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tenfourfox/dom/crypto/WebCryptoTask.cpp

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/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
#include "pk11pub.h"
#include "cryptohi.h"
#include "secerr.h"
#include "ScopedNSSTypes.h"
#include "nsNSSComponent.h"
#include "jsapi.h"
#include "mozilla/Telemetry.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/CryptoBuffer.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/CryptoKey.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/KeyAlgorithmProxy.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/TypedArray.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/WebCryptoCommon.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/WebCryptoTask.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/WebCryptoThreadPool.h"
namespace mozilla {
namespace dom {
// Pre-defined identifiers for telemetry histograms
enum TelemetryMethod {
TM_ENCRYPT = 0,
TM_DECRYPT = 1,
TM_SIGN = 2,
TM_VERIFY = 3,
TM_DIGEST = 4,
TM_GENERATEKEY = 5,
TM_DERIVEKEY = 6,
TM_DERIVEBITS = 7,
TM_IMPORTKEY = 8,
TM_EXPORTKEY = 9,
TM_WRAPKEY = 10,
TM_UNWRAPKEY = 11
};
enum TelemetryAlgorithm {
// Please make additions at the end of the list,
// to preserve comparability of histograms over time
TA_UNKNOWN = 0,
// encrypt / decrypt
TA_AES_CBC = 1,
TA_AES_CFB = 2,
TA_AES_CTR = 3,
TA_AES_GCM = 4,
TA_RSAES_PKCS1 = 5, // NB: This algorithm has been removed
TA_RSA_OAEP = 6,
// sign/verify
TA_RSASSA_PKCS1 = 7,
TA_RSA_PSS = 8,
TA_HMAC_SHA_1 = 9,
TA_HMAC_SHA_224 = 10,
TA_HMAC_SHA_256 = 11,
TA_HMAC_SHA_384 = 12,
TA_HMAC_SHA_512 = 13,
// digest
TA_SHA_1 = 14,
TA_SHA_224 = 15,
TA_SHA_256 = 16,
TA_SHA_384 = 17,
TA_SHA_512 = 18,
// Later additions
TA_AES_KW = 19,
TA_ECDH = 20,
TA_PBKDF2 = 21,
TA_ECDSA = 22,
};
// Convenience functions for extracting / converting information
// OOM-safe CryptoBuffer initialization, suitable for constructors
#define ATTEMPT_BUFFER_INIT(dst, src) \
if (!dst.Assign(src)) { \
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR; \
return; \
}
// OOM-safe CryptoBuffer-to-SECItem copy, suitable for DoCrypto
#define ATTEMPT_BUFFER_TO_SECITEM(arena, dst, src) \
if (!src.ToSECItem(arena, dst)) { \
return NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR; \
}
// OOM-safe CryptoBuffer copy, suitable for DoCrypto
#define ATTEMPT_BUFFER_ASSIGN(dst, src) \
if (!dst.Assign(src)) { \
return NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR; \
}
// Safety check for algorithms that use keys, suitable for constructors
#define CHECK_KEY_ALGORITHM(keyAlg, algName) \
{ \
if (!NORMALIZED_EQUALS(keyAlg.mName, algName)) { \
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR; \
return; \
} \
}
class ClearException
{
public:
explicit ClearException(JSContext* aCx)
: mCx(aCx)
{}
~ClearException()
{
JS_ClearPendingException(mCx);
}
private:
JSContext* mCx;
};
template<class OOS>
static nsresult
GetAlgorithmName(JSContext* aCx, const OOS& aAlgorithm, nsString& aName)
{
ClearException ce(aCx);
if (aAlgorithm.IsString()) {
// If string, then treat as algorithm name
aName.Assign(aAlgorithm.GetAsString());
} else {
// Coerce to algorithm and extract name
JS::RootedValue value(aCx, JS::ObjectValue(*aAlgorithm.GetAsObject()));
Algorithm alg;
if (!alg.Init(aCx, value)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
}
aName = alg.mName;
}
if (!NormalizeToken(aName, aName)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
}
return NS_OK;
}
template<class T, class OOS>
static nsresult
Coerce(JSContext* aCx, T& aTarget, const OOS& aAlgorithm)
{
ClearException ce(aCx);
if (!aAlgorithm.IsObject()) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
}
JS::RootedValue value(aCx, JS::ObjectValue(*aAlgorithm.GetAsObject()));
if (!aTarget.Init(aCx, value)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
}
return NS_OK;
}
inline size_t
MapHashAlgorithmNameToBlockSize(const nsString& aName)
{
if (aName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_SHA1) ||
aName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_SHA256)) {
return 512;
}
if (aName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_SHA384) ||
aName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_SHA512)) {
return 1024;
}
return 0;
}
inline nsresult
GetKeyLengthForAlgorithm(JSContext* aCx, const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm,
size_t& aLength)
{
aLength = 0;
// Extract algorithm name
nsString algName;
if (NS_FAILED(GetAlgorithmName(aCx, aAlgorithm, algName))) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
}
// Read AES key length from given algorithm object.
if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CBC) ||
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CTR) ||
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_GCM) ||
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_KW)) {
RootedDictionary<AesDerivedKeyParams> params(aCx);
if (NS_FAILED(Coerce(aCx, params, aAlgorithm))) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
}
if (params.mLength != 128 &&
params.mLength != 192 &&
params.mLength != 256) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
}
aLength = params.mLength;
return NS_OK;
}
// Read HMAC key length from given algorithm object or
// determine key length as the block size of the given hash.
if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_HMAC)) {
RootedDictionary<HmacDerivedKeyParams> params(aCx);
if (NS_FAILED(Coerce(aCx, params, aAlgorithm))) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
}
// Return the passed length, if any.
if (params.mLength.WasPassed()) {
aLength = params.mLength.Value();
return NS_OK;
}
nsString hashName;
if (NS_FAILED(GetAlgorithmName(aCx, params.mHash, hashName))) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
}
// Return the given hash algorithm's block size as the key length.
size_t length = MapHashAlgorithmNameToBlockSize(hashName);
if (length == 0) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
}
aLength = length;
return NS_OK;
}
return NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
}
inline bool
MapOIDTagToNamedCurve(SECOidTag aOIDTag, nsString& aResult)
{
switch (aOIDTag) {
case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP256R1:
aResult.AssignLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_NAMED_CURVE_P256);
break;
case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP384R1:
aResult.AssignLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_NAMED_CURVE_P384);
break;
case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP521R1:
aResult.AssignLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_NAMED_CURVE_P521);
break;
default:
return false;
}
return true;
}
// Helper function to clone data from an ArrayBuffer or ArrayBufferView object
inline bool
CloneData(JSContext* aCx, CryptoBuffer& aDst, JS::Handle<JSObject*> aSrc)
{
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
// Try ArrayBuffer
RootedTypedArray<ArrayBuffer> ab(aCx);
if (ab.Init(aSrc)) {
return !!aDst.Assign(ab);
}
// Try ArrayBufferView
RootedTypedArray<ArrayBufferView> abv(aCx);
if (abv.Init(aSrc)) {
return !!aDst.Assign(abv);
}
return false;
}
// Implementation of WebCryptoTask methods
void
WebCryptoTask::DispatchWithPromise(Promise* aResultPromise)
{
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
mResultPromise = aResultPromise;
// Fail if an error was set during the constructor
MAYBE_EARLY_FAIL(mEarlyRv)
// Perform pre-NSS operations, and fail if they fail
mEarlyRv = BeforeCrypto();
MAYBE_EARLY_FAIL(mEarlyRv)
// Skip NSS if we're already done, or launch a CryptoTask
if (mEarlyComplete) {
CallCallback(mEarlyRv);
Skip();
return;
}
// Ensure that NSS is initialized, since presumably CalculateResult
// will use NSS functions
if (!EnsureNSSInitializedChromeOrContent()) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR;
MAYBE_EARLY_FAIL(mEarlyRv)
}
// Store calling thread and dispatch to thread pool.
mOriginalThread = NS_GetCurrentThread();
mEarlyRv = WebCryptoThreadPool::Dispatch(this);
MAYBE_EARLY_FAIL(mEarlyRv)
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
WebCryptoTask::Run()
{
// Run heavy crypto operations on the thread pool, off the original thread.
if (!IsOnOriginalThread()) {
nsNSSShutDownPreventionLock locker;
if (isAlreadyShutDown()) {
mRv = NS_ERROR_NOT_AVAILABLE;
} else {
mRv = CalculateResult();
}
// Back to the original thread, i.e. continue below.
mOriginalThread->Dispatch(this, NS_DISPATCH_NORMAL);
return NS_OK;
}
// We're now back on the calling thread.
// Release NSS resources now, before calling CallCallback, so that
// WebCryptoTasks have consistent behavior regardless of whether NSS is shut
// down between CalculateResult being called and CallCallback being called.
virtualDestroyNSSReference();
CallCallback(mRv);
return NS_OK;
}
void
WebCryptoTask::FailWithError(nsresult aRv)
{
MOZ_ASSERT(IsOnOriginalThread());
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_RESOLVED, false);
// Blindly convert nsresult to DOMException
// Individual tasks must ensure they pass the right values
mResultPromise->MaybeReject(aRv);
// Manually release mResultPromise while we're on the main thread
mResultPromise = nullptr;
Cleanup();
}
nsresult
WebCryptoTask::CalculateResult()
{
MOZ_ASSERT(!IsOnOriginalThread());
if (isAlreadyShutDown()) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR;
}
return DoCrypto();
}
void
WebCryptoTask::CallCallback(nsresult rv)
{
MOZ_ASSERT(IsOnOriginalThread());
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
FailWithError(rv);
return;
}
nsresult rv2 = AfterCrypto();
if (NS_FAILED(rv2)) {
FailWithError(rv2);
return;
}
Resolve();
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_RESOLVED, true);
// Manually release mResultPromise while we're on the main thread
mResultPromise = nullptr;
Cleanup();
}
// Some generic utility classes
class FailureTask : public WebCryptoTask
{
public:
explicit FailureTask(nsresult aRv) {
mEarlyRv = aRv;
}
};
class ReturnArrayBufferViewTask : public WebCryptoTask
{
protected:
CryptoBuffer mResult;
private:
// Returns mResult as an ArrayBufferView, or an error
virtual void Resolve() override
{
TypedArrayCreator<ArrayBuffer> ret(mResult);
mResultPromise->MaybeResolve(ret);
}
};
class DeferredData
{
public:
template<class T>
void SetData(const T& aData) {
mDataIsSet = mData.Assign(aData);
}
protected:
DeferredData()
: mDataIsSet(false)
{}
CryptoBuffer mData;
bool mDataIsSet;
};
class AesTask : public ReturnArrayBufferViewTask,
public DeferredData
{
public:
AesTask(JSContext* aCx, const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm,
CryptoKey& aKey, bool aEncrypt)
: mSymKey(aKey.GetSymKey())
, mEncrypt(aEncrypt)
{
Init(aCx, aAlgorithm, aKey, aEncrypt);
}
AesTask(JSContext* aCx, const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm,
CryptoKey& aKey, const CryptoOperationData& aData,
bool aEncrypt)
: mSymKey(aKey.GetSymKey())
, mEncrypt(aEncrypt)
{
Init(aCx, aAlgorithm, aKey, aEncrypt);
SetData(aData);
}
void Init(JSContext* aCx, const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm,
CryptoKey& aKey, bool aEncrypt)
{
nsString algName;
mEarlyRv = GetAlgorithmName(aCx, aAlgorithm, algName);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
return;
}
// Check that we got a reasonable key
if ((mSymKey.Length() != 16) &&
(mSymKey.Length() != 24) &&
(mSymKey.Length() != 32))
{
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
return;
}
// Cache parameters depending on the specific algorithm
TelemetryAlgorithm telemetryAlg;
if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CBC)) {
CHECK_KEY_ALGORITHM(aKey.Algorithm(), WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CBC);
mMechanism = CKM_AES_CBC_PAD;
telemetryAlg = TA_AES_CBC;
RootedDictionary<AesCbcParams> params(aCx);
nsresult rv = Coerce(aCx, params, aAlgorithm);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR;
return;
}
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_INIT(mIv, params.mIv)
if (mIv.Length() != 16) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
return;
}
} else if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CTR)) {
CHECK_KEY_ALGORITHM(aKey.Algorithm(), WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CTR);
mMechanism = CKM_AES_CTR;
telemetryAlg = TA_AES_CTR;
RootedDictionary<AesCtrParams> params(aCx);
nsresult rv = Coerce(aCx, params, aAlgorithm);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
return;
}
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_INIT(mIv, params.mCounter)
if (mIv.Length() != 16) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
return;
}
mCounterLength = params.mLength;
} else if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_GCM)) {
CHECK_KEY_ALGORITHM(aKey.Algorithm(), WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_GCM);
mMechanism = CKM_AES_GCM;
telemetryAlg = TA_AES_GCM;
RootedDictionary<AesGcmParams> params(aCx);
nsresult rv = Coerce(aCx, params, aAlgorithm);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
return;
}
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_INIT(mIv, params.mIv)
if (params.mAdditionalData.WasPassed()) {
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_INIT(mAad, params.mAdditionalData.Value())
}
// 32, 64, 96, 104, 112, 120 or 128
mTagLength = 128;
if (params.mTagLength.WasPassed()) {
mTagLength = params.mTagLength.Value();
if ((mTagLength > 128) ||
!(mTagLength == 32 || mTagLength == 64 ||
(mTagLength >= 96 && mTagLength % 8 == 0))) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
return;
}
}
} else {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
return;
}
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_ALG, telemetryAlg);
}
private:
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mMechanism;
CryptoBuffer mSymKey;
CryptoBuffer mIv; // Initialization vector
CryptoBuffer mAad; // Additional Authenticated Data
uint8_t mTagLength;
uint8_t mCounterLength;
bool mEncrypt;
virtual nsresult DoCrypto() override
{
nsresult rv;
if (!mDataIsSet) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
ScopedPLArenaPool arena(PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE));
if (!arena) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
// Construct the parameters object depending on algorithm
SECItem param = { siBuffer, nullptr, 0 };
CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS ctrParams;
CK_GCM_PARAMS gcmParams;
switch (mMechanism) {
case CKM_AES_CBC_PAD:
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_TO_SECITEM(arena, &param, mIv);
break;
case CKM_AES_CTR:
ctrParams.ulCounterBits = mCounterLength;
MOZ_ASSERT(mIv.Length() == 16);
memcpy(&ctrParams.cb, mIv.Elements(), 16);
param.type = siBuffer;
param.data = (unsigned char*) &ctrParams;
param.len = sizeof(ctrParams);
break;
case CKM_AES_GCM:
gcmParams.pIv = mIv.Elements();
gcmParams.ulIvLen = mIv.Length();
gcmParams.pAAD = mAad.Elements();
gcmParams.ulAADLen = mAad.Length();
gcmParams.ulTagBits = mTagLength;
param.type = siBuffer;
param.data = (unsigned char*) &gcmParams;
param.len = sizeof(gcmParams);
break;
default:
return NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
}
// Import the key
SECItem keyItem = { siBuffer, nullptr, 0 };
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_TO_SECITEM(arena, &keyItem, mSymKey);
ScopedPK11SlotInfo slot(PK11_GetInternalSlot());
MOZ_ASSERT(slot.get());
ScopedPK11SymKey symKey(PK11_ImportSymKey(slot, mMechanism, PK11_OriginUnwrap,
CKA_ENCRYPT, &keyItem, nullptr));
if (!symKey) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR;
}
// Initialize the output buffer (enough space for padding / a full tag)
uint32_t dataLen = mData.Length();
uint32_t maxLen = dataLen + 16;
if (!mResult.SetLength(maxLen, fallible)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR;
}
uint32_t outLen = 0;
// Perform the encryption/decryption
if (mEncrypt) {
rv = MapSECStatus(PK11_Encrypt(symKey.get(), mMechanism, &param,
mResult.Elements(), &outLen,
mResult.Length(), mData.Elements(),
mData.Length()));
} else {
rv = MapSECStatus(PK11_Decrypt(symKey.get(), mMechanism, &param,
mResult.Elements(), &outLen,
mResult.Length(), mData.Elements(),
mData.Length()));
}
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR);
mResult.TruncateLength(outLen);
return rv;
}
};
// This class looks like an encrypt/decrypt task, like AesTask,
// but it is only exposed to wrapKey/unwrapKey, not encrypt/decrypt
class AesKwTask : public ReturnArrayBufferViewTask,
public DeferredData
{
public:
AesKwTask(JSContext* aCx, const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm,
CryptoKey& aKey, bool aEncrypt)
: mMechanism(CKM_NSS_AES_KEY_WRAP)
, mSymKey(aKey.GetSymKey())
, mEncrypt(aEncrypt)
{
Init(aCx, aAlgorithm, aKey, aEncrypt);
}
AesKwTask(JSContext* aCx, const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm,
CryptoKey& aKey, const CryptoOperationData& aData,
bool aEncrypt)
: mMechanism(CKM_NSS_AES_KEY_WRAP)
, mSymKey(aKey.GetSymKey())
, mEncrypt(aEncrypt)
{
Init(aCx, aAlgorithm, aKey, aEncrypt);
SetData(aData);
}
void Init(JSContext* aCx, const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm,
CryptoKey& aKey, bool aEncrypt)
{
CHECK_KEY_ALGORITHM(aKey.Algorithm(), WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_KW);
nsString algName;
mEarlyRv = GetAlgorithmName(aCx, aAlgorithm, algName);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
return;
}
// Check that we got a reasonable key
if ((mSymKey.Length() != 16) &&
(mSymKey.Length() != 24) &&
(mSymKey.Length() != 32))
{
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
return;
}
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_ALG, TA_AES_KW);
}
private:
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mMechanism;
CryptoBuffer mSymKey;
bool mEncrypt;
virtual nsresult DoCrypto() override
{
nsresult rv;
if (!mDataIsSet) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
// Check that the input is a multiple of 64 bits long
if (mData.Length() == 0 || mData.Length() % 8 != 0) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
}
ScopedPLArenaPool arena(PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE));
if (!arena) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
// Import the key
SECItem keyItem = { siBuffer, nullptr, 0 };
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_TO_SECITEM(arena, &keyItem, mSymKey);
ScopedPK11SlotInfo slot(PK11_GetInternalSlot());
MOZ_ASSERT(slot.get());
ScopedPK11SymKey symKey(PK11_ImportSymKey(slot, mMechanism, PK11_OriginUnwrap,
CKA_WRAP, &keyItem, nullptr));
if (!symKey) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR;
}
// Import the data to a SECItem
SECItem dataItem = { siBuffer, nullptr, 0 };
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_TO_SECITEM(arena, &dataItem, mData);
// Parameters for the fake keys
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE fakeMechanism = CKM_SHA_1_HMAC;
CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE fakeOperation = CKA_SIGN;
if (mEncrypt) {
// Import the data into a fake PK11SymKey structure
ScopedPK11SymKey keyToWrap(PK11_ImportSymKey(slot, fakeMechanism,
PK11_OriginUnwrap, fakeOperation,
&dataItem, nullptr));
if (!keyToWrap) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
// Encrypt and return the wrapped key
// AES-KW encryption results in a wrapped key 64 bits longer
if (!mResult.SetLength(mData.Length() + 8, fallible)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
SECItem resultItem = {siBuffer, mResult.Elements(),
(unsigned int) mResult.Length()};
rv = MapSECStatus(PK11_WrapSymKey(mMechanism, nullptr, symKey.get(),
keyToWrap.get(), &resultItem));
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR);
} else {
// Decrypt the ciphertext into a temporary PK11SymKey
// Unwrapped key should be 64 bits shorter
int keySize = mData.Length() - 8;
ScopedPK11SymKey unwrappedKey(PK11_UnwrapSymKey(symKey, mMechanism, nullptr,
&dataItem, fakeMechanism,
fakeOperation, keySize));
if (!unwrappedKey) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
// Export the key to get the cleartext
rv = MapSECStatus(PK11_ExtractKeyValue(unwrappedKey));
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR;
}
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_ASSIGN(mResult, PK11_GetKeyData(unwrappedKey));
}
return rv;
}
};
class RsaOaepTask : public ReturnArrayBufferViewTask,
public DeferredData
{
public:
RsaOaepTask(JSContext* aCx, const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm,
CryptoKey& aKey, bool aEncrypt)
: mPrivKey(aKey.GetPrivateKey())
, mPubKey(aKey.GetPublicKey())
, mEncrypt(aEncrypt)
{
Init(aCx, aAlgorithm, aKey, aEncrypt);
}
RsaOaepTask(JSContext* aCx, const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm,
CryptoKey& aKey, const CryptoOperationData& aData,
bool aEncrypt)
: mPrivKey(aKey.GetPrivateKey())
, mPubKey(aKey.GetPublicKey())
, mEncrypt(aEncrypt)
{
Init(aCx, aAlgorithm, aKey, aEncrypt);
SetData(aData);
}
void Init(JSContext* aCx, const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm,
CryptoKey& aKey, bool aEncrypt)
{
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_ALG, TA_RSA_OAEP);
CHECK_KEY_ALGORITHM(aKey.Algorithm(), WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSA_OAEP);
if (mEncrypt) {
if (!mPubKey) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR;
return;
}
mStrength = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrength(mPubKey);
} else {
if (!mPrivKey) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR;
return;
}
mStrength = PK11_GetPrivateModulusLen(mPrivKey);
}
// The algorithm could just be given as a string
// in which case there would be no label specified.
if (!aAlgorithm.IsString()) {
RootedDictionary<RsaOaepParams> params(aCx);
mEarlyRv = Coerce(aCx, params, aAlgorithm);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
return;
}
if (params.mLabel.WasPassed()) {
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_INIT(mLabel, params.mLabel.Value());
}
}
// Otherwise mLabel remains the empty octet string, as intended
// Look up the MGF based on the KeyAlgorithm.
// static_cast is safe because we only get here if the algorithm name
// is RSA-OAEP, and that only happens if we've constructed
// an RsaHashedKeyAlgorithm.
mHashMechanism = KeyAlgorithmProxy::GetMechanism(aKey.Algorithm().mRsa.mHash);
switch (mHashMechanism) {
case CKM_SHA_1:
mMgfMechanism = CKG_MGF1_SHA1; break;
case CKM_SHA256:
mMgfMechanism = CKG_MGF1_SHA256; break;
case CKM_SHA384:
mMgfMechanism = CKG_MGF1_SHA384; break;
case CKM_SHA512:
mMgfMechanism = CKG_MGF1_SHA512; break;
default:
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
return;
}
}
private:
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mHashMechanism;
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mMgfMechanism;
ScopedSECKEYPrivateKey mPrivKey;
ScopedSECKEYPublicKey mPubKey;
CryptoBuffer mLabel;
uint32_t mStrength;
bool mEncrypt;
virtual nsresult DoCrypto() override
{
nsresult rv;
if (!mDataIsSet) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
// Ciphertext is an integer mod the modulus, so it will be
// no longer than mStrength octets
if (!mResult.SetLength(mStrength, fallible)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR;
}
CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS oaepParams;
oaepParams.source = CKZ_DATA_SPECIFIED;
oaepParams.pSourceData = mLabel.Length() ? mLabel.Elements() : nullptr;
oaepParams.ulSourceDataLen = mLabel.Length();
oaepParams.mgf = mMgfMechanism;
oaepParams.hashAlg = mHashMechanism;
SECItem param;
param.type = siBuffer;
param.data = (unsigned char*) &oaepParams;
param.len = sizeof(oaepParams);
uint32_t outLen = 0;
if (mEncrypt) {
// PK11_PubEncrypt() checks the plaintext's length and fails if it is too
// long to encrypt, i.e. if it is longer than (k - 2hLen - 2) with 'k'
// being the length in octets of the RSA modulus n and 'hLen' being the
// output length in octets of the chosen hash function.
// <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3447#section-7.1>
rv = MapSECStatus(PK11_PubEncrypt(
mPubKey.get(), CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP, &param,
mResult.Elements(), &outLen, mResult.Length(),
mData.Elements(), mData.Length(), nullptr));
} else {
rv = MapSECStatus(PK11_PrivDecrypt(
mPrivKey.get(), CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP, &param,
mResult.Elements(), &outLen, mResult.Length(),
mData.Elements(), mData.Length()));
}
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR);
mResult.TruncateLength(outLen);
return NS_OK;
}
};
class HmacTask : public WebCryptoTask
{
public:
HmacTask(JSContext* aCx, const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm,
CryptoKey& aKey,
const CryptoOperationData& aSignature,
const CryptoOperationData& aData,
bool aSign)
: mMechanism(aKey.Algorithm().Mechanism())
, mSymKey(aKey.GetSymKey())
, mSign(aSign)
{
CHECK_KEY_ALGORITHM(aKey.Algorithm(), WEBCRYPTO_ALG_HMAC);
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_INIT(mData, aData);
if (!aSign) {
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_INIT(mSignature, aSignature);
}
// Check that we got a symmetric key
if (mSymKey.Length() == 0) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
return;
}
TelemetryAlgorithm telemetryAlg;
switch (mMechanism) {
case CKM_SHA_1_HMAC: telemetryAlg = TA_HMAC_SHA_1; break;
case CKM_SHA224_HMAC: telemetryAlg = TA_HMAC_SHA_224; break;
case CKM_SHA256_HMAC: telemetryAlg = TA_HMAC_SHA_256; break;
case CKM_SHA384_HMAC: telemetryAlg = TA_HMAC_SHA_384; break;
case CKM_SHA512_HMAC: telemetryAlg = TA_HMAC_SHA_512; break;
default: telemetryAlg = TA_UNKNOWN;
}
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_ALG, telemetryAlg);
}
private:
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mMechanism;
CryptoBuffer mSymKey;
CryptoBuffer mData;
CryptoBuffer mSignature;
CryptoBuffer mResult;
bool mSign;
virtual nsresult DoCrypto() override
{
// Initialize the output buffer
if (!mResult.SetLength(HASH_LENGTH_MAX, fallible)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR;
}
ScopedPLArenaPool arena(PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE));
if (!arena) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
// Import the key
uint32_t outLen;
SECItem keyItem = { siBuffer, nullptr, 0 };
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_TO_SECITEM(arena, &keyItem, mSymKey);
ScopedPK11SlotInfo slot(PK11_GetInternalSlot());
MOZ_ASSERT(slot.get());
ScopedPK11SymKey symKey(PK11_ImportSymKey(slot, mMechanism, PK11_OriginUnwrap,
CKA_SIGN, &keyItem, nullptr));
if (!symKey) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR;
}
// Compute the MAC
SECItem param = { siBuffer, nullptr, 0 };
ScopedPK11Context ctx(PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(mMechanism, CKA_SIGN,
symKey.get(), &param));
if (!ctx.get()) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
nsresult rv = MapSECStatus(PK11_DigestBegin(ctx.get()));
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR);
rv = MapSECStatus(PK11_DigestOp(ctx.get(), mData.Elements(), mData.Length()));
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR);
rv = MapSECStatus(PK11_DigestFinal(ctx.get(), mResult.Elements(),
&outLen, mResult.Length()));
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR);
mResult.TruncateLength(outLen);
return rv;
}
// Returns mResult as an ArrayBufferView, or an error
virtual void Resolve() override
{
if (mSign) {
// Return the computed MAC
TypedArrayCreator<ArrayBuffer> ret(mResult);
mResultPromise->MaybeResolve(ret);
} else {
// Compare the MAC to the provided signature
// No truncation allowed
bool equal = (mResult.Length() == mSignature.Length());
if (equal) {
int cmp = NSS_SecureMemcmp(mSignature.Elements(),
mResult.Elements(),
mSignature.Length());
equal = (cmp == 0);
}
mResultPromise->MaybeResolve(equal);
}
}
};
class AsymmetricSignVerifyTask : public WebCryptoTask
{
public:
AsymmetricSignVerifyTask(JSContext* aCx,
const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm,
CryptoKey& aKey,
const CryptoOperationData& aSignature,
const CryptoOperationData& aData,
bool aSign)
: mOidTag(SEC_OID_UNKNOWN)
, mPrivKey(aKey.GetPrivateKey())
, mPubKey(aKey.GetPublicKey())
, mSign(aSign)
, mVerified(false)
, mEcdsa(false)
{
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_INIT(mData, aData);
if (!aSign) {
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_INIT(mSignature, aSignature);
}
nsString algName;
mEarlyRv = GetAlgorithmName(aCx, aAlgorithm, algName);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
return;
}
// Look up the SECOidTag
if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1)) {
mEcdsa = false;
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_ALG, TA_RSASSA_PKCS1);
CHECK_KEY_ALGORITHM(aKey.Algorithm(), WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1);
// For RSA, the hash name comes from the key algorithm
nsString hashName = aKey.Algorithm().mRsa.mHash.mName;
switch (MapAlgorithmNameToMechanism(hashName)) {
case CKM_SHA_1:
mOidTag = SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA1_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION; break;
case CKM_SHA256:
mOidTag = SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA256_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION; break;
case CKM_SHA384:
mOidTag = SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA384_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION; break;
case CKM_SHA512:
mOidTag = SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA512_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION; break;
default:
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
return;
}
} else if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_ECDSA)) {
mEcdsa = true;
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_ALG, TA_ECDSA);
CHECK_KEY_ALGORITHM(aKey.Algorithm(), WEBCRYPTO_ALG_ECDSA);
// For ECDSA, the hash name comes from the algorithm parameter
RootedDictionary<EcdsaParams> params(aCx);
mEarlyRv = Coerce(aCx, params, aAlgorithm);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
return;
}
nsString hashName;
mEarlyRv = GetAlgorithmName(aCx, params.mHash, hashName);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
return;
}
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE hashMechanism = MapAlgorithmNameToMechanism(hashName);
if (hashMechanism == UNKNOWN_CK_MECHANISM) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
return;
}
switch (hashMechanism) {
case CKM_SHA_1:
mOidTag = SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA1_SIGNATURE; break;
case CKM_SHA256:
mOidTag = SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA256_SIGNATURE; break;
case CKM_SHA384:
mOidTag = SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA384_SIGNATURE; break;
case CKM_SHA512:
mOidTag = SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA512_SIGNATURE; break;
default:
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
return;
}
} else {
// This shouldn't happen; CreateSignVerifyTask shouldn't create
// one of these unless it's for the above algorithms.
MOZ_ASSERT(false);
}
// Check that we have the appropriate key
if ((mSign && !mPrivKey) || (!mSign && !mPubKey)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR;
return;
}
}
private:
SECOidTag mOidTag;
ScopedSECKEYPrivateKey mPrivKey;
ScopedSECKEYPublicKey mPubKey;
CryptoBuffer mSignature;
CryptoBuffer mData;
bool mSign;
bool mVerified;
bool mEcdsa;
virtual nsresult DoCrypto() override
{
nsresult rv;
if (mSign) {
ScopedSECItem signature(::SECITEM_AllocItem(nullptr, nullptr, 0));
if (!signature.get()) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
rv = MapSECStatus(SEC_SignData(signature, mData.Elements(),
mData.Length(), mPrivKey, mOidTag));
if (mEcdsa) {
// DER-decode the signature
int signatureLength = PK11_SignatureLen(mPrivKey);
ScopedSECItem rawSignature(DSAU_DecodeDerSigToLen(signature.get(),
signatureLength));
if (!rawSignature.get()) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_ASSIGN(mSignature, rawSignature);
} else {
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_ASSIGN(mSignature, signature);
}
} else {
ScopedSECItem signature(::SECITEM_AllocItem(nullptr, nullptr, 0));
if (!signature.get()) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR;
}
if (mEcdsa) {
// DER-encode the signature
ScopedSECItem rawSignature(::SECITEM_AllocItem(nullptr, nullptr, 0));
if (!rawSignature || !mSignature.ToSECItem(nullptr, rawSignature)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR;
}
rv = MapSECStatus(DSAU_EncodeDerSigWithLen(signature, rawSignature,
rawSignature->len));
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR);
} else if (!mSignature.ToSECItem(nullptr, signature)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR;
}
rv = MapSECStatus(VFY_VerifyData(mData.Elements(), mData.Length(),
mPubKey, signature, mOidTag, nullptr));
mVerified = NS_SUCCEEDED(rv);
}
return NS_OK;
}
virtual void Resolve() override
{
if (mSign) {
TypedArrayCreator<ArrayBuffer> ret(mSignature);
mResultPromise->MaybeResolve(ret);
} else {
mResultPromise->MaybeResolve(mVerified);
}
}
};
class DigestTask : public ReturnArrayBufferViewTask
{
public:
DigestTask(JSContext* aCx,
const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm,
const CryptoOperationData& aData)
{
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_INIT(mData, aData);
nsString algName;
mEarlyRv = GetAlgorithmName(aCx, aAlgorithm, algName);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
return;
}
TelemetryAlgorithm telemetryAlg;
if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_SHA1)) {
mOidTag = SEC_OID_SHA1;
telemetryAlg = TA_SHA_1;
} else if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_SHA256)) {
mOidTag = SEC_OID_SHA256;
telemetryAlg = TA_SHA_224;
} else if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_SHA384)) {
mOidTag = SEC_OID_SHA384;
telemetryAlg = TA_SHA_256;
} else if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_SHA512)) {
mOidTag = SEC_OID_SHA512;
telemetryAlg = TA_SHA_384;
} else {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
return;
}
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_ALG, telemetryAlg);
}
private:
SECOidTag mOidTag;
CryptoBuffer mData;
virtual nsresult DoCrypto() override
{
// Resize the result buffer
uint32_t hashLen = HASH_ResultLenByOidTag(mOidTag);
if (!mResult.SetLength(hashLen, fallible)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR;
}
// Compute the hash
nsresult rv = MapSECStatus(PK11_HashBuf(mOidTag, mResult.Elements(),
mData.Elements(), mData.Length()));
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR;
}
return rv;
}
};
class ImportKeyTask : public WebCryptoTask
{
public:
void Init(JSContext* aCx,
const nsAString& aFormat,
const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, bool aExtractable,
const Sequence<nsString>& aKeyUsages)
{
mFormat = aFormat;
mDataIsSet = false;
mDataIsJwk = false;
// Get the current global object from the context
nsIGlobalObject *global = xpc::NativeGlobal(JS::CurrentGlobalOrNull(aCx));
if (!global) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR;
return;
}
// This stuff pretty much always happens, so we'll do it here
mKey = new CryptoKey(global);
mKey->SetExtractable(aExtractable);
mKey->ClearUsages();
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < aKeyUsages.Length(); ++i) {
mEarlyRv = mKey->AddUsage(aKeyUsages[i]);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
return;
}
}
mEarlyRv = GetAlgorithmName(aCx, aAlgorithm, mAlgName);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
return;
}
}
static bool JwkCompatible(const JsonWebKey& aJwk, const CryptoKey* aKey)
{
// Check 'ext'
if (aKey->Extractable() &&
aJwk.mExt.WasPassed() && !aJwk.mExt.Value()) {
return false;
}
// Check 'alg'
if (aJwk.mAlg.WasPassed() &&
aJwk.mAlg.Value() != aKey->Algorithm().JwkAlg()) {
return false;
}
// Check 'key_ops'
if (aJwk.mKey_ops.WasPassed()) {
nsTArray<nsString> usages;
aKey->GetUsages(usages);
for (size_t i = 0; i < usages.Length(); ++i) {
if (!aJwk.mKey_ops.Value().Contains(usages[i])) {
return false;
}
}
}
// Individual algorithms may still have to check 'use'
return true;
}
void SetKeyData(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JSObject*> aKeyData) {
// First try to treat as ArrayBuffer/ABV,
// and if that fails, try to initialize a JWK
if (CloneData(aCx, mKeyData, aKeyData)) {
mDataIsJwk = false;
if (mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_JWK)) {
SetJwkFromKeyData();
}
} else {
ClearException ce(aCx);
JS::RootedValue value(aCx, JS::ObjectValue(*aKeyData));
if (!mJwk.Init(aCx, value)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
return;
}
mDataIsJwk = true;
}
}
void SetKeyData(const CryptoBuffer& aKeyData)
{
if (!mKeyData.Assign(aKeyData)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
return;
}
mDataIsJwk = false;
if (mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_JWK)) {
SetJwkFromKeyData();
}
}
void SetJwkFromKeyData()
{
nsDependentCSubstring utf8((const char*) mKeyData.Elements(),
(const char*) (mKeyData.Elements() +
mKeyData.Length()));
if (!IsUTF8(utf8)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
return;
}
nsString json = NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(utf8);
if (!mJwk.Init(json)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
return;
}
mDataIsJwk = true;
}
protected:
nsString mFormat;
RefPtr<CryptoKey> mKey;
CryptoBuffer mKeyData;
bool mDataIsSet;
bool mDataIsJwk;
JsonWebKey mJwk;
nsString mAlgName;
private:
virtual void Resolve() override
{
mResultPromise->MaybeResolve(mKey);
}
virtual void Cleanup() override
{
mKey = nullptr;
}
};
class ImportSymmetricKeyTask : public ImportKeyTask
{
public:
ImportSymmetricKeyTask(JSContext* aCx,
const nsAString& aFormat,
const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, bool aExtractable,
const Sequence<nsString>& aKeyUsages)
{
Init(aCx, aFormat, aAlgorithm, aExtractable, aKeyUsages);
}
ImportSymmetricKeyTask(JSContext* aCx,
const nsAString& aFormat, const JS::Handle<JSObject*> aKeyData,
const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, bool aExtractable,
const Sequence<nsString>& aKeyUsages)
{
Init(aCx, aFormat, aAlgorithm, aExtractable, aKeyUsages);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
return;
}
SetKeyData(aCx, aKeyData);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS_VOID(mEarlyRv);
if (mDataIsJwk && !mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_JWK)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
return;
}
}
void Init(JSContext* aCx,
const nsAString& aFormat,
const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, bool aExtractable,
const Sequence<nsString>& aKeyUsages)
{
ImportKeyTask::Init(aCx, aFormat, aAlgorithm, aExtractable, aKeyUsages);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
return;
}
// If this is an HMAC key, import the hash name
if (mAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_HMAC)) {
RootedDictionary<HmacImportParams> params(aCx);
mEarlyRv = Coerce(aCx, params, aAlgorithm);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
return;
}
mEarlyRv = GetAlgorithmName(aCx, params.mHash, mHashName);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
return;
}
}
}
virtual nsresult BeforeCrypto() override
{
nsresult rv;
// If we're doing a JWK import, import the key data
if (mDataIsJwk) {
if (!mJwk.mK.WasPassed()) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
}
// Import the key material
rv = mKeyData.FromJwkBase64(mJwk.mK.Value());
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
}
}
// Check that we have valid key data.
if (mKeyData.Length() == 0) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
}
// Construct an appropriate KeyAlorithm,
// and verify that usages are appropriate
uint32_t length = 8 * mKeyData.Length(); // bytes to bits
if (mAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CBC) ||
mAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CTR) ||
mAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_GCM) ||
mAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_KW)) {
if (mKey->HasUsageOtherThan(CryptoKey::ENCRYPT | CryptoKey::DECRYPT |
CryptoKey::WRAPKEY | CryptoKey::UNWRAPKEY)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
}
if (mAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_KW) &&
mKey->HasUsageOtherThan(CryptoKey::WRAPKEY | CryptoKey::UNWRAPKEY)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
}
if ( (length != 128) && (length != 192) && (length != 256) ) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
}
mKey->Algorithm().MakeAes(mAlgName, length);
if (mDataIsJwk && mJwk.mUse.WasPassed() &&
!mJwk.mUse.Value().EqualsLiteral(JWK_USE_ENC)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
}
} else if (mAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_PBKDF2)) {
if (mKey->HasUsageOtherThan(CryptoKey::DERIVEKEY | CryptoKey::DERIVEBITS)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
}
mKey->Algorithm().MakeAes(mAlgName, length);
if (mDataIsJwk && mJwk.mUse.WasPassed()) {
// There is not a 'use' value consistent with PBKDF
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
};
} else if (mAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_HMAC)) {
if (mKey->HasUsageOtherThan(CryptoKey::SIGN | CryptoKey::VERIFY)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
}
mKey->Algorithm().MakeHmac(length, mHashName);
if (mKey->Algorithm().Mechanism() == UNKNOWN_CK_MECHANISM) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
}
if (mDataIsJwk && mJwk.mUse.WasPassed() &&
!mJwk.mUse.Value().EqualsLiteral(JWK_USE_SIG)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
}
} else {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
}
if (NS_FAILED(mKey->SetSymKey(mKeyData))) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
mKey->SetType(CryptoKey::SECRET);
if (mDataIsJwk && !JwkCompatible(mJwk, mKey)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
}
mEarlyComplete = true;
return NS_OK;
}
private:
nsString mHashName;
};
class ImportRsaKeyTask : public ImportKeyTask
{
public:
ImportRsaKeyTask(JSContext* aCx,
const nsAString& aFormat,
const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, bool aExtractable,
const Sequence<nsString>& aKeyUsages)
{
Init(aCx, aFormat, aAlgorithm, aExtractable, aKeyUsages);
}
ImportRsaKeyTask(JSContext* aCx,
const nsAString& aFormat, JS::Handle<JSObject*> aKeyData,
const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, bool aExtractable,
const Sequence<nsString>& aKeyUsages)
{
Init(aCx, aFormat, aAlgorithm, aExtractable, aKeyUsages);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
return;
}
SetKeyData(aCx, aKeyData);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS_VOID(mEarlyRv);
if (mDataIsJwk && !mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_JWK)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
return;
}
}
void Init(JSContext* aCx,
const nsAString& aFormat,
const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, bool aExtractable,
const Sequence<nsString>& aKeyUsages)
{
ImportKeyTask::Init(aCx, aFormat, aAlgorithm, aExtractable, aKeyUsages);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
return;
}
// If this is RSA with a hash, cache the hash name
if (mAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1) ||
mAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSA_OAEP)) {
RootedDictionary<RsaHashedImportParams> params(aCx);
mEarlyRv = Coerce(aCx, params, aAlgorithm);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
return;
}
mEarlyRv = GetAlgorithmName(aCx, params.mHash, mHashName);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
return;
}
}
// Check support for the algorithm and hash names
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech1 = MapAlgorithmNameToMechanism(mAlgName);
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech2 = MapAlgorithmNameToMechanism(mHashName);
if ((mech1 == UNKNOWN_CK_MECHANISM) || (mech2 == UNKNOWN_CK_MECHANISM)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
return;
}
}
private:
nsString mHashName;
uint32_t mModulusLength;
CryptoBuffer mPublicExponent;
virtual nsresult DoCrypto() override
{
nsNSSShutDownPreventionLock locker;
// Import the key data itself
ScopedSECKEYPublicKey pubKey;
ScopedSECKEYPrivateKey privKey;
if (mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_SPKI) ||
(mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_JWK) &&
!mJwk.mD.WasPassed())) {
// Public key import
if (mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_SPKI)) {
pubKey = CryptoKey::PublicKeyFromSpki(mKeyData, locker);
} else {
pubKey = CryptoKey::PublicKeyFromJwk(mJwk, locker);
}
if (!pubKey) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
}
if (NS_FAILED(mKey->SetPublicKey(pubKey.get()))) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
mKey->SetType(CryptoKey::PUBLIC);
} else if (mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_PKCS8) ||
(mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_JWK) &&
mJwk.mD.WasPassed())) {
// Private key import
if (mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_PKCS8)) {
privKey = CryptoKey::PrivateKeyFromPkcs8(mKeyData, locker);
} else {
privKey = CryptoKey::PrivateKeyFromJwk(mJwk, locker);
}
if (!privKey) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
}
if (NS_FAILED(mKey->SetPrivateKey(privKey.get()))) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
mKey->SetType(CryptoKey::PRIVATE);
pubKey = SECKEY_ConvertToPublicKey(privKey.get());
if (!pubKey) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR;
}
} else {
// Invalid key format
return NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
}
// Extract relevant information from the public key
mModulusLength = 8 * pubKey->u.rsa.modulus.len;
if (!mPublicExponent.Assign(&pubKey->u.rsa.publicExponent)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
return NS_OK;
}
virtual nsresult AfterCrypto() override
{
// Check permissions for the requested operation
if (mAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSA_OAEP)) {
if ((mKey->GetKeyType() == CryptoKey::PUBLIC &&
mKey->HasUsageOtherThan(CryptoKey::ENCRYPT | CryptoKey::WRAPKEY)) ||
(mKey->GetKeyType() == CryptoKey::PRIVATE &&
mKey->HasUsageOtherThan(CryptoKey::DECRYPT | CryptoKey::UNWRAPKEY))) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
}
} else if (mAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1)) {
if ((mKey->GetKeyType() == CryptoKey::PUBLIC &&
mKey->HasUsageOtherThan(CryptoKey::VERIFY)) ||
(mKey->GetKeyType() == CryptoKey::PRIVATE &&
mKey->HasUsageOtherThan(CryptoKey::SIGN))) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
}
}
// Set an appropriate KeyAlgorithm
if (!mKey->Algorithm().MakeRsa(mAlgName, mModulusLength,
mPublicExponent, mHashName)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
if (mDataIsJwk && !JwkCompatible(mJwk, mKey)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
}
return NS_OK;
}
};
class ImportEcKeyTask : public ImportKeyTask
{
public:
ImportEcKeyTask(JSContext* aCx, const nsAString& aFormat,
const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, bool aExtractable,
const Sequence<nsString>& aKeyUsages)
{
Init(aCx, aFormat, aAlgorithm, aExtractable, aKeyUsages);
}
ImportEcKeyTask(JSContext* aCx, const nsAString& aFormat,
JS::Handle<JSObject*> aKeyData,
const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, bool aExtractable,
const Sequence<nsString>& aKeyUsages)
{
Init(aCx, aFormat, aAlgorithm, aExtractable, aKeyUsages);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
return;
}
SetKeyData(aCx, aKeyData);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS_VOID(mEarlyRv);
}
void Init(JSContext* aCx, const nsAString& aFormat,
const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, bool aExtractable,
const Sequence<nsString>& aKeyUsages)
{
ImportKeyTask::Init(aCx, aFormat, aAlgorithm, aExtractable, aKeyUsages);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
return;
}
if (mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_RAW)) {
RootedDictionary<EcKeyImportParams> params(aCx);
mEarlyRv = Coerce(aCx, params, aAlgorithm);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv) || !params.mNamedCurve.WasPassed()) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
return;
}
if (!NormalizeToken(params.mNamedCurve.Value(), mNamedCurve)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
return;
}
}
}
private:
nsString mNamedCurve;
virtual nsresult DoCrypto() override
{
// Import the key data itself
ScopedSECKEYPublicKey pubKey;
ScopedSECKEYPrivateKey privKey;
nsNSSShutDownPreventionLock locker;
if (mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_JWK) && mJwk.mD.WasPassed()) {
// Private key import
privKey = CryptoKey::PrivateKeyFromJwk(mJwk, locker);
if (!privKey) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
}
if (NS_FAILED(mKey->SetPrivateKey(privKey.get()))) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
mKey->SetType(CryptoKey::PRIVATE);
} else if (mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_RAW) ||
mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_SPKI) ||
(mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_JWK) &&
!mJwk.mD.WasPassed())) {
// Public key import
if (mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_RAW)) {
pubKey = CryptoKey::PublicECKeyFromRaw(mKeyData, mNamedCurve, locker);
} else if (mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_SPKI)) {
pubKey = CryptoKey::PublicKeyFromSpki(mKeyData, locker);
} else if (mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_JWK)) {
pubKey = CryptoKey::PublicKeyFromJwk(mJwk, locker);
} else {
MOZ_ASSERT(false);
}
if (!pubKey) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
}
if (mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_SPKI)) {
if (!CheckEncodedECParameters(&pubKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
// Construct the OID tag.
SECItem oid = { siBuffer, nullptr, 0 };
oid.len = pubKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams.data[1];
oid.data = pubKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams.data + 2;
// Find a matching and supported named curve.
if (!MapOIDTagToNamedCurve(SECOID_FindOIDTag(&oid), mNamedCurve)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
}
}
if (NS_FAILED(mKey->SetPublicKey(pubKey.get()))) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
mKey->SetType(CryptoKey::PUBLIC);
} else {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
}
// Extract 'crv' parameter from JWKs.
if (mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_JWK)) {
if (!NormalizeToken(mJwk.mCrv.Value(), mNamedCurve)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
}
}
return NS_OK;
}
virtual nsresult AfterCrypto() override
{
uint32_t privateAllowedUsages = 0, publicAllowedUsages = 0;
if (mAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_ECDH)) {
privateAllowedUsages = CryptoKey::DERIVEBITS | CryptoKey::DERIVEKEY;
publicAllowedUsages = CryptoKey::DERIVEBITS | CryptoKey::DERIVEKEY;
} else if (mAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_ECDSA)) {
privateAllowedUsages = CryptoKey::SIGN;
publicAllowedUsages = CryptoKey::VERIFY;
}
// Check permissions for the requested operation
if ((mKey->GetKeyType() == CryptoKey::PRIVATE &&
mKey->HasUsageOtherThan(privateAllowedUsages)) ||
(mKey->GetKeyType() == CryptoKey::PUBLIC &&
mKey->HasUsageOtherThan(publicAllowedUsages))) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
}
mKey->Algorithm().MakeEc(mAlgName, mNamedCurve);
if (mDataIsJwk && !JwkCompatible(mJwk, mKey)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
}
return NS_OK;
}
};
class ImportDhKeyTask : public ImportKeyTask
{
public:
ImportDhKeyTask(JSContext* aCx, const nsAString& aFormat,
const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, bool aExtractable,
const Sequence<nsString>& aKeyUsages)
{
Init(aCx, aFormat, aAlgorithm, aExtractable, aKeyUsages);
}
ImportDhKeyTask(JSContext* aCx, const nsAString& aFormat,
JS::Handle<JSObject*> aKeyData,
const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, bool aExtractable,
const Sequence<nsString>& aKeyUsages)
{
Init(aCx, aFormat, aAlgorithm, aExtractable, aKeyUsages);
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(mEarlyRv)) {
SetKeyData(aCx, aKeyData);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS_VOID(mEarlyRv);
}
}
void Init(JSContext* aCx, const nsAString& aFormat,
const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, bool aExtractable,
const Sequence<nsString>& aKeyUsages)
{
ImportKeyTask::Init(aCx, aFormat, aAlgorithm, aExtractable, aKeyUsages);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
return;
}
if (mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_RAW)) {
RootedDictionary<DhImportKeyParams> params(aCx);
mEarlyRv = Coerce(aCx, params, aAlgorithm);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
return;
}
CryptoBuffer prime;
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_INIT(mPrime, params.mPrime);
CryptoBuffer generator;
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_INIT(mGenerator, params.mGenerator);
}
}
private:
CryptoBuffer mPrime;
CryptoBuffer mGenerator;
virtual nsresult DoCrypto() override
{
// Import the key data itself
ScopedSECKEYPublicKey pubKey;
nsNSSShutDownPreventionLock locker;
if (mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_RAW) ||
mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_SPKI)) {
// Public key import
if (mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_RAW)) {
pubKey = CryptoKey::PublicDhKeyFromRaw(mKeyData, mPrime, mGenerator, locker);
} else if (mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_SPKI)) {
pubKey = CryptoKey::PublicKeyFromSpki(mKeyData, locker);
} else {
MOZ_ASSERT(false);
}
if (!pubKey) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
}
if (mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_SPKI)) {
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_ASSIGN(mPrime, &pubKey->u.dh.prime);
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_ASSIGN(mGenerator, &pubKey->u.dh.base);
}
if (NS_FAILED(mKey->SetPublicKey(pubKey.get()))) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
mKey->SetType(CryptoKey::PUBLIC);
} else {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
}
return NS_OK;
}
virtual nsresult AfterCrypto() override
{
// Check permissions for the requested operation
if (mKey->HasUsageOtherThan(CryptoKey::DERIVEBITS | CryptoKey::DERIVEKEY)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
}
if (!mKey->Algorithm().MakeDh(mAlgName, mPrime, mGenerator)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
return NS_OK;
}
};
class ExportKeyTask : public WebCryptoTask
{
public:
ExportKeyTask(const nsAString& aFormat, CryptoKey& aKey)
: mFormat(aFormat)
, mSymKey(aKey.GetSymKey())
, mPrivateKey(aKey.GetPrivateKey())
, mPublicKey(aKey.GetPublicKey())
, mKeyType(aKey.GetKeyType())
, mExtractable(aKey.Extractable())
, mAlg(aKey.Algorithm().JwkAlg())
{
aKey.GetUsages(mKeyUsages);
}
protected:
nsString mFormat;
CryptoBuffer mSymKey;
ScopedSECKEYPrivateKey mPrivateKey;
ScopedSECKEYPublicKey mPublicKey;
CryptoKey::KeyType mKeyType;
bool mExtractable;
nsString mAlg;
nsTArray<nsString> mKeyUsages;
CryptoBuffer mResult;
JsonWebKey mJwk;
private:
virtual void ReleaseNSSResources() override
{
mPrivateKey.dispose();
mPublicKey.dispose();
}
virtual nsresult DoCrypto() override
{
nsNSSShutDownPreventionLock locker;
if (mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_RAW)) {
if (mPublicKey && mPublicKey->keyType == dhKey) {
nsresult rv = CryptoKey::PublicDhKeyToRaw(mPublicKey, mResult, locker);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
return NS_OK;
}
if (mPublicKey && mPublicKey->keyType == ecKey) {
nsresult rv = CryptoKey::PublicECKeyToRaw(mPublicKey, mResult, locker);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
return NS_OK;
}
mResult = mSymKey;
if (mResult.Length() == 0) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
}
return NS_OK;
} else if (mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_PKCS8)) {
if (!mPrivateKey) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
}
switch (mPrivateKey->keyType) {
case rsaKey: {
nsresult rv = CryptoKey::PrivateKeyToPkcs8(mPrivateKey.get(), mResult, locker);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
return NS_OK;
}
default:
return NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
}
} else if (mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_SPKI)) {
if (!mPublicKey) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
}
return CryptoKey::PublicKeyToSpki(mPublicKey.get(), mResult, locker);
} else if (mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_JWK)) {
if (mKeyType == CryptoKey::SECRET) {
nsString k;
nsresult rv = mSymKey.ToJwkBase64(k);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
mJwk.mK.Construct(k);
mJwk.mKty = NS_LITERAL_STRING(JWK_TYPE_SYMMETRIC);
} else if (mKeyType == CryptoKey::PUBLIC) {
if (!mPublicKey) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR;
}
nsresult rv = CryptoKey::PublicKeyToJwk(mPublicKey, mJwk, locker);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
} else if (mKeyType == CryptoKey::PRIVATE) {
if (!mPrivateKey) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR;
}
nsresult rv = CryptoKey::PrivateKeyToJwk(mPrivateKey, mJwk, locker);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
}
if (!mAlg.IsEmpty()) {
mJwk.mAlg.Construct(mAlg);
}
mJwk.mExt.Construct(mExtractable);
if (!mKeyUsages.IsEmpty()) {
mJwk.mKey_ops.Construct();
if (!mJwk.mKey_ops.Value().AppendElements(mKeyUsages, fallible)) {
return NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
}
}
return NS_OK;
}
return NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
}
// Returns mResult as an ArrayBufferView or JWK, as appropriate
virtual void Resolve() override
{
if (mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_JWK)) {
mResultPromise->MaybeResolve(mJwk);
return;
}
TypedArrayCreator<ArrayBuffer> ret(mResult);
mResultPromise->MaybeResolve(ret);
}
};
class GenerateSymmetricKeyTask : public WebCryptoTask
{
public:
GenerateSymmetricKeyTask(JSContext* aCx,
const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, bool aExtractable,
const Sequence<nsString>& aKeyUsages)
{
nsIGlobalObject* global = xpc::NativeGlobal(JS::CurrentGlobalOrNull(aCx));
if (!global) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR;
return;
}
// Create an empty key and set easy attributes
mKey = new CryptoKey(global);
mKey->SetExtractable(aExtractable);
mKey->SetType(CryptoKey::SECRET);
// Extract algorithm name
nsString algName;
mEarlyRv = GetAlgorithmName(aCx, aAlgorithm, algName);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
return;
}
// Construct an appropriate KeyAlorithm
uint32_t allowedUsages = 0;
if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CBC) ||
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CTR) ||
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_GCM) ||
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_KW)) {
mEarlyRv = GetKeyLengthForAlgorithm(aCx, aAlgorithm, mLength);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
return;
}
mKey->Algorithm().MakeAes(algName, mLength);
allowedUsages = CryptoKey::ENCRYPT | CryptoKey::DECRYPT |
CryptoKey::WRAPKEY | CryptoKey::UNWRAPKEY;
} else if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_HMAC)) {
RootedDictionary<HmacKeyGenParams> params(aCx);
mEarlyRv = Coerce(aCx, params, aAlgorithm);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
return;
}
nsString hashName;
mEarlyRv = GetAlgorithmName(aCx, params.mHash, hashName);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
return;
}
if (params.mLength.WasPassed()) {
mLength = params.mLength.Value();
} else {
mLength = MapHashAlgorithmNameToBlockSize(hashName);
}
if (mLength == 0) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
return;
}
mKey->Algorithm().MakeHmac(mLength, hashName);
allowedUsages = CryptoKey::SIGN | CryptoKey::VERIFY;
} else {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
return;
}
// Add key usages
mKey->ClearUsages();
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < aKeyUsages.Length(); ++i) {
mEarlyRv = mKey->AddUsageIntersecting(aKeyUsages[i], allowedUsages);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
return;
}
}
mLength = mLength >> 3; // bits to bytes
mMechanism = mKey->Algorithm().Mechanism();
// SetSymKey done in Resolve, after we've done the keygen
}
private:
RefPtr<CryptoKey> mKey;
size_t mLength;
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mMechanism;
CryptoBuffer mKeyData;
virtual nsresult DoCrypto() override
{
ScopedPK11SlotInfo slot(PK11_GetInternalSlot());
MOZ_ASSERT(slot.get());
ScopedPK11SymKey symKey(PK11_KeyGen(slot.get(), mMechanism, nullptr,
mLength, nullptr));
if (!symKey) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR;
}
nsresult rv = MapSECStatus(PK11_ExtractKeyValue(symKey));
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR;
}
// This doesn't leak, because the SECItem* returned by PK11_GetKeyData
// just refers to a buffer managed by symKey. The assignment copies the
// data, so mKeyData manages one copy, while symKey manages another.
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_ASSIGN(mKeyData, PK11_GetKeyData(symKey));
return NS_OK;
}
virtual void Resolve() override
{
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(mKey->SetSymKey(mKeyData))) {
mResultPromise->MaybeResolve(mKey);
} else {
mResultPromise->MaybeReject(NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR);
}
}
virtual void Cleanup() override
{
mKey = nullptr;
}
};
GenerateAsymmetricKeyTask::GenerateAsymmetricKeyTask(
JSContext* aCx, const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, bool aExtractable,
const Sequence<nsString>& aKeyUsages)
: mKeyPair(new CryptoKeyPair())
{
nsIGlobalObject* global = xpc::NativeGlobal(JS::CurrentGlobalOrNull(aCx));
if (!global) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR;
return;
}
mArena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
if (!mArena) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR;
return;
}
// Create an empty key pair and set easy attributes
mKeyPair->mPrivateKey = new CryptoKey(global);
mKeyPair->mPublicKey = new CryptoKey(global);
// Extract algorithm name
mEarlyRv = GetAlgorithmName(aCx, aAlgorithm, mAlgName);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
return;
}
// Construct an appropriate KeyAlorithm
uint32_t privateAllowedUsages = 0, publicAllowedUsages = 0;
if (mAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1) ||
mAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSA_OAEP)) {
RootedDictionary<RsaHashedKeyGenParams> params(aCx);
mEarlyRv = Coerce(aCx, params, aAlgorithm);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
return;
}
// Pull relevant info
uint32_t modulusLength = params.mModulusLength;
CryptoBuffer publicExponent;
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_INIT(publicExponent, params.mPublicExponent);
nsString hashName;
mEarlyRv = GetAlgorithmName(aCx, params.mHash, hashName);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
return;
}
// Create algorithm
if (!mKeyPair->mPublicKey.get()->Algorithm().MakeRsa(mAlgName,
modulusLength,
publicExponent,
hashName)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
return;
}
if (!mKeyPair->mPrivateKey.get()->Algorithm().MakeRsa(mAlgName,
modulusLength,
publicExponent,
hashName)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
return;
}
mMechanism = CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN;
// Set up params struct
mRsaParams.keySizeInBits = modulusLength;
bool converted = publicExponent.GetBigIntValue(mRsaParams.pe);
if (!converted) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR;
return;
}
} else if (mAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_ECDH) ||
mAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_ECDSA)) {
RootedDictionary<EcKeyGenParams> params(aCx);
mEarlyRv = Coerce(aCx, params, aAlgorithm);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
return;
}
if (!NormalizeToken(params.mNamedCurve, mNamedCurve)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
return;
}
// Create algorithm.
mKeyPair->mPublicKey.get()->Algorithm().MakeEc(mAlgName, mNamedCurve);
mKeyPair->mPrivateKey.get()->Algorithm().MakeEc(mAlgName, mNamedCurve);
mMechanism = CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN;
} else if (mAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_DH)) {
RootedDictionary<DhKeyGenParams> params(aCx);
mEarlyRv = Coerce(aCx, params, aAlgorithm);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
return;
}
CryptoBuffer prime;
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_INIT(prime, params.mPrime);
CryptoBuffer generator;
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_INIT(generator, params.mGenerator);
// Set up params.
if (!prime.ToSECItem(mArena, &mDhParams.prime) ||
!generator.ToSECItem(mArena, &mDhParams.base)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR;
return;
}
// Create algorithm.
if (!mKeyPair->mPublicKey.get()->Algorithm().MakeDh(mAlgName,
prime,
generator)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
return;
}
if (!mKeyPair->mPrivateKey.get()->Algorithm().MakeDh(mAlgName,
prime,
generator)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
return;
}
mMechanism = CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN;
} else {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
return;
}
// Set key usages.
if (mAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1) ||
mAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_ECDSA)) {
privateAllowedUsages = CryptoKey::SIGN;
publicAllowedUsages = CryptoKey::VERIFY;
} else if (mAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSA_OAEP)) {
privateAllowedUsages = CryptoKey::DECRYPT | CryptoKey::UNWRAPKEY;
publicAllowedUsages = CryptoKey::ENCRYPT | CryptoKey::WRAPKEY;
} else if (mAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_ECDH) ||
mAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_DH)) {
privateAllowedUsages = CryptoKey::DERIVEKEY | CryptoKey::DERIVEBITS;
publicAllowedUsages = 0;
}
mKeyPair->mPrivateKey.get()->SetExtractable(aExtractable);
mKeyPair->mPrivateKey.get()->SetType(CryptoKey::PRIVATE);
mKeyPair->mPublicKey.get()->SetExtractable(true);
mKeyPair->mPublicKey.get()->SetType(CryptoKey::PUBLIC);
mKeyPair->mPrivateKey.get()->ClearUsages();
mKeyPair->mPublicKey.get()->ClearUsages();
for (uint32_t i=0; i < aKeyUsages.Length(); ++i) {
mEarlyRv = mKeyPair->mPrivateKey.get()->AddUsageIntersecting(aKeyUsages[i],
privateAllowedUsages);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
return;
}
mEarlyRv = mKeyPair->mPublicKey.get()->AddUsageIntersecting(aKeyUsages[i],
publicAllowedUsages);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
return;
}
}
// If no usages ended up being allowed, DataError
if (!mKeyPair->mPublicKey.get()->HasAnyUsage() &&
!mKeyPair->mPrivateKey.get()->HasAnyUsage()) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
return;
}
}
void
GenerateAsymmetricKeyTask::ReleaseNSSResources()
{
mPublicKey.dispose();
mPrivateKey.dispose();
}
nsresult
GenerateAsymmetricKeyTask::DoCrypto()
{
MOZ_ASSERT(mKeyPair);
ScopedPK11SlotInfo slot(PK11_GetInternalSlot());
MOZ_ASSERT(slot.get());
void* param;
switch (mMechanism) {
case CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN:
param = &mRsaParams;
break;
case CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN:
param = &mDhParams;
break;
case CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN: {
param = CreateECParamsForCurve(mNamedCurve, mArena);
if (!param) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR;
}
break;
}
default:
return NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
}
SECKEYPublicKey* pubKey = nullptr;
mPrivateKey = PK11_GenerateKeyPair(slot.get(), mMechanism, param, &pubKey,
PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE, nullptr);
mPublicKey = pubKey;
if (!mPrivateKey.get() || !mPublicKey.get()) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR;
}
nsresult rv = mKeyPair->mPrivateKey.get()->SetPrivateKey(mPrivateKey);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR);
rv = mKeyPair->mPublicKey.get()->SetPublicKey(mPublicKey);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR);
// PK11_GenerateKeyPair() does not set a CKA_EC_POINT attribute on the
// private key, we need this later when exporting to PKCS8 and JWK though.
if (mMechanism == CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN) {
rv = mKeyPair->mPrivateKey->AddPublicKeyData(mPublicKey);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR);
}
return NS_OK;
}
void
GenerateAsymmetricKeyTask::Resolve()
{
mResultPromise->MaybeResolve(*mKeyPair);
}
void
GenerateAsymmetricKeyTask::Cleanup()
{
mKeyPair = nullptr;
}
class DerivePbkdfBitsTask : public ReturnArrayBufferViewTask
{
public:
DerivePbkdfBitsTask(JSContext* aCx,
const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, CryptoKey& aKey, uint32_t aLength)
: mSymKey(aKey.GetSymKey())
{
Init(aCx, aAlgorithm, aKey, aLength);
}
DerivePbkdfBitsTask(JSContext* aCx, const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm,
CryptoKey& aKey, const ObjectOrString& aTargetAlgorithm)
: mSymKey(aKey.GetSymKey())
{
size_t length;
mEarlyRv = GetKeyLengthForAlgorithm(aCx, aTargetAlgorithm, length);
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(mEarlyRv)) {
Init(aCx, aAlgorithm, aKey, length);
}
}
void Init(JSContext* aCx, const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, CryptoKey& aKey,
uint32_t aLength)
{
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_ALG, TA_PBKDF2);
CHECK_KEY_ALGORITHM(aKey.Algorithm(), WEBCRYPTO_ALG_PBKDF2);
// Check that we got a symmetric key
if (mSymKey.Length() == 0) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR;
return;
}
RootedDictionary<Pbkdf2Params> params(aCx);
mEarlyRv = Coerce(aCx, params, aAlgorithm);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
return;
}
// length must be a multiple of 8 bigger than zero.
if (aLength == 0 || aLength % 8) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
return;
}
// Extract the hash algorithm.
nsString hashName;
mEarlyRv = GetAlgorithmName(aCx, params.mHash, hashName);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
return;
}
// Check the given hash algorithm.
switch (MapAlgorithmNameToMechanism(hashName)) {
case CKM_SHA_1: mHashOidTag = SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA1; break;
case CKM_SHA256: mHashOidTag = SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA256; break;
case CKM_SHA384: mHashOidTag = SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA384; break;
case CKM_SHA512: mHashOidTag = SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA512; break;
default:
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
return;
}
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_INIT(mSalt, params.mSalt)
mLength = aLength >> 3; // bits to bytes
mIterations = params.mIterations;
}
private:
size_t mLength;
size_t mIterations;
CryptoBuffer mSalt;
CryptoBuffer mSymKey;
SECOidTag mHashOidTag;
virtual nsresult DoCrypto() override
{
ScopedPLArenaPool arena(PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE));
if (!arena) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
SECItem salt = { siBuffer, nullptr, 0 };
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_TO_SECITEM(arena, &salt, mSalt);
// Always pass in cipherAlg=SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA1 (i.e. PBMAC1) as this
// parameter is unused for key generation. It is currently only used
// for PBKDF2 authentication or key (un)wrapping when specifying an
// encryption algorithm (PBES2).
ScopedSECAlgorithmID alg_id(PK11_CreatePBEV2AlgorithmID(
SEC_OID_PKCS5_PBKDF2, SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA1, mHashOidTag,
mLength, mIterations, &salt));
if (!alg_id.get()) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
ScopedPK11SlotInfo slot(PK11_GetInternalSlot());
if (!slot.get()) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
SECItem keyItem = { siBuffer, nullptr, 0 };
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_TO_SECITEM(arena, &keyItem, mSymKey);
ScopedPK11SymKey symKey(PK11_PBEKeyGen(slot, alg_id, &keyItem, false, nullptr));
if (!symKey.get()) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
nsresult rv = MapSECStatus(PK11_ExtractKeyValue(symKey));
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
// This doesn't leak, because the SECItem* returned by PK11_GetKeyData
// just refers to a buffer managed by symKey. The assignment copies the
// data, so mResult manages one copy, while symKey manages another.
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_ASSIGN(mResult, PK11_GetKeyData(symKey));
return NS_OK;
}
};
template<class DeriveBitsTask>
class DeriveKeyTask : public DeriveBitsTask
{
public:
DeriveKeyTask(JSContext* aCx,
const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, CryptoKey& aBaseKey,
const ObjectOrString& aDerivedKeyType, bool aExtractable,
const Sequence<nsString>& aKeyUsages)
: DeriveBitsTask(aCx, aAlgorithm, aBaseKey, aDerivedKeyType)
, mResolved(false)
{
if (NS_FAILED(this->mEarlyRv)) {
return;
}
NS_NAMED_LITERAL_STRING(format, WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_RAW);
mTask = new ImportSymmetricKeyTask(aCx, format, aDerivedKeyType,
aExtractable, aKeyUsages);
}
protected:
RefPtr<ImportSymmetricKeyTask> mTask;
bool mResolved;
private:
virtual void Resolve() override {
mTask->SetKeyData(this->mResult);
mTask->DispatchWithPromise(this->mResultPromise);
mResolved = true;
}
virtual void Cleanup() override
{
if (mTask && !mResolved) {
mTask->Skip();
}
mTask = nullptr;
}
};
class DeriveEcdhBitsTask : public ReturnArrayBufferViewTask
{
public:
DeriveEcdhBitsTask(JSContext* aCx,
const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, CryptoKey& aKey, uint32_t aLength)
: mLength(aLength),
mPrivKey(aKey.GetPrivateKey())
{
Init(aCx, aAlgorithm, aKey);
}
DeriveEcdhBitsTask(JSContext* aCx, const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm,
CryptoKey& aKey, const ObjectOrString& aTargetAlgorithm)
: mPrivKey(aKey.GetPrivateKey())
{
mEarlyRv = GetKeyLengthForAlgorithm(aCx, aTargetAlgorithm, mLength);
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(mEarlyRv)) {
Init(aCx, aAlgorithm, aKey);
}
}
void Init(JSContext* aCx, const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, CryptoKey& aKey)
{
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_ALG, TA_ECDH);
CHECK_KEY_ALGORITHM(aKey.Algorithm(), WEBCRYPTO_ALG_ECDH);
// Check that we have a private key.
if (!mPrivKey) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR;
return;
}
// Length must be a multiple of 8 bigger than zero.
if (mLength == 0 || mLength % 8) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
return;
}
mLength = mLength >> 3; // bits to bytes
// Retrieve the peer's public key.
RootedDictionary<EcdhKeyDeriveParams> params(aCx);
mEarlyRv = Coerce(aCx, params, aAlgorithm);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
return;
}
CryptoKey* publicKey = params.mPublic;
mPubKey = publicKey->GetPublicKey();
if (!mPubKey) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR;
return;
}
CHECK_KEY_ALGORITHM(publicKey->Algorithm(), WEBCRYPTO_ALG_ECDH);
// Both keys must use the same named curve.
nsString curve1 = aKey.Algorithm().mEc.mNamedCurve;
nsString curve2 = publicKey->Algorithm().mEc.mNamedCurve;
if (!curve1.Equals(curve2)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
return;
}
}
private:
size_t mLength;
ScopedSECKEYPrivateKey mPrivKey;
ScopedSECKEYPublicKey mPubKey;
virtual nsresult DoCrypto() override
{
// CKM_SHA512_HMAC and CKA_SIGN are key type and usage attributes of the
// derived symmetric key and don't matter because we ignore them anyway.
ScopedPK11SymKey symKey(PK11_PubDeriveWithKDF(
mPrivKey, mPubKey, PR_FALSE, nullptr, nullptr, CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE,
CKM_SHA512_HMAC, CKA_SIGN, 0, CKD_NULL, nullptr, nullptr));
if (!symKey.get()) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
nsresult rv = MapSECStatus(PK11_ExtractKeyValue(symKey));
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
// This doesn't leak, because the SECItem* returned by PK11_GetKeyData
// just refers to a buffer managed by symKey. The assignment copies the
// data, so mResult manages one copy, while symKey manages another.
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_ASSIGN(mResult, PK11_GetKeyData(symKey));
if (mLength > mResult.Length()) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
}
if (!mResult.SetLength(mLength, fallible)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR;
}
return NS_OK;
}
};
class DeriveDhBitsTask : public ReturnArrayBufferViewTask
{
public:
DeriveDhBitsTask(JSContext* aCx,
const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, CryptoKey& aKey, uint32_t aLength)
: mLength(aLength),
mPrivKey(aKey.GetPrivateKey())
{
Init(aCx, aAlgorithm, aKey);
}
DeriveDhBitsTask(JSContext* aCx, const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm,
CryptoKey& aKey, const ObjectOrString& aTargetAlgorithm)
: mPrivKey(aKey.GetPrivateKey())
{
mEarlyRv = GetKeyLengthForAlgorithm(aCx, aTargetAlgorithm, mLength);
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(mEarlyRv)) {
Init(aCx, aAlgorithm, aKey);
}
}
void Init(JSContext* aCx, const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, CryptoKey& aKey)
{
CHECK_KEY_ALGORITHM(aKey.Algorithm(), WEBCRYPTO_ALG_DH);
// Check that we have a private key.
if (!mPrivKey) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR;
return;
}
mLength = mLength >> 3; // bits to bytes
// Retrieve the peer's public key.
RootedDictionary<DhKeyDeriveParams> params(aCx);
mEarlyRv = Coerce(aCx, params, aAlgorithm);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
return;
}
CryptoKey* publicKey = params.mPublic;
mPubKey = publicKey->GetPublicKey();
if (!mPubKey) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR;
return;
}
KeyAlgorithmProxy alg1 = publicKey->Algorithm();
CHECK_KEY_ALGORITHM(alg1, WEBCRYPTO_ALG_DH);
// Both keys must use the same prime and generator.
KeyAlgorithmProxy alg2 = aKey.Algorithm();
if (alg1.mDh.mPrime != alg2.mDh.mPrime ||
alg1.mDh.mGenerator != alg2.mDh.mGenerator) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
return;
}
}
private:
size_t mLength;
ScopedSECKEYPrivateKey mPrivKey;
ScopedSECKEYPublicKey mPubKey;
virtual nsresult DoCrypto() override
{
// CKM_SHA512_HMAC and CKA_SIGN are key type and usage attributes of the
// derived symmetric key and don't matter because we ignore them anyway.
ScopedPK11SymKey symKey(PK11_PubDeriveWithKDF(
mPrivKey, mPubKey, PR_FALSE, nullptr, nullptr, CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE,
CKM_SHA512_HMAC, CKA_SIGN, 0, CKD_NULL, nullptr, nullptr));
if (!symKey.get()) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
nsresult rv = MapSECStatus(PK11_ExtractKeyValue(symKey));
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
// This doesn't leak, because the SECItem* returned by PK11_GetKeyData
// just refers to a buffer managed by symKey. The assignment copies the
// data, so mResult manages one copy, while symKey manages another.
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_ASSIGN(mResult, PK11_GetKeyData(symKey));
if (mLength > mResult.Length()) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
}
if (!mResult.SetLength(mLength, fallible)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR;
}
return NS_OK;
}
};
template<class KeyEncryptTask>
class WrapKeyTask : public ExportKeyTask
{
public:
WrapKeyTask(JSContext* aCx,
const nsAString& aFormat,
CryptoKey& aKey,
CryptoKey& aWrappingKey,
const ObjectOrString& aWrapAlgorithm)
: ExportKeyTask(aFormat, aKey)
, mResolved(false)
{
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
return;
}
mTask = new KeyEncryptTask(aCx, aWrapAlgorithm, aWrappingKey, true);
}
private:
RefPtr<KeyEncryptTask> mTask;
bool mResolved;
virtual nsresult AfterCrypto() override {
// If wrapping JWK, stringify the JSON
if (mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_JWK)) {
nsAutoString json;
if (!mJwk.ToJSON(json)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8 utf8(json);
if (!mResult.Assign((const uint8_t*) utf8.BeginReading(), utf8.Length())) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
}
return NS_OK;
}
virtual void Resolve() override
{
mTask->SetData(mResult);
mTask->DispatchWithPromise(mResultPromise);
mResolved = true;
}
virtual void Cleanup() override
{
if (mTask && !mResolved) {
mTask->Skip();
}
mTask = nullptr;
}
};
template<class KeyEncryptTask>
class UnwrapKeyTask : public KeyEncryptTask
{
public:
UnwrapKeyTask(JSContext* aCx,
const ArrayBufferViewOrArrayBuffer& aWrappedKey,
CryptoKey& aUnwrappingKey,
const ObjectOrString& aUnwrapAlgorithm,
ImportKeyTask* aTask)
: KeyEncryptTask(aCx, aUnwrapAlgorithm, aUnwrappingKey, aWrappedKey, false)
, mTask(aTask)
, mResolved(false)
{}
private:
RefPtr<ImportKeyTask> mTask;
bool mResolved;
virtual void Resolve() override
{
mTask->SetKeyData(KeyEncryptTask::mResult);
mTask->DispatchWithPromise(KeyEncryptTask::mResultPromise);
mResolved = true;
}
virtual void Cleanup() override
{
if (mTask && !mResolved) {
mTask->Skip();
}
mTask = nullptr;
}
};
// Task creation methods for WebCryptoTask
// Note: We do not perform algorithm normalization as a monolithic process,
// as described in the spec. Instead:
// * Each method handles its slice of the supportedAlgorithms structure
// * Task constructors take care of:
// * Coercing the algorithm to the proper concrete type
// * Cloning subordinate data items
// * Cloning input data as needed
//
// Thus, support for different algorithms is determined by the if-statements
// below, rather than a data structure.
//
// This results in algorithm normalization coming after some other checks,
// and thus slightly more steps being done synchronously than the spec calls
// for. But none of these steps is especially time-consuming.
WebCryptoTask*
WebCryptoTask::CreateEncryptDecryptTask(JSContext* aCx,
const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm,
CryptoKey& aKey,
const CryptoOperationData& aData,
bool aEncrypt)
{
TelemetryMethod method = (aEncrypt)? TM_ENCRYPT : TM_DECRYPT;
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_METHOD, method);
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_EXTRACTABLE_ENC, aKey.Extractable());
// Ensure key is usable for this operation
if ((aEncrypt && !aKey.HasUsage(CryptoKey::ENCRYPT)) ||
(!aEncrypt && !aKey.HasUsage(CryptoKey::DECRYPT))) {
return new FailureTask(NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR);
}
nsString algName;
nsresult rv = GetAlgorithmName(aCx, aAlgorithm, algName);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return new FailureTask(rv);
}
if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CBC) ||
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CTR) ||
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_GCM)) {
return new AesTask(aCx, aAlgorithm, aKey, aData, aEncrypt);
} else if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSA_OAEP)) {
return new RsaOaepTask(aCx, aAlgorithm, aKey, aData, aEncrypt);
}
return new FailureTask(NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR);
}
WebCryptoTask*
WebCryptoTask::CreateSignVerifyTask(JSContext* aCx,
const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm,
CryptoKey& aKey,
const CryptoOperationData& aSignature,
const CryptoOperationData& aData,
bool aSign)
{
TelemetryMethod method = (aSign)? TM_SIGN : TM_VERIFY;
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_METHOD, method);
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_EXTRACTABLE_SIG, aKey.Extractable());
// Ensure key is usable for this operation
if ((aSign && !aKey.HasUsage(CryptoKey::SIGN)) ||
(!aSign && !aKey.HasUsage(CryptoKey::VERIFY))) {
return new FailureTask(NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR);
}
nsString algName;
nsresult rv = GetAlgorithmName(aCx, aAlgorithm, algName);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return new FailureTask(rv);
}
if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_HMAC)) {
return new HmacTask(aCx, aAlgorithm, aKey, aSignature, aData, aSign);
} else if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1) ||
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_ECDSA)) {
return new AsymmetricSignVerifyTask(aCx, aAlgorithm, aKey, aSignature,
aData, aSign);
}
return new FailureTask(NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR);
}
WebCryptoTask*
WebCryptoTask::CreateDigestTask(JSContext* aCx,
const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm,
const CryptoOperationData& aData)
{
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_METHOD, TM_DIGEST);
nsString algName;
nsresult rv = GetAlgorithmName(aCx, aAlgorithm, algName);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return new FailureTask(rv);
}
if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_SHA1) ||
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_SHA256) ||
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_SHA384) ||
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_SHA512)) {
return new DigestTask(aCx, aAlgorithm, aData);
}
return new FailureTask(NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR);
}
WebCryptoTask*
WebCryptoTask::CreateImportKeyTask(JSContext* aCx,
const nsAString& aFormat,
JS::Handle<JSObject*> aKeyData,
const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm,
bool aExtractable,
const Sequence<nsString>& aKeyUsages)
{
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_METHOD, TM_IMPORTKEY);
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_EXTRACTABLE_IMPORT, aExtractable);
// Verify that the format is recognized
if (!aFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_RAW) &&
!aFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_SPKI) &&
!aFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_PKCS8) &&
!aFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_JWK)) {
return new FailureTask(NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR);
}
// Verify that aKeyUsages does not contain an unrecognized value
if (!CryptoKey::AllUsagesRecognized(aKeyUsages)) {
return new FailureTask(NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR);
}
nsString algName;
nsresult rv = GetAlgorithmName(aCx, aAlgorithm, algName);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return new FailureTask(rv);
}
// SPEC-BUG: PBKDF2 is not supposed to be supported for this operation.
// However, the spec should be updated to allow it.
if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CBC) ||
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CTR) ||
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_GCM) ||
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_KW) ||
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_PBKDF2) ||
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_HMAC)) {
return new ImportSymmetricKeyTask(aCx, aFormat, aKeyData, aAlgorithm,
aExtractable, aKeyUsages);
} else if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1) ||
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSA_OAEP)) {
return new ImportRsaKeyTask(aCx, aFormat, aKeyData, aAlgorithm,
aExtractable, aKeyUsages);
} else if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_ECDH) ||
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_ECDSA)) {
return new ImportEcKeyTask(aCx, aFormat, aKeyData, aAlgorithm,
aExtractable, aKeyUsages);
} else if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_DH)) {
return new ImportDhKeyTask(aCx, aFormat, aKeyData, aAlgorithm,
aExtractable, aKeyUsages);
} else {
return new FailureTask(NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR);
}
}
WebCryptoTask*
WebCryptoTask::CreateExportKeyTask(const nsAString& aFormat,
CryptoKey& aKey)
{
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_METHOD, TM_EXPORTKEY);
// Verify that the format is recognized
if (!aFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_RAW) &&
!aFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_SPKI) &&
!aFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_PKCS8) &&
!aFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_JWK)) {
return new FailureTask(NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR);
}
// Verify that the key is extractable
if (!aKey.Extractable()) {
return new FailureTask(NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR);
}
// Verify that the algorithm supports export
// SPEC-BUG: PBKDF2 is not supposed to be supported for this operation.
// However, the spec should be updated to allow it.
nsString algName = aKey.Algorithm().mName;
if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CBC) ||
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CTR) ||
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_GCM) ||
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_KW) ||
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_PBKDF2) ||
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_HMAC) ||
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1) ||
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSA_OAEP) ||
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_ECDSA) ||
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_ECDH) ||
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_DH)) {
return new ExportKeyTask(aFormat, aKey);
}
return new FailureTask(NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR);
}
WebCryptoTask*
WebCryptoTask::CreateGenerateKeyTask(JSContext* aCx,
const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm,
bool aExtractable,
const Sequence<nsString>& aKeyUsages)
{
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_METHOD, TM_GENERATEKEY);
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_EXTRACTABLE_GENERATE, aExtractable);
// Verify that aKeyUsages does not contain an unrecognized value
// SPEC-BUG: Spec says that this should be InvalidAccessError, but that
// is inconsistent with other analogous points in the spec
if (!CryptoKey::AllUsagesRecognized(aKeyUsages)) {
return new FailureTask(NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR);
}
nsString algName;
nsresult rv = GetAlgorithmName(aCx, aAlgorithm, algName);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return new FailureTask(rv);
}
if (algName.EqualsASCII(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CBC) ||
algName.EqualsASCII(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CTR) ||
algName.EqualsASCII(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_GCM) ||
algName.EqualsASCII(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_KW) ||
algName.EqualsASCII(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_HMAC)) {
return new GenerateSymmetricKeyTask(aCx, aAlgorithm, aExtractable, aKeyUsages);
} else if (algName.EqualsASCII(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1) ||
algName.EqualsASCII(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSA_OAEP) ||
algName.EqualsASCII(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_ECDH) ||
algName.EqualsASCII(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_ECDSA) ||
algName.EqualsASCII(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_DH)) {
return new GenerateAsymmetricKeyTask(aCx, aAlgorithm, aExtractable, aKeyUsages);
} else {
return new FailureTask(NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR);
}
}
WebCryptoTask*
WebCryptoTask::CreateDeriveKeyTask(JSContext* aCx,
const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm,
CryptoKey& aBaseKey,
const ObjectOrString& aDerivedKeyType,
bool aExtractable,
const Sequence<nsString>& aKeyUsages)
{
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_METHOD, TM_DERIVEKEY);
// Ensure baseKey is usable for this operation
if (!aBaseKey.HasUsage(CryptoKey::DERIVEKEY)) {
return new FailureTask(NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR);
}
// Verify that aKeyUsages does not contain an unrecognized value
if (!CryptoKey::AllUsagesRecognized(aKeyUsages)) {
return new FailureTask(NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR);
}
nsString algName;
nsresult rv = GetAlgorithmName(aCx, aAlgorithm, algName);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return new FailureTask(rv);
}
if (algName.EqualsASCII(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_PBKDF2)) {
return new DeriveKeyTask<DerivePbkdfBitsTask>(aCx, aAlgorithm, aBaseKey,
aDerivedKeyType, aExtractable,
aKeyUsages);
}
if (algName.EqualsASCII(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_ECDH)) {
return new DeriveKeyTask<DeriveEcdhBitsTask>(aCx, aAlgorithm, aBaseKey,
aDerivedKeyType, aExtractable,
aKeyUsages);
}
return new FailureTask(NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR);
}
WebCryptoTask*
WebCryptoTask::CreateDeriveBitsTask(JSContext* aCx,
const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm,
CryptoKey& aKey,
uint32_t aLength)
{
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_METHOD, TM_DERIVEBITS);
// Ensure baseKey is usable for this operation
if (!aKey.HasUsage(CryptoKey::DERIVEBITS)) {
return new FailureTask(NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR);
}
nsString algName;
nsresult rv = GetAlgorithmName(aCx, aAlgorithm, algName);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return new FailureTask(rv);
}
if (algName.EqualsASCII(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_PBKDF2)) {
return new DerivePbkdfBitsTask(aCx, aAlgorithm, aKey, aLength);
}
if (algName.EqualsASCII(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_ECDH)) {
return new DeriveEcdhBitsTask(aCx, aAlgorithm, aKey, aLength);
}
if (algName.EqualsASCII(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_DH)) {
return new DeriveDhBitsTask(aCx, aAlgorithm, aKey, aLength);
}
return new FailureTask(NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR);
}
WebCryptoTask*
WebCryptoTask::CreateWrapKeyTask(JSContext* aCx,
const nsAString& aFormat,
CryptoKey& aKey,
CryptoKey& aWrappingKey,
const ObjectOrString& aWrapAlgorithm)
{
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_METHOD, TM_WRAPKEY);
// Verify that the format is recognized
if (!aFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_RAW) &&
!aFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_SPKI) &&
!aFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_PKCS8) &&
!aFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_JWK)) {
return new FailureTask(NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR);
}
// Ensure wrappingKey is usable for this operation
if (!aWrappingKey.HasUsage(CryptoKey::WRAPKEY)) {
return new FailureTask(NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR);
}
// Ensure key is extractable
if (!aKey.Extractable()) {
return new FailureTask(NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR);
}
nsString wrapAlgName;
nsresult rv = GetAlgorithmName(aCx, aWrapAlgorithm, wrapAlgName);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return new FailureTask(rv);
}
if (wrapAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CBC) ||
wrapAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CTR) ||
wrapAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_GCM)) {
return new WrapKeyTask<AesTask>(aCx, aFormat, aKey,
aWrappingKey, aWrapAlgorithm);
} else if (wrapAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_KW)) {
return new WrapKeyTask<AesKwTask>(aCx, aFormat, aKey,
aWrappingKey, aWrapAlgorithm);
} else if (wrapAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSA_OAEP)) {
return new WrapKeyTask<RsaOaepTask>(aCx, aFormat, aKey,
aWrappingKey, aWrapAlgorithm);
}
return new FailureTask(NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR);
}
WebCryptoTask*
WebCryptoTask::CreateUnwrapKeyTask(JSContext* aCx,
const nsAString& aFormat,
const ArrayBufferViewOrArrayBuffer& aWrappedKey,
CryptoKey& aUnwrappingKey,
const ObjectOrString& aUnwrapAlgorithm,
const ObjectOrString& aUnwrappedKeyAlgorithm,
bool aExtractable,
const Sequence<nsString>& aKeyUsages)
{
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_METHOD, TM_UNWRAPKEY);
// Ensure key is usable for this operation
if (!aUnwrappingKey.HasUsage(CryptoKey::UNWRAPKEY)) {
return new FailureTask(NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR);
}
// Verify that aKeyUsages does not contain an unrecognized value
if (!CryptoKey::AllUsagesRecognized(aKeyUsages)) {
return new FailureTask(NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR);
}
nsString keyAlgName;
nsresult rv = GetAlgorithmName(aCx, aUnwrappedKeyAlgorithm, keyAlgName);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return new FailureTask(rv);
}
CryptoOperationData dummy;
RefPtr<ImportKeyTask> importTask;
if (keyAlgName.EqualsASCII(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CBC) ||
keyAlgName.EqualsASCII(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CTR) ||
keyAlgName.EqualsASCII(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_GCM) ||
keyAlgName.EqualsASCII(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_HMAC)) {
importTask = new ImportSymmetricKeyTask(aCx, aFormat,
aUnwrappedKeyAlgorithm,
aExtractable, aKeyUsages);
} else if (keyAlgName.EqualsASCII(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1) ||
keyAlgName.EqualsASCII(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSA_OAEP)) {
importTask = new ImportRsaKeyTask(aCx, aFormat,
aUnwrappedKeyAlgorithm,
aExtractable, aKeyUsages);
} else {
return new FailureTask(NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR);
}
nsString unwrapAlgName;
rv = GetAlgorithmName(aCx, aUnwrapAlgorithm, unwrapAlgName);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return new FailureTask(rv);
}
if (unwrapAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CBC) ||
unwrapAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CTR) ||
unwrapAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_GCM)) {
return new UnwrapKeyTask<AesTask>(aCx, aWrappedKey,
aUnwrappingKey, aUnwrapAlgorithm,
importTask);
} else if (unwrapAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_KW)) {
return new UnwrapKeyTask<AesKwTask>(aCx, aWrappedKey,
aUnwrappingKey, aUnwrapAlgorithm,
importTask);
} else if (unwrapAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSA_OAEP)) {
return new UnwrapKeyTask<RsaOaepTask>(aCx, aWrappedKey,
aUnwrappingKey, aUnwrapAlgorithm,
importTask);
}
return new FailureTask(NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR);
}
} // namespace dom
} // namespace mozilla
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