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tenfourfox/netwerk/base/nsILoadInfo.idl

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/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 2; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*-
* vim: ft=cpp tw=78 sw=2 et ts=2 sts=2 cin
* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
#include "nsISupports.idl"
#include "nsIContentPolicy.idl"
interface nsIDOMDocument;
interface nsINode;
interface nsIPrincipal;
%{C++
#include "nsTArray.h"
#include "mozilla/BasePrincipal.h"
#include "mozilla/LoadTainting.h"
class nsCString;
%}
[ref] native const_nsIPrincipalArray(const nsTArray<nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal>>);
native NeckoOriginAttributes(mozilla::NeckoOriginAttributes);
[ref] native const_OriginAttributesRef(const mozilla::NeckoOriginAttributes);
[ref] native StringArrayRef(const nsTArray<nsCString>);
typedef unsigned long nsSecurityFlags;
/**
* An nsILoadOwner represents per-load information about who started the load.
*/
[scriptable, builtinclass, uuid(ddc65bf9-2f60-41ab-b22a-4f1ae9efcd36)]
interface nsILoadInfo : nsISupports
{
/**
* No special security flags:
*/
const unsigned long SEC_NORMAL = 0;
/**
* The following five flags determine the security mode and hence what kind of
* security checks should be performed throughout the lifetime of the channel.
*
* * SEC_REQUIRE_SAME_ORIGIN_DATA_INHERITS
* * SEC_REQUIRE_SAME_ORIGIN_DATA_IS_BLOCKED
* * SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_DATA_INHERITS
* * SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_DATA_IS_NULL
* * SEC_REQUIRE_CORS_DATA_INHERITS
*
* Exactly one of these flags are required to be set in order to allow
* the channel to perform the correct security checks (SOP, CORS, ...) and
* return the correct result principal. If none or more than one of these
* flags are set AsyncOpen2 will fail.
*/
/*
* Enforce the same origin policy where data: loads inherit
* the principal.
*/
const unsigned long SEC_REQUIRE_SAME_ORIGIN_DATA_INHERITS = (1<<0);
/*
* Enforce the same origin policy but data: loads are blocked.
*/
const unsigned long SEC_REQUIRE_SAME_ORIGIN_DATA_IS_BLOCKED = (1<<1);
/**
* Allow loads from other origins. Loads from data: will inherit
* the principal of the origin that triggered the load.
* Commonly used by plain <img>, <video>, <link rel=stylesheet> etc.
*/
const unsigned long SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_DATA_INHERITS = (1<<2);
/**
* Allow loads from other origins. Loads from data: will be allowed,
* but the resulting resource will get a null principal.
* Used in blink/webkit for <iframe>s. Likely also the mode
* that should be used by most Chrome code.
*/
const unsigned long SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_DATA_IS_NULL = (1<<3);
/**
* Allow loads from any origin, but require CORS for cross-origin
* loads. Loads from data: are allowed and the result will inherit
* the principal of the origin that triggered the load.
* Commonly used by <img crossorigin>, <video crossorigin>,
* XHR, fetch(), etc.
*/
const unsigned long SEC_REQUIRE_CORS_DATA_INHERITS = (1<<4);
/**
* Choose cookie policy. The default policy is equivalent to "INCLUDE" for
* SEC_REQUIRE_SAME_ORIGIN_* and SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_* modes, and
* equivalent to "SAME_ORIGIN" for SEC_REQUIRE_CORS_DATA_INHERITS mode.
*
* This means that if you want to perform a CORS load with credentials, pass
* SEC_COOKIES_INCLUDE.
*
* Note that these flags are still subject to the user's cookie policies.
* For example, if the user is blocking 3rd party cookies, those cookies
* will be blocked no matter which of these flags are set.
*/
const unsigned long SEC_COOKIES_DEFAULT = (0 << 5);
const unsigned long SEC_COOKIES_INCLUDE = (1 << 5);
const unsigned long SEC_COOKIES_SAME_ORIGIN = (2 << 5);
const unsigned long SEC_COOKIES_OMIT = (3 << 5);
/**
* Force inheriting of the Principal. The resulting resource will use the
* principal of the document which is doing the load. Setting this flag
* will cause GetChannelResultPrincipal to return the same principal as
* the loading principal that's passed in when creating the channel.
*
* This will happen independently of the scheme of the URI that the
* channel is loading.
*
* So if the loading document comes from "http://a.com/", and the channel
* is loading the URI "http://b.com/whatever", GetChannelResultPrincipal
* will return a principal from "http://a.com/".
*
* This flag can not be used together with SEC_SANDBOXED.
*/
const unsigned long SEC_FORCE_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL = (1<<7);
/**
* Sandbox the load. The resulting resource will use a freshly created
* null principal. So GetChannelResultPrincipal will always return a
* null principal whenever this flag is set.
*
* This will happen independently of the scheme of the URI that the
* channel is loading.
*
* This flag can not be used together with SEC_FORCE_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL.
*/
const unsigned long SEC_SANDBOXED = (1<<8);
/**
* Inherit the Principal for about:blank.
*/
const unsigned long SEC_ABOUT_BLANK_INHERITS = (1<<9);
/**
* Allow access to chrome: packages that are content accessible.
*/
const unsigned long SEC_ALLOW_CHROME = (1<<10);
/**
* Don't follow redirects. Instead the redirect response is returned
* as a successful response for the channel.
*
* Redirects not initiated by a server response, i.e. REDIRECT_INTERNAL and
* REDIRECT_STS_UPGRADE, are still followed.
*
* Note: If this flag is set and the channel response is a redirect, then
* the response body might not be available.
* This can happen if the redirect was cached.
*/
const unsigned long SEC_DONT_FOLLOW_REDIRECTS = (1<<11);
/**
* The loadingPrincipal is the principal that is responsible for the load.
* It is *NOT* the principal tied to the resource/URI that this
* channel is loading, it's the principal of the resource's
* caller or requester. For example, if this channel is loading
* an image from http://b.com that is embedded in a document
* who's origin is http://a.com, the loadingPrincipal is http://a.com.
*
* The loadingPrincipal will never be null.
*/
readonly attribute nsIPrincipal loadingPrincipal;
/**
* A C++-friendly version of loadingPrincipal.
*/
[noscript, notxpcom, nostdcall, binaryname(LoadingPrincipal)]
nsIPrincipal binaryLoadingPrincipal();
/**
* The triggeringPrincipal is the principal that triggerd the load.
* Most likely the triggeringPrincipal and the loadingPrincipal are the same,
* in which case triggeringPrincipal returns the loadingPrincipal.
* In some cases the loadingPrincipal and the triggeringPrincipal are different
* however, e.g. a stylesheet may import a subresource. In that case the
* stylesheet principal is the triggeringPrincipal and the document that loads
* the stylesheet provides a loadingContext and hence the loadingPrincipal.
*
* If triggeringPrincipal and loadingPrincipal are the same, then
* triggeringPrincipal returns loadingPrincipal.
*/
readonly attribute nsIPrincipal triggeringPrincipal;
/**
* A C++-friendly version of triggeringPrincipal.
*/
[noscript, notxpcom, nostdcall, binaryname(TriggeringPrincipal)]
nsIPrincipal binaryTriggeringPrincipal();
/**
* The loadingDocument of the channel.
*
* The loadingDocument of a channel is the document that requested the
* load of the resource. It is *not* the resource itself, it's the
* resource's caller or requester in which the load is happening.
*
* <script> example: Assume a document who's origin is http://a.com embeds
* a script from http://b.com. The loadingDocument for the channel
* associated with the http://b.com script load is the document with origin
* http://a.com
*
* <iframe> example: Assume a document with origin http://a.com embeds
* <iframe src="http://b.com">. The loadingDocument for the channel associated
* with the http://b.com network request is the document who's origin is
* http://a.com. Now assume the iframe to http://b.com then further embeds
* <script src="http://c.com">. The loadingDocument for the channel associated
* with the http://c.com network request is the iframe with origin http://b.com.
*
* Warning: The loadingDocument can be null!
*/
readonly attribute nsIDOMDocument loadingDocument;
/**
* A C++-friendly version of loadingDocument (loadingNode).
* This is the node most proximally responsible for the load.
*/
[noscript, notxpcom, nostdcall, binaryname(LoadingNode)]
nsINode binaryLoadingNode();
/**
* The securityFlags of that channel.
*/
readonly attribute nsSecurityFlags securityFlags;
%{ C++
inline nsSecurityFlags GetSecurityFlags()
{
nsSecurityFlags result;
mozilla::DebugOnly<nsresult> rv = GetSecurityFlags(&result);
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_SUCCEEDED(rv));
return result;
}
%}
/**
* Allows to query only the security mode bits from above.
*/
[infallible] readonly attribute unsigned long securityMode;
/**
* True if this request is embedded in a context that can't be third-party
* (i.e. an iframe embedded in a cross-origin parent window). If this is
* false, then this request may be third-party if it's a third-party to
* loadingPrincipal.
*/
[infallible] readonly attribute boolean isInThirdPartyContext;
/**
* See the SEC_COOKIES_* flags above. This attribute will never return
* SEC_COOKIES_DEFAULT, but will instead return what the policy resolves to.
* I.e. SEC_COOKIES_SAME_ORIGIN for CORS mode, and SEC_COOKIES_INCLUDE
* otherwise.
*/
[infallible] readonly attribute unsigned long cookiePolicy;
/**
* If forceInheritPrincipal is true, the data coming from the channel should
* use loadingPrincipal for its principal, even when the data is loaded over
* http:// or another protocol that would normally use a URI-based principal.
* This attribute will never be true when loadingSandboxed is true.
*/
[infallible] readonly attribute boolean forceInheritPrincipal;
/**
* If loadingSandboxed is true, the data coming from the channel is
* being loaded sandboxed, so it should have a nonce origin and
* hence should use a NullPrincipal.
*/
[infallible] readonly attribute boolean loadingSandboxed;
/**
* If aboutBlankInherits is true, then about:blank should inherit
* the principal.
*/
[infallible] readonly attribute boolean aboutBlankInherits;
/**
* If allowChrome is true, then use nsIScriptSecurityManager::ALLOW_CHROME
* when calling CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal().
*/
[infallible] readonly attribute boolean allowChrome;
/**
* Returns true if SEC_DONT_FOLLOW_REDIRECTS is set.
*/
[infallible] readonly attribute boolean dontFollowRedirects;
/**
* The external contentPolicyType of the channel, used for security checks
* like Mixed Content Blocking and Content Security Policy.
*
* Specifically, content policy types with _INTERNAL_ in their name will
* never get returned from this attribute.
*/
readonly attribute nsContentPolicyType externalContentPolicyType;
%{ C++
inline nsContentPolicyType GetExternalContentPolicyType()
{
nsContentPolicyType result;
mozilla::DebugOnly<nsresult> rv = GetExternalContentPolicyType(&result);
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_SUCCEEDED(rv));
return result;
}
%}
/**
* The internal contentPolicyType of the channel, used for constructing
* RequestContext values when creating a fetch event for an intercepted
* channel.
*
* This should not be used for the purposes of security checks, since
* the content policy implementations cannot be expected to deal with
* _INTERNAL_ values. Please use the contentPolicyType attribute above
* for that purpose.
*/
[noscript, notxpcom]
nsContentPolicyType internalContentPolicyType();
/**
* Returns true if document or any of the documents ancestors
* up to the toplevel document make use of the CSP directive
* 'upgrade-insecure-requests'. Used to identify upgrade
* requests in e10s where the loadingDocument is not available.
*
* Warning: If the loadingDocument is null, then the
* upgradeInsecureRequests is false.
*/
[infallible] readonly attribute boolean upgradeInsecureRequests;
/**
* Typically these are the window IDs of the window in which the element being
* loaded lives. However, if the element being loaded is <frame
* src="foo.html"> (or, more generally, if the element QIs to
* nsIFrameLoaderOwner) then the window IDs are for the window containing the
* foo.html document. In this case, parentOuterWindowID is the window ID of
* the window containing the <frame> element.
*
* Note that these window IDs can be 0 if the window is not
* available. parentOuterWindowID will be the same as outerWindowID if the
* window has no parent.
*/
[infallible] readonly attribute unsigned long long innerWindowID;
[infallible] readonly attribute unsigned long long outerWindowID;
[infallible] readonly attribute unsigned long long parentOuterWindowID;
/**
* Customized NeckoOriginAttributes within LoadInfo to allow overwriting of the
* default originAttributes from the loadingPrincipal.
*/
[implicit_jscontext, binaryname(ScriptableOriginAttributes)]
attribute jsval originAttributes;
[noscript, nostdcall, binaryname(GetOriginAttributes)]
NeckoOriginAttributes binaryGetOriginAttributes();
[noscript, nostdcall, binaryname(SetOriginAttributes)]
void binarySetOriginAttributes(in const_OriginAttributesRef aOriginAttrs);
%{ C++
inline mozilla::NeckoOriginAttributes GetOriginAttributes()
{
mozilla::NeckoOriginAttributes result;
mozilla::DebugOnly<nsresult> rv = GetOriginAttributes(&result);
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_SUCCEEDED(rv));
return result;
}
%}
/**
* Whenever a channel is openend by asyncOpen2() [or also open2()],
* lets set this flag so that redirects of such channels are also
* openend using asyncOpen2() [open2()].
*
* Please note, once the flag is set to true it must remain true
* throughout the lifetime of the channel. Trying to set it
* to anything else than true will be discareded.
*
*/
[infallible] attribute boolean enforceSecurity;
/**
* Whenever a channel is evaluated by the ContentSecurityManager
* the first time, we set this flag to true to indicate that
* subsequent calls of AsyncOpen2() do not have to enforce all
* security checks again. E.g., after a redirect there is no
* need to set up CORS again. We need this separate flag
* because the redirectChain might also contain internal
* redirects which might pollute the redirectChain so we can't
* rely on the size of the redirectChain-array to query whether
* a channel got redirected or not.
*
* Please note, once the flag is set to true it must remain true
* throughout the lifetime of the channel. Trying to set it
* to anything else than true will be discarded.
*
*/
[infallible] attribute boolean initialSecurityCheckDone;
/**
* Whenever a channel gets redirected, append the principal of the
* channel [before the channels got redirected] to the loadinfo,
* so that at every point this array lets us reason about all the
* redirects this channel went through.
* @param aPrincipal, the channelURIPrincipal before the channel
* got redirected.
* @param aIsInternalRedirect should be true if the channel is going
* through an internal redirect, otherwise false.
*/
void appendRedirectedPrincipal(in nsIPrincipal principal,
in boolean isInternalRedirect);
/**
* An array of nsIPrincipals which stores redirects associated with this
* channel. This array is filled whether or not the channel has ever been
* opened. The last element of the array is associated with the most recent
* redirect. Please note, that this array *includes* internal redirects.
*/
[implicit_jscontext]
readonly attribute jsval redirectChainIncludingInternalRedirects;
/**
* A C++-friendly version of redirectChain.
* Please note that this array has the same lifetime as the
* loadInfo object - use with caution!
*/
[noscript, notxpcom, nostdcall, binaryname(RedirectChainIncludingInternalRedirects)]
const_nsIPrincipalArray binaryRedirectChainIncludingInternalRedirects();
/**
* Same as RedirectChain but does *not* include internal redirects.
*/
[implicit_jscontext]
readonly attribute jsval redirectChain;
/**
* A C++-friendly version of redirectChain.
* Please note that this array has the same lifetime as the
* loadInfo object - use with caution!
*/
[noscript, notxpcom, nostdcall, binaryname(RedirectChain)]
const_nsIPrincipalArray binaryRedirectChain();
/**
* Sets the list of unsafe headers according to CORS spec, as well as
* potentially forces a preflight.
* Note that you do not need to set the Content-Type header. That will be
* automatically detected as needed.
*
* Only call this function when using the SEC_REQUIRE_CORS_DATA_INHERITS mode.
*/
[noscript, notxpcom, nostdcall]
void setCorsPreflightInfo(in StringArrayRef unsafeHeaders,
in boolean forcePreflight);
/**
* A C++-friendly getter for the list of cors-unsafe headers.
* Please note that this array has the same lifetime as the
* loadInfo object - use with caution!
*/
[noscript, notxpcom, nostdcall, binaryname(CorsUnsafeHeaders)]
StringArrayRef corsUnsafeHeaders();
/**
* Returns value set through setCorsPreflightInfo.
*/
[infallible] readonly attribute boolean forcePreflight;
/**
* A C++ friendly getter for the forcePreflight flag.
*/
[infallible] readonly attribute boolean isPreflight;
/**
* Constants reflecting the channel tainting. These are mainly defined here
* for script. Internal C++ code should use the enum defined in LoadTainting.h.
* See LoadTainting.h for documentation.
*/
const unsigned long TAINTING_BASIC = 0;
const unsigned long TAINTING_CORS = 1;
const unsigned long TAINTING_OPAQUE = 2;
/**
* Determine the associated channel's current tainting. Note, this can
* change due to a service worker intercept, so it should be checked after
* OnStartRequest() fires.
*/
readonly attribute unsigned long tainting;
/**
* Note a new tainting level and possibly increase the current tainting
* to match. If the tainting level is already greater than the given
* value, then there is no effect. It is not possible to reduce the tainting
* level on an existing channel/loadinfo.
*/
void maybeIncreaseTainting(in unsigned long aTainting);
/**
* Various helper code to provide more convenient C++ access to the tainting
* attribute and maybeIncreaseTainting().
*/
%{C++
static_assert(TAINTING_BASIC == static_cast<uint32_t>(mozilla::LoadTainting::Basic),
"basic tainting enums should match");
static_assert(TAINTING_CORS == static_cast<uint32_t>(mozilla::LoadTainting::CORS),
"cors tainting enums should match");
static_assert(TAINTING_OPAQUE == static_cast<uint32_t>(mozilla::LoadTainting::Opaque),
"opaque tainting enums should match");
mozilla::LoadTainting GetTainting()
{
uint32_t tainting = TAINTING_BASIC;
MOZ_ALWAYS_TRUE(NS_SUCCEEDED(GetTainting(&tainting)));
return static_cast<mozilla::LoadTainting>(tainting);
}
void MaybeIncreaseTainting(mozilla::LoadTainting aTainting)
{
uint32_t tainting = static_cast<uint32_t>(aTainting);
MOZ_ALWAYS_TRUE(NS_SUCCEEDED(MaybeIncreaseTainting(tainting)));
}
%}
/**
* This attribute will be true if this is a load triggered by
* https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/iframe-embed-object.html#process-the-iframe-attributes
* or https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/obsolete.html#process-the-frame-attributes
*/
[infallible] readonly attribute boolean isFromProcessingFrameAttributes;
};
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