any erroneous
// duplicate entries rather than trying to detect them, because:
//
// (1) It's simpler, and simpler generally means more secure
// (2) An attacker can't make us accept a JAR we would otherwise
// reject just by adding additional SHA1-Digest-Manifest
// attributes.
break;
}
// ignore unrecognized attributes
}
return NS_OK;
}
// Parses MANIFEST.MF. The filenames of all entries will be returned in
// mfItems. buf must be a pre-allocated scratch buffer that is used for doing
// I/O.
nsresult
ParseMF(const char* filebuf, nsIZipReader * zip,
/*out*/ nsTHashtable<nsCStringHashKey> & mfItems,
ScopedAutoSECItem & buf)
{
nsresult rv;
const char* nextLineStart = filebuf;
rv = CheckManifestVersion(nextLineStart, NS_LITERAL_CSTRING(JAR_MF_HEADER));
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
// Skip the rest of the header section, which ends with a blank line.
{
nsAutoCString line;
do {
rv = ReadLine(nextLineStart, line);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
} while (line.Length() > 0);
// Manifest containing no file entries is OK, though useless.
if (*nextLineStart == '\0') {
return NS_OK;
}
}
nsAutoCString curItemName;
ScopedAutoSECItem digest;
for (;;) {
nsAutoCString curLine;
rv = ReadLine(nextLineStart, curLine);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
if (curLine.Length() == 0) {
// end of section (blank line or end-of-file)
if (curItemName.Length() == 0) {
// '...Each section must start with an attribute with the name as
// "Name",...', so every section must have a Name attribute.
return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
}
if (digest.len == 0) {
// We require every entry to have a digest, since we require every
// entry to be signed and we don't allow duplicate entries.
return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
}
if (mfItems.Contains(curItemName)) {
// Duplicate entry
return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
}
// Verify that the entry's content digest matches the digest from this
// MF section.
rv = VerifyEntryContentDigest(zip, curItemName, digest, buf);
if (NS_FAILED(rv))
return rv;
mfItems.PutEntry(curItemName);
if (*nextLineStart == '\0') // end-of-file
break;
// reset so we know we haven't encountered either of these for the next
// item yet.
curItemName.Truncate();
digest.reset();
continue; // skip the rest of the loop below
}
nsAutoCString attrName;
nsAutoCString attrValue;
rv = ParseAttribute(curLine, attrName, attrValue);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
// Lines to look for:
// (1) Digest:
if (attrName.LowerCaseEqualsLiteral("sha1-digest"))
{
if (digest.len > 0) // multiple SHA1 digests in section
return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
rv = MapSECStatus(ATOB_ConvertAsciiToItem(&digest, attrValue.get()));
if (NS_FAILED(rv))
return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
continue;
}
// (2) Name: associates this manifest section with a file in the jar.
if (attrName.LowerCaseEqualsLiteral("name"))
{
if (MOZ_UNLIKELY(curItemName.Length() > 0)) // multiple names in section
return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
if (MOZ_UNLIKELY(attrValue.Length() == 0))
return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
curItemName = attrValue;
continue;
}
// (3) Magic: the only other must-understand attribute
if (attrName.LowerCaseEqualsLiteral("magic")) {
// We don't understand any magic, so we can't verify an entry that
// requires magic. Since we require every entry to have a valid
// signature, we have no choice but to reject the entry.
return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
}
// unrecognized attributes must be ignored
}
return NS_OK;
}
struct VerifyCertificateContext {
AppTrustedRoot trustedRoot;
ScopedCERTCertList& builtChain;
};
nsresult
VerifyCertificate(CERTCertificate* signerCert, void* voidContext, void* pinArg)
{
// TODO: null pinArg is tolerated.
if (NS_WARN_IF(!signerCert) || NS_WARN_IF(!voidContext)) {
return NS_ERROR_INVALID_ARG;
}
const VerifyCertificateContext& context =
*reinterpret_cast<const VerifyCertificateContext*>(voidContext);
AppTrustDomain trustDomain(context.builtChain, pinArg);
if (trustDomain.SetTrustedRoot(context.trustedRoot) != SECSuccess) {
return MapSECStatus(SECFailure);
}
Input certDER;
Result rv = certDER.Init(signerCert->derCert.data, signerCert->derCert.len);
if (rv != Success) {
return mozilla::psm::GetXPCOMFromNSSError(MapResultToPRErrorCode(rv));
}
rv = BuildCertChain(trustDomain, certDER, Now(),
EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity,
KeyUsage::digitalSignature,
KeyPurposeId::id_kp_codeSigning,
CertPolicyId::anyPolicy,
nullptr/*stapledOCSPResponse*/);
if (rv == Result::ERROR_EXPIRED_CERTIFICATE) {
// For code-signing you normally need trusted 3rd-party timestamps to
// handle expiration properly. The signer could always mess with their
// system clock so you can't trust the certificate was un-expired when
// the signing took place. The choice is either to ignore expiration
// or to enforce expiration at time of use. The latter leads to the
// user-hostile result that perfectly good code stops working.
//
// Our package format doesn't support timestamps (nor do we have a
// trusted 3rd party timestamper), but since we sign all of our apps and
// add-ons ourselves we can trust ourselves not to mess with the clock
// on the signing systems. We also have a revocation mechanism if we
// need it. It's OK to ignore cert expiration under these conditions.
//
// This is an invalid approach if
// * we issue certs to let others sign their own packages
// * mozilla::pkix returns "expired" when there are "worse" problems
// with the certificate or chain.
// (see bug 1267318)
rv = Success;
}
if (rv != Success) {
return mozilla::psm::GetXPCOMFromNSSError(MapResultToPRErrorCode(rv));
}
return NS_OK;
}
nsresult
VerifySignature(AppTrustedRoot trustedRoot, const SECItem& buffer,
const SECItem& detachedDigest,
/*out*/ ScopedCERTCertList& builtChain)
{
VerifyCertificateContext context = { trustedRoot, builtChain };
// XXX: missing pinArg
return VerifyCMSDetachedSignatureIncludingCertificate(buffer, detachedDigest,
VerifyCertificate,
&context, nullptr);
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
OpenSignedAppFile(AppTrustedRoot aTrustedRoot, nsIFile* aJarFile,
/*out, optional */ nsIZipReader** aZipReader,
/*out, optional */ nsIX509Cert** aSignerCert)
{
NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aJarFile);
if (aZipReader) {
*aZipReader = nullptr;
}
if (aSignerCert) {
*aSignerCert = nullptr;
}
nsresult rv;
static NS_DEFINE_CID(kZipReaderCID, NS_ZIPREADER_CID);
nsCOMPtr<nsIZipReader> zip = do_CreateInstance(kZipReaderCID, &rv);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
rv = zip->Open(aJarFile);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
// Signature (RSA) file
nsAutoCString sigFilename;
ScopedAutoSECItem sigBuffer;
rv = FindAndLoadOneEntry(zip, nsLiteralCString(JAR_RSA_SEARCH_STRING),
sigFilename, sigBuffer, nullptr);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_NOT_SIGNED;
}
// Signature (SF) file
nsAutoCString sfFilename;
ScopedAutoSECItem sfBuffer;
Digest sfCalculatedDigest;
rv = FindAndLoadOneEntry(zip, NS_LITERAL_CSTRING(JAR_SF_SEARCH_STRING),
sfFilename, sfBuffer, &sfCalculatedDigest);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
}
sigBuffer.type = siBuffer;
ScopedCERTCertList builtChain;
rv = VerifySignature(aTrustedRoot, sigBuffer, sfCalculatedDigest.get(),
builtChain);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
ScopedAutoSECItem mfDigest;
rv = ParseSF(char_ptr_cast(sfBuffer.data), mfDigest);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
// Manifest (MF) file
nsAutoCString mfFilename;
ScopedAutoSECItem manifestBuffer;
Digest mfCalculatedDigest;
rv = FindAndLoadOneEntry(zip, NS_LITERAL_CSTRING(JAR_MF_SEARCH_STRING),
mfFilename, manifestBuffer, &mfCalculatedDigest);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
if (SECITEM_CompareItem(&mfDigest, &mfCalculatedDigest.get()) != SECEqual) {
return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
}
// Allocate the I/O buffer only once per JAR, instead of once per entry, in
// order to minimize malloc/free calls and in order to avoid fragmenting
// memory.
ScopedAutoSECItem buf(128 * 1024);
nsTHashtable<nsCStringHashKey> items;
rv = ParseMF(char_ptr_cast(manifestBuffer.data), zip, items, buf);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
// Verify every entry in the file.
nsCOMPtr<nsIUTF8StringEnumerator> entries;
rv = zip->FindEntries(EmptyCString(), getter_AddRefs(entries));
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && !entries) {
rv = NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
}
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
for (;;) {
bool hasMore;
rv = entries->HasMore(&hasMore);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
if (!hasMore) {
break;
}
nsAutoCString entryFilename;
rv = entries->GetNext(entryFilename);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug, ("Verifying digests for %s",
entryFilename.get()));
// The files that comprise the signature mechanism are not covered by the
// signature.
//
// XXX: This is OK for a single signature, but doesn't work for
// multiple signatures, because the metadata for the other signatures
// is not signed either.
if (entryFilename == mfFilename ||
entryFilename == sfFilename ||
entryFilename == sigFilename) {
continue;
}
if (entryFilename.Length() == 0) {
return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_ENTRY_INVALID;
}
// Entries with names that end in "/" are directory entries, which are not
// signed.
//
// XXX: As long as we don't unpack the JAR into the filesystem, the "/"
// entries are harmless. But, it is not clear what the security
// implications of directory entries are if/when we were to unpackage the
// JAR into the filesystem.
if (entryFilename[entryFilename.Length() - 1] == '/') {
continue;
}
nsCStringHashKey * item = items.GetEntry(entryFilename);
if (!item) {
return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_UNSIGNED_ENTRY;
}
// Remove the item so we can check for leftover items later
items.RemoveEntry(item);
}
// We verified that every entry that we require to be signed is signed. But,
// were there any missing entries--that is, entries that are mentioned in the
// manifest but missing from the archive?
if (items.Count() != 0) {
return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_ENTRY_MISSING;
}
// Return the reader to the caller if they want it
if (aZipReader) {
zip.forget(aZipReader);
}
// Return the signer's certificate to the reader if they want it.
// XXX: We should return an nsIX509CertList with the whole validated chain.
if (aSignerCert) {
MOZ_ASSERT(CERT_LIST_HEAD(builtChain));
nsCOMPtr<nsIX509Cert> signerCert =
nsNSSCertificate::Create(CERT_LIST_HEAD(builtChain)->cert);
NS_ENSURE_TRUE(signerCert, NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
signerCert.forget(aSignerCert);
}
return NS_OK;
}
nsresult
VerifySignedManifest(AppTrustedRoot aTrustedRoot,
nsIInputStream* aManifestStream,
nsIInputStream* aSignatureStream,
/*out, optional */ nsIX509Cert** aSignerCert)
{
NS_ENSURE_ARG(aManifestStream);
NS_ENSURE_ARG(aSignatureStream);
if (aSignerCert) {
*aSignerCert = nullptr;
}
// Load signature file in buffer
ScopedAutoSECItem signatureBuffer;
nsresult rv = ReadStream(aSignatureStream, signatureBuffer);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
signatureBuffer.type = siBuffer;
// Load manifest file in buffer
ScopedAutoSECItem manifestBuffer;
rv = ReadStream(aManifestStream, manifestBuffer);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
// Calculate SHA1 digest of the manifest buffer
Digest manifestCalculatedDigest;
rv = manifestCalculatedDigest.DigestBuf(SEC_OID_SHA1,
manifestBuffer.data,
manifestBuffer.len - 1); // buffer is null terminated
if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
return rv;
}
// Get base64 encoded string from manifest buffer digest
UniquePtr<char, void(&)(void*)>
base64EncDigest(NSSBase64_EncodeItem(nullptr, nullptr, 0,
const_cast<SECItem*>(&manifestCalculatedDigest.get())),
PORT_Free);
if (NS_WARN_IF(!base64EncDigest)) {
return NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
}
// Calculate SHA1 digest of the base64 encoded string
Digest doubleDigest;
rv = doubleDigest.DigestBuf(SEC_OID_SHA1,
reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(base64EncDigest.get()),
strlen(base64EncDigest.get()));
if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
return rv;
}
// Verify the manifest signature (signed digest of the base64 encoded string)
ScopedCERTCertList builtChain;
rv = VerifySignature(aTrustedRoot, signatureBuffer,
doubleDigest.get(), builtChain);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
// Return the signer's certificate to the reader if they want it.
if (aSignerCert) {
MOZ_ASSERT(CERT_LIST_HEAD(builtChain));
nsCOMPtr<nsIX509Cert> signerCert =
nsNSSCertificate::Create(CERT_LIST_HEAD(builtChain)->cert);
if (NS_WARN_IF(!signerCert)) {
return NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
}
signerCert.forget(aSignerCert);
}
return NS_OK;
}
class OpenSignedAppFileTask final : public CryptoTask
{
public:
OpenSignedAppFileTask(AppTrustedRoot aTrustedRoot, nsIFile* aJarFile,
nsIOpenSignedAppFileCallback* aCallback)
: mTrustedRoot(aTrustedRoot)
, mJarFile(aJarFile)
, mCallback(new nsMainThreadPtrHolder<nsIOpenSignedAppFileCallback>(aCallback))
{
}
private:
virtual nsresult CalculateResult() override
{
return OpenSignedAppFile(mTrustedRoot, mJarFile,
getter_AddRefs(mZipReader),
getter_AddRefs(mSignerCert));
}
// nsNSSCertificate implements nsNSSShutdownObject, so there's nothing that
// needs to be released
virtual void ReleaseNSSResources() override { }
virtual void CallCallback(nsresult rv) override
{
(void) mCallback->OpenSignedAppFileFinished(rv, mZipReader, mSignerCert);
}
const AppTrustedRoot mTrustedRoot;
const nsCOMPtr<nsIFile> mJarFile;
nsMainThreadPtrHandle<nsIOpenSignedAppFileCallback> mCallback;
nsCOMPtr<nsIZipReader> mZipReader; // out
nsCOMPtr<nsIX509Cert> mSignerCert; // out
};
class VerifySignedmanifestTask final : public CryptoTask
{
public:
VerifySignedmanifestTask(AppTrustedRoot aTrustedRoot,
nsIInputStream* aManifestStream,
nsIInputStream* aSignatureStream,
nsIVerifySignedManifestCallback* aCallback)
: mTrustedRoot(aTrustedRoot)
, mManifestStream(aManifestStream)
, mSignatureStream(aSignatureStream)
, mCallback(
new nsMainThreadPtrHolder<nsIVerifySignedManifestCallback>(aCallback))
{
}
private:
virtual nsresult CalculateResult() override
{
return VerifySignedManifest(mTrustedRoot, mManifestStream,
mSignatureStream, getter_AddRefs(mSignerCert));
}
// nsNSSCertificate implements nsNSSShutdownObject, so there's nothing that
// needs to be released
virtual void ReleaseNSSResources() override { }
virtual void CallCallback(nsresult rv) override
{
(void) mCallback->VerifySignedManifestFinished(rv, mSignerCert);
}
const AppTrustedRoot mTrustedRoot;
const nsCOMPtr<nsIInputStream> mManifestStream;
const nsCOMPtr<nsIInputStream> mSignatureStream;
nsMainThreadPtrHandle<nsIVerifySignedManifestCallback> mCallback;
nsCOMPtr<nsIX509Cert> mSignerCert; // out
};
} // unnamed namespace
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsNSSCertificateDB::OpenSignedAppFileAsync(
AppTrustedRoot aTrustedRoot, nsIFile* aJarFile,
nsIOpenSignedAppFileCallback* aCallback)
{
NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aJarFile);
NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aCallback);
RefPtr<OpenSignedAppFileTask> task(new OpenSignedAppFileTask(aTrustedRoot,
aJarFile,
aCallback));
return task->Dispatch("SignedJAR");
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsNSSCertificateDB::VerifySignedManifestAsync(
AppTrustedRoot aTrustedRoot, nsIInputStream* aManifestStream,
nsIInputStream* aSignatureStream, nsIVerifySignedManifestCallback* aCallback)
{
NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aManifestStream);
NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aSignatureStream);
NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aCallback);
RefPtr<VerifySignedmanifestTask> task(
new VerifySignedmanifestTask(aTrustedRoot, aManifestStream,
aSignatureStream, aCallback));
return task->Dispatch("SignedManifest");
}
//
// Signature verification for archives unpacked into a file structure
//
// Finds the "*.rsa" signature file in the META-INF directory and returns
// the name. It is an error if there are none or more than one .rsa file
nsresult
FindSignatureFilename(nsIFile* aMetaDir,
/*out*/ nsAString& aFilename)
{
nsCOMPtr<nsISimpleEnumerator> entries;
nsresult rv = aMetaDir->GetDirectoryEntries(getter_AddRefs(entries));
nsCOMPtr<nsIDirectoryEnumerator> files = do_QueryInterface(entries);
if (NS_FAILED(rv) || !files) {
return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_NOT_SIGNED;
}
bool found = false;
nsCOMPtr<nsIFile> file;
rv = files->GetNextFile(getter_AddRefs(file));
while (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && file) {
nsAutoString leafname;
rv = file->GetLeafName(leafname);
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
if (StringEndsWith(leafname, NS_LITERAL_STRING(".rsa"))) {
if (!found) {
found = true;
aFilename = leafname;
} else {
// second signature file is an error
rv = NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
break;
}
}
rv = files->GetNextFile(getter_AddRefs(file));
}
}
if (!found) {
rv = NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_NOT_SIGNED;
}
files->Close();
return rv;
}
// Loads the signature metadata file that matches the given filename in
// the passed-in Meta-inf directory. If bufDigest is not null then on
// success bufDigest will contain the SHA-1 digest of the entry.
nsresult
LoadOneMetafile(nsIFile* aMetaDir,
const nsAString& aFilename,
/*out*/ SECItem& aBuf,
/*optional, out*/ Digest* aBufDigest)
{
nsCOMPtr<nsIFile> metafile;
nsresult rv = aMetaDir->Clone(getter_AddRefs(metafile));
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
rv = metafile->Append(aFilename);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
bool exists;
rv = metafile->Exists(&exists);
if (NS_FAILED(rv) || !exists) {
// we can call a missing .rsa file "unsigned" but FindSignatureFilename()
// already found one: missing other metadata files means a broken signature.
return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
}
nsCOMPtr<nsIInputStream> stream;
rv = NS_NewLocalFileInputStream(getter_AddRefs(stream), metafile);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
rv = ReadStream(stream, aBuf);
stream->Close();
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
if (aBufDigest) {
rv = aBufDigest->DigestBuf(SEC_OID_SHA1, aBuf.data, aBuf.len - 1);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
}
return NS_OK;
}
// Parses MANIFEST.MF and verifies the contents of the unpacked files
// listed in the manifest.
// The filenames of all entries will be returned in aMfItems. aBuf must
// be a pre-allocated scratch buffer that is used for doing I/O.
nsresult
ParseMFUnpacked(const char* aFilebuf, nsIFile* aDir,
/*out*/ nsTHashtable<nsStringHashKey>& aMfItems,
ScopedAutoSECItem& aBuf)
{
nsresult rv;
const char* nextLineStart = aFilebuf;
rv = CheckManifestVersion(nextLineStart, NS_LITERAL_CSTRING(JAR_MF_HEADER));
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
// Skip the rest of the header section, which ends with a blank line.
{
nsAutoCString line;
do {
rv = ReadLine(nextLineStart, line);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
} while (line.Length() > 0);
// Manifest containing no file entries is OK, though useless.
if (*nextLineStart == '\0') {
return NS_OK;
}
}
nsAutoString curItemName;
ScopedAutoSECItem digest;
for (;;) {
nsAutoCString curLine;
rv = ReadLine(nextLineStart, curLine);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
if (curLine.Length() == 0) {
// end of section (blank line or end-of-file)
if (curItemName.Length() == 0) {
// '...Each section must start with an attribute with the name as
// "Name",...', so every section must have a Name attribute.
return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
}
if (digest.len == 0) {
// We require every entry to have a digest, since we require every
// entry to be signed and we don't allow duplicate entries.
return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
}
if (aMfItems.Contains(curItemName)) {
// Duplicate entry
return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
}
// Verify that the file's content digest matches the digest from this
// MF section.
rv = VerifyFileContentDigest(aDir, curItemName, digest, aBuf);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
aMfItems.PutEntry(curItemName);
if (*nextLineStart == '\0') {
// end-of-file
break;
}
// reset so we know we haven't encountered either of these for the next
// item yet.
curItemName.Truncate();
digest.reset();
continue; // skip the rest of the loop below
}
nsAutoCString attrName;
nsAutoCString attrValue;
rv = ParseAttribute(curLine, attrName, attrValue);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
// Lines to look for:
// (1) Digest:
if (attrName.LowerCaseEqualsLiteral("sha1-digest")) {
if (digest.len > 0) {
// multiple SHA1 digests in section
return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
}
rv = MapSECStatus(ATOB_ConvertAsciiToItem(&digest, attrValue.get()));
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
}
continue;
}
// (2) Name: associates this manifest section with a file in the jar.
if (attrName.LowerCaseEqualsLiteral("name")) {
if (MOZ_UNLIKELY(curItemName.Length() > 0)) {
// multiple names in section
return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
}
if (MOZ_UNLIKELY(attrValue.Length() == 0)) {
return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
}
curItemName = NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(attrValue);
continue;
}
// (3) Magic: the only other must-understand attribute
if (attrName.LowerCaseEqualsLiteral("magic")) {
// We don't understand any magic, so we can't verify an entry that
// requires magic. Since we require every entry to have a valid
// signature, we have no choice but to reject the entry.
return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
}
// unrecognized attributes must be ignored
}
return NS_OK;
}
// recursively check a directory tree for files not in the list of
// verified files we found in the manifest. For each file we find
// Check it against the files found in the manifest. If the file wasn't
// in the manifest then it's unsigned and we can stop looking. Otherwise
// remove it from the collection so we can check leftovers later.
//
// @param aDir Directory to check
// @param aPath Relative path to that directory (to check against aItems)
// @param aItems All the files found
// @param *Filename signature files that won't be in the manifest
nsresult
CheckDirForUnsignedFiles(nsIFile* aDir,
const nsString& aPath,
/* in/out */ nsTHashtable<nsStringHashKey>& aItems,
const nsAString& sigFilename,
const nsAString& sfFilename,
const nsAString& mfFilename)
{
nsCOMPtr<nsISimpleEnumerator> entries;
nsresult rv = aDir->GetDirectoryEntries(getter_AddRefs(entries));
nsCOMPtr<nsIDirectoryEnumerator> files = do_QueryInterface(entries);
if (NS_FAILED(rv) || !files) {
return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_ENTRY_MISSING;
}
bool inMeta = StringBeginsWith(aPath, NS_LITERAL_STRING(JAR_META_DIR));
while (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIFile> file;
rv = files->GetNextFile(getter_AddRefs(file));
if (NS_FAILED(rv) || !file) {
break;
}
nsAutoString leafname;
rv = file->GetLeafName(leafname);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
nsAutoString curName(aPath + leafname);
bool isDir;
rv = file->IsDirectory(&isDir);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
// if it's a directory we need to recurse
if (isDir) {
curName.Append(NS_LITERAL_STRING("/"));
rv = CheckDirForUnsignedFiles(file, curName, aItems,
sigFilename, sfFilename, mfFilename);
} else {
// The files that comprise the signature mechanism are not covered by the
// signature.
//
// XXX: This is OK for a single signature, but doesn't work for
// multiple signatures because the metadata for the other signatures
// is not signed either.
if (inMeta && ( leafname == sigFilename ||
leafname == sfFilename ||
leafname == mfFilename )) {
continue;
}
// make sure the current file was found in the manifest
nsStringHashKey* item = aItems.GetEntry(curName);
if (!item) {
return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_UNSIGNED_ENTRY;
}
// Remove the item so we can check for leftover items later
aItems.RemoveEntry(item);
}
}
files->Close();
return rv;
}
/*
* Verify the signature of a directory structure as if it were a
* signed JAR file (used for unpacked JARs)
*/
nsresult
VerifySignedDirectory(AppTrustedRoot aTrustedRoot,
nsIFile* aDirectory,
/*out, optional */ nsIX509Cert** aSignerCert)
{
NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aDirectory);
if (aSignerCert) {
*aSignerCert = nullptr;
}
// Make sure there's a META-INF directory
nsCOMPtr<nsIFile> metaDir;
nsresult rv = aDirectory->Clone(getter_AddRefs(metaDir));
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
rv = metaDir->Append(NS_LITERAL_STRING(JAR_META_DIR));
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
bool exists;
rv = metaDir->Exists(&exists);
if (NS_FAILED(rv) || !exists) {
return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_NOT_SIGNED;
}
bool isDirectory;
rv = metaDir->IsDirectory(&isDirectory);
if (NS_FAILED(rv) || !isDirectory) {
return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_NOT_SIGNED;
}
// Find and load the Signature (RSA) file
nsAutoString sigFilename;
rv = FindSignatureFilename(metaDir, sigFilename);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
ScopedAutoSECItem sigBuffer;
rv = LoadOneMetafile(metaDir, sigFilename, sigBuffer, nullptr);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_NOT_SIGNED;
}
// Load the signature (SF) file and verify the signature.
// The .sf and .rsa files must have the same name apart from the extension.
nsAutoString sfFilename(Substring(sigFilename, 0, sigFilename.Length() - 3)
+ NS_LITERAL_STRING("sf"));
ScopedAutoSECItem sfBuffer;
Digest sfCalculatedDigest;
rv = LoadOneMetafile(metaDir, sfFilename, sfBuffer, &sfCalculatedDigest);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
}
sigBuffer.type = siBuffer;
ScopedCERTCertList builtChain;
rv = VerifySignature(aTrustedRoot, sigBuffer, sfCalculatedDigest.get(),
builtChain);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
}
// Get the expected manifest hash from the signed .sf file
ScopedAutoSECItem mfDigest;
rv = ParseSF(char_ptr_cast(sfBuffer.data), mfDigest);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
}
// Load manifest (MF) file and verify signature
nsAutoString mfFilename(NS_LITERAL_STRING("manifest.mf"));
ScopedAutoSECItem manifestBuffer;
Digest mfCalculatedDigest;
rv = LoadOneMetafile(metaDir, mfFilename, manifestBuffer, &mfCalculatedDigest);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
}
if (SECITEM_CompareItem(&mfDigest, &mfCalculatedDigest.get()) != SECEqual) {
return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID;
}
// Parse manifest and verify signed hash of all listed files
// Allocate the I/O buffer only once per JAR, instead of once per entry, in
// order to minimize malloc/free calls and in order to avoid fragmenting
// memory.
ScopedAutoSECItem buf(128 * 1024);
nsTHashtable<nsStringHashKey> items;
rv = ParseMFUnpacked(char_ptr_cast(manifestBuffer.data),
aDirectory, items, buf);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)){
return rv;
}
// We've checked that everything listed in the manifest exists and is signed
// correctly. Now check on disk for extra (unsigned) files.
// Deletes found entries from items as it goes.
rv = CheckDirForUnsignedFiles(aDirectory, EmptyString(), items,
sigFilename, sfFilename, mfFilename);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
// We verified that every entry that we require to be signed is signed. But,
// were there any missing entries--that is, entries that are mentioned in the
// manifest but missing from the directory tree? (There shouldn't be given
// ParseMFUnpacked() checking them all, but it's a cheap sanity check.)
if (items.Count() != 0) {
return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_ENTRY_MISSING;
}
// Return the signer's certificate to the reader if they want it.
// XXX: We should return an nsIX509CertList with the whole validated chain.
if (aSignerCert) {
MOZ_ASSERT(CERT_LIST_HEAD(builtChain));
nsCOMPtr<nsIX509Cert> signerCert =
nsNSSCertificate::Create(CERT_LIST_HEAD(builtChain)->cert);
NS_ENSURE_TRUE(signerCert, NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
signerCert.forget(aSignerCert);
}
return NS_OK;
}
class VerifySignedDirectoryTask final : public CryptoTask
{
public:
VerifySignedDirectoryTask(AppTrustedRoot aTrustedRoot, nsIFile* aUnpackedJar,
nsIVerifySignedDirectoryCallback* aCallback)
: mTrustedRoot(aTrustedRoot)
, mDirectory(aUnpackedJar)
, mCallback(new nsMainThreadPtrHolder<nsIVerifySignedDirectoryCallback>(aCallback))
{
}
private:
virtual nsresult CalculateResult() override
{
return VerifySignedDirectory(mTrustedRoot,
mDirectory,
getter_AddRefs(mSignerCert));
}
// This class doesn't directly hold NSS resources so there's nothing that
// needs to be released
virtual void ReleaseNSSResources() override { }
virtual void CallCallback(nsresult rv) override
{
(void) mCallback->VerifySignedDirectoryFinished(rv, mSignerCert);
}
const AppTrustedRoot mTrustedRoot;
const nsCOMPtr<nsIFile> mDirectory;
nsMainThreadPtrHandle<nsIVerifySignedDirectoryCallback> mCallback;
nsCOMPtr<nsIX509Cert> mSignerCert; // out
};
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsNSSCertificateDB::VerifySignedDirectoryAsync(
AppTrustedRoot aTrustedRoot, nsIFile* aUnpackedJar,
nsIVerifySignedDirectoryCallback* aCallback)
{
NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aUnpackedJar);
NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aCallback);
RefPtr<VerifySignedDirectoryTask> task(new VerifySignedDirectoryTask(aTrustedRoot,
aUnpackedJar,
aCallback));
return task->Dispatch("UnpackedJar");
}
Reference in New Issue View Git Blame Copy Permalink