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tenfourfox/security/manager/ssl/nsNTLMAuthModule.cpp
Cameron Kaiser c9b2922b70 hello FPR
2017-04-19 00:56:45 -07:00

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/* vim:set ts=2 sw=2 et cindent: */
/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
#include "nsNTLMAuthModule.h"
#include <time.h>
#include "md4.h"
#include "mozilla/CheckedInt.h"
#include "mozilla/Endian.h"
#include "mozilla/Likely.h"
#include "mozilla/Preferences.h"
#include "mozilla/Telemetry.h"
#include "nsCOMPtr.h"
#include "nsComponentManagerUtils.h"
#include "nsICryptoHash.h"
#include "nsICryptoHMAC.h"
#include "nsIKeyModule.h"
#include "nsKeyModule.h"
#include "nsNativeCharsetUtils.h"
#include "nsNetCID.h"
#include "nsNSSShutDown.h"
#include "nsUnicharUtils.h"
#include "pk11pub.h"
#include "mozilla/Logging.h"
#include "prsystem.h"
static bool sNTLMv1Forced = false;
static PRLogModuleInfo *
GetNTLMLog()
{
static PRLogModuleInfo *sNTLMLog;
if (!sNTLMLog)
sNTLMLog = PR_NewLogModule("NTLM");
return sNTLMLog;
}
#define LOG(x) MOZ_LOG(GetNTLMLog(), mozilla::LogLevel::Debug, x)
#define LOG_ENABLED() MOZ_LOG_TEST(GetNTLMLog(), mozilla::LogLevel::Debug)
static void des_makekey(const uint8_t *raw, uint8_t *key);
static void des_encrypt(const uint8_t *key, const uint8_t *src, uint8_t *hash);
//-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
// this file contains a cross-platform NTLM authentication implementation. it
// is based on documentation from: http://davenport.sourceforge.net/ntlm.html
//-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
#define NTLM_NegotiateUnicode 0x00000001
#define NTLM_NegotiateOEM 0x00000002
#define NTLM_RequestTarget 0x00000004
#define NTLM_Unknown1 0x00000008
#define NTLM_NegotiateSign 0x00000010
#define NTLM_NegotiateSeal 0x00000020
#define NTLM_NegotiateDatagramStyle 0x00000040
#define NTLM_NegotiateLanManagerKey 0x00000080
#define NTLM_NegotiateNetware 0x00000100
#define NTLM_NegotiateNTLMKey 0x00000200
#define NTLM_Unknown2 0x00000400
#define NTLM_Unknown3 0x00000800
#define NTLM_NegotiateDomainSupplied 0x00001000
#define NTLM_NegotiateWorkstationSupplied 0x00002000
#define NTLM_NegotiateLocalCall 0x00004000
#define NTLM_NegotiateAlwaysSign 0x00008000
#define NTLM_TargetTypeDomain 0x00010000
#define NTLM_TargetTypeServer 0x00020000
#define NTLM_TargetTypeShare 0x00040000
#define NTLM_NegotiateNTLM2Key 0x00080000
#define NTLM_RequestInitResponse 0x00100000
#define NTLM_RequestAcceptResponse 0x00200000
#define NTLM_RequestNonNTSessionKey 0x00400000
#define NTLM_NegotiateTargetInfo 0x00800000
#define NTLM_Unknown4 0x01000000
#define NTLM_Unknown5 0x02000000
#define NTLM_Unknown6 0x04000000
#define NTLM_Unknown7 0x08000000
#define NTLM_Unknown8 0x10000000
#define NTLM_Negotiate128 0x20000000
#define NTLM_NegotiateKeyExchange 0x40000000
#define NTLM_Negotiate56 0x80000000
// we send these flags with our type 1 message
#define NTLM_TYPE1_FLAGS \
(NTLM_NegotiateUnicode | \
NTLM_NegotiateOEM | \
NTLM_RequestTarget | \
NTLM_NegotiateNTLMKey | \
NTLM_NegotiateAlwaysSign | \
NTLM_NegotiateNTLM2Key)
static const char NTLM_SIGNATURE[] = "NTLMSSP";
static const char NTLM_TYPE1_MARKER[] = { 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 };
static const char NTLM_TYPE2_MARKER[] = { 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 };
static const char NTLM_TYPE3_MARKER[] = { 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 };
#define NTLM_TYPE1_HEADER_LEN 32
#define NTLM_TYPE2_HEADER_LEN 48
#define NTLM_TYPE3_HEADER_LEN 64
/**
* We don't actually send a LM response, but we still have to send something in this spot
*/
#define LM_RESP_LEN 24
#define NTLM_CHAL_LEN 8
#define NTLM_HASH_LEN 16
#define NTLMv2_HASH_LEN 16
#define NTLM_RESP_LEN 24
#define NTLMv2_RESP_LEN 16
#define NTLMv2_BLOB1_LEN 28
//-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
/**
* Prints a description of flags to the NSPR Log, if enabled.
*/
static void LogFlags(uint32_t flags)
{
if (!LOG_ENABLED())
return;
#define TEST(_flag) \
if (flags & NTLM_ ## _flag) \
PR_LogPrint(" 0x%08x (" # _flag ")\n", NTLM_ ## _flag)
TEST(NegotiateUnicode);
TEST(NegotiateOEM);
TEST(RequestTarget);
TEST(Unknown1);
TEST(NegotiateSign);
TEST(NegotiateSeal);
TEST(NegotiateDatagramStyle);
TEST(NegotiateLanManagerKey);
TEST(NegotiateNetware);
TEST(NegotiateNTLMKey);
TEST(Unknown2);
TEST(Unknown3);
TEST(NegotiateDomainSupplied);
TEST(NegotiateWorkstationSupplied);
TEST(NegotiateLocalCall);
TEST(NegotiateAlwaysSign);
TEST(TargetTypeDomain);
TEST(TargetTypeServer);
TEST(TargetTypeShare);
TEST(NegotiateNTLM2Key);
TEST(RequestInitResponse);
TEST(RequestAcceptResponse);
TEST(RequestNonNTSessionKey);
TEST(NegotiateTargetInfo);
TEST(Unknown4);
TEST(Unknown5);
TEST(Unknown6);
TEST(Unknown7);
TEST(Unknown8);
TEST(Negotiate128);
TEST(NegotiateKeyExchange);
TEST(Negotiate56);
#undef TEST
}
/**
* Prints a hexdump of buf to the NSPR Log, if enabled.
* @param tag Description of the data, will be printed in front of the data
* @param buf the data to print
* @param bufLen length of the data
*/
static void
LogBuf(const char *tag, const uint8_t *buf, uint32_t bufLen)
{
int i;
if (!LOG_ENABLED())
return;
PR_LogPrint("%s =\n", tag);
char line[80];
while (bufLen > 0)
{
int count = bufLen;
if (count > 8)
count = 8;
strcpy(line, " ");
for (i=0; i<count; ++i)
{
int len = strlen(line);
PR_snprintf(line + len, sizeof(line) - len, "0x%02x ", int(buf[i]));
}
for (; i<8; ++i)
{
int len = strlen(line);
PR_snprintf(line + len, sizeof(line) - len, " ");
}
int len = strlen(line);
PR_snprintf(line + len, sizeof(line) - len, " ");
for (i=0; i<count; ++i)
{
len = strlen(line);
if (isprint(buf[i]))
PR_snprintf(line + len, sizeof(line) - len, "%c", buf[i]);
else
PR_snprintf(line + len, sizeof(line) - len, ".");
}
PR_LogPrint("%s\n", line);
bufLen -= count;
buf += count;
}
}
#include "plbase64.h"
#include "prmem.h"
/**
* Print base64-encoded token to the NSPR Log.
* @param name Description of the token, will be printed in front
* @param token The token to print
* @param tokenLen length of the data in token
*/
static void LogToken(const char *name, const void *token, uint32_t tokenLen)
{
if (!LOG_ENABLED())
return;
char *b64data = PL_Base64Encode((const char *) token, tokenLen, nullptr);
if (b64data)
{
PR_LogPrint("%s: %s\n", name, b64data);
PR_Free(b64data);
}
}
//-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
// byte order swapping
#define SWAP16(x) ((((x) & 0xff) << 8) | (((x) >> 8) & 0xff))
#define SWAP32(x) ((SWAP16((x) & 0xffff) << 16) | (SWAP16((x) >> 16)))
static void *
WriteBytes(void *buf, const void *data, uint32_t dataLen)
{
memcpy(buf, data, dataLen);
return (uint8_t *) buf + dataLen;
}
static void *
WriteDWORD(void *buf, uint32_t dword)
{
#ifdef IS_BIG_ENDIAN
// NTLM uses little endian on the wire
dword = SWAP32(dword);
#endif
return WriteBytes(buf, &dword, sizeof(dword));
}
static void *
WriteSecBuf(void *buf, uint16_t length, uint32_t offset)
{
#ifdef IS_BIG_ENDIAN
length = SWAP16(length);
offset = SWAP32(offset);
#endif
buf = WriteBytes(buf, &length, sizeof(length));
buf = WriteBytes(buf, &length, sizeof(length));
buf = WriteBytes(buf, &offset, sizeof(offset));
return buf;
}
#ifdef IS_BIG_ENDIAN
/**
* WriteUnicodeLE copies a unicode string from one buffer to another. The
* resulting unicode string is in little-endian format. The input string is
* assumed to be in the native endianness of the local machine. It is safe
* to pass the same buffer as both input and output, which is a handy way to
* convert the unicode buffer to little-endian on big-endian platforms.
*/
static void *
WriteUnicodeLE(void *buf, const char16_t *str, uint32_t strLen)
{
// convert input string from BE to LE
uint8_t *cursor = (uint8_t *) buf,
*input = (uint8_t *) str;
for (uint32_t i=0; i<strLen; ++i, input+=2, cursor+=2)
{
// allow for the case where |buf == str|
uint8_t temp = input[0];
cursor[0] = input[1];
cursor[1] = temp;
}
return buf;
}
#endif
static uint16_t
ReadUint16(const uint8_t *&buf)
{
uint16_t x = ((uint16_t) buf[0]) | ((uint16_t) buf[1] << 8);
buf += sizeof(x);
return x;
}
static uint32_t
ReadUint32(const uint8_t *&buf)
{
uint32_t x = ( (uint32_t) buf[0]) |
(((uint32_t) buf[1]) << 8) |
(((uint32_t) buf[2]) << 16) |
(((uint32_t) buf[3]) << 24);
buf += sizeof(x);
return x;
}
//-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
static void
ZapBuf(void *buf, size_t bufLen)
{
memset(buf, 0, bufLen);
}
static void
ZapString(nsString &s)
{
ZapBuf(s.BeginWriting(), s.Length() * 2);
}
/**
* NTLM_Hash computes the NTLM hash of the given password.
*
* @param password
* null-terminated unicode password.
* @param hash
* 16-byte result buffer
*/
static void
NTLM_Hash(const nsString &password, unsigned char *hash)
{
uint32_t len = password.Length();
uint8_t *passbuf;
#ifdef IS_BIG_ENDIAN
passbuf = (uint8_t *) malloc(len * 2);
WriteUnicodeLE(passbuf, password.get(), len);
#else
passbuf = (uint8_t *) password.get();
#endif
md4sum(passbuf, len * 2, hash);
#ifdef IS_BIG_ENDIAN
ZapBuf(passbuf, len * 2);
free(passbuf);
#endif
}
//-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
/**
* LM_Response generates the LM response given a 16-byte password hash and the
* challenge from the Type-2 message.
*
* @param hash
* 16-byte password hash
* @param challenge
* 8-byte challenge from Type-2 message
* @param response
* 24-byte buffer to contain the LM response upon return
*/
static void
LM_Response(const uint8_t *hash, const uint8_t *challenge, uint8_t *response)
{
uint8_t keybytes[21], k1[8], k2[8], k3[8];
memcpy(keybytes, hash, 16);
ZapBuf(keybytes + 16, 5);
des_makekey(keybytes , k1);
des_makekey(keybytes + 7, k2);
des_makekey(keybytes + 14, k3);
des_encrypt(k1, challenge, response);
des_encrypt(k2, challenge, response + 8);
des_encrypt(k3, challenge, response + 16);
}
//-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
static nsresult
GenerateType1Msg(void **outBuf, uint32_t *outLen)
{
//
// verify that bufLen is sufficient
//
*outLen = NTLM_TYPE1_HEADER_LEN;
*outBuf = moz_xmalloc(*outLen);
if (!*outBuf)
return NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
//
// write out type 1 msg
//
void *cursor = *outBuf;
// 0 : signature
cursor = WriteBytes(cursor, NTLM_SIGNATURE, sizeof(NTLM_SIGNATURE));
// 8 : marker
cursor = WriteBytes(cursor, NTLM_TYPE1_MARKER, sizeof(NTLM_TYPE1_MARKER));
// 12 : flags
cursor = WriteDWORD(cursor, NTLM_TYPE1_FLAGS);
//
// NOTE: it is common for the domain and workstation fields to be empty.
// this is true of Win2k clients, and my guess is that there is
// little utility to sending these strings before the charset has
// been negotiated. we follow suite -- anyways, it doesn't hurt
// to save some bytes on the wire ;-)
//
// 16 : supplied domain security buffer (empty)
cursor = WriteSecBuf(cursor, 0, 0);
// 24 : supplied workstation security buffer (empty)
cursor = WriteSecBuf(cursor, 0, 0);
return NS_OK;
}
struct Type2Msg
{
uint32_t flags; // NTLM_Xxx bitwise combination
uint8_t challenge[NTLM_CHAL_LEN]; // 8 byte challenge
const uint8_t *target; // target string (type depends on flags)
uint32_t targetLen; // target length in bytes
const uint8_t *targetInfo; // target Attribute-Value pairs (DNS domain, et al)
uint32_t targetInfoLen; // target AV pairs length in bytes
};
static nsresult
ParseType2Msg(const void *inBuf, uint32_t inLen, Type2Msg *msg)
{
// make sure inBuf is long enough to contain a meaningful type2 msg.
//
// 0 NTLMSSP Signature
// 8 NTLM Message Type
// 12 Target Name
// 20 Flags
// 24 Challenge
// 32 targetInfo
// 48 start of optional data blocks
//
if (inLen < NTLM_TYPE2_HEADER_LEN)
return NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
const uint8_t *cursor = reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(inBuf);
// verify NTLMSSP signature
if (memcmp(cursor, NTLM_SIGNATURE, sizeof(NTLM_SIGNATURE)) != 0)
return NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
cursor += sizeof(NTLM_SIGNATURE);
// verify Type-2 marker
if (memcmp(cursor, NTLM_TYPE2_MARKER, sizeof(NTLM_TYPE2_MARKER)) != 0)
return NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
cursor += sizeof(NTLM_TYPE2_MARKER);
// Read target name security buffer: ...
// ... read target length.
uint32_t targetLen = ReadUint16(cursor);
// ... skip next 16-bit "allocated space" value.
ReadUint16(cursor);
// ... read offset from inBuf.
uint32_t offset = ReadUint32(cursor);
mozilla::CheckedInt<uint32_t> targetEnd = offset;
targetEnd += targetLen;
// Check the offset / length combo is in range of the input buffer, including
// integer overflow checking.
if (MOZ_LIKELY(targetEnd.isValid() && targetEnd.value() <= inLen)) {
msg->targetLen = targetLen;
msg->target = reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(inBuf) + offset;
} else {
// Do not error out, for (conservative) backward compatibility.
msg->targetLen = 0;
msg->target = nullptr;
}
// read flags
msg->flags = ReadUint32(cursor);
// read challenge
memcpy(msg->challenge, cursor, sizeof(msg->challenge));
cursor += sizeof(msg->challenge);
LOG(("NTLM type 2 message:\n"));
LogBuf("target", reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*> (msg->target), msg->targetLen);
LogBuf("flags", reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*> (&msg->flags), 4);
LogFlags(msg->flags);
LogBuf("challenge", msg->challenge, sizeof(msg->challenge));
// Read (and skip) the reserved field
ReadUint32(cursor);
ReadUint32(cursor);
// Read target name security buffer: ...
// ... read target length.
uint32_t targetInfoLen = ReadUint16(cursor);
// ... skip next 16-bit "allocated space" value.
ReadUint16(cursor);
// ... read offset from inBuf.
offset = ReadUint32(cursor);
mozilla::CheckedInt<uint32_t> targetInfoEnd = offset;
targetInfoEnd += targetInfoLen;
// Check the offset / length combo is in range of the input buffer, including
// integer overflow checking.
if (MOZ_LIKELY(targetInfoEnd.isValid() && targetInfoEnd.value() <= inLen)) {
msg->targetInfoLen = targetInfoLen;
msg->targetInfo = reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(inBuf) + offset;
} else {
NS_ERROR("failed to get NTLMv2 target info");
return NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
}
return NS_OK;
}
static nsresult
GenerateType3Msg(const nsString &domain,
const nsString &username,
const nsString &password,
const void *inBuf,
uint32_t inLen,
void **outBuf,
uint32_t *outLen)
{
// inBuf contains Type-2 msg (the challenge) from server
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
nsresult rv;
Type2Msg msg;
rv = ParseType2Msg(inBuf, inLen, &msg);
if (NS_FAILED(rv))
return rv;
bool unicode = (msg.flags & NTLM_NegotiateUnicode);
// There is no negotiation for NTLMv2, so we just do it unless we are forced
// by explict user configuration to use the older DES-based cryptography.
bool ntlmv2 = (sNTLMv1Forced == false);
// temporary buffers for unicode strings
#ifdef IS_BIG_ENDIAN
nsAutoString ucsDomainBuf, ucsUserBuf;
#endif
nsAutoCString hostBuf;
nsAutoString ucsHostBuf;
// temporary buffers for oem strings
nsAutoCString oemDomainBuf, oemUserBuf, oemHostBuf;
// pointers and lengths for the string buffers; encoding is unicode if
// the "negotiate unicode" flag was set in the Type-2 message.
const void *domainPtr, *userPtr, *hostPtr;
uint32_t domainLen, userLen, hostLen;
// This is for NTLM, for NTLMv2 we set the new full length once we know it
mozilla::CheckedInt<uint16_t> ntlmRespLen = NTLM_RESP_LEN;
//
// get domain name
//
if (unicode)
{
#ifdef IS_BIG_ENDIAN
ucsDomainBuf = domain;
domainPtr = ucsDomainBuf.get();
domainLen = ucsDomainBuf.Length() * 2;
WriteUnicodeLE((void *) domainPtr, reinterpret_cast<const char16_t*> (domainPtr),
ucsDomainBuf.Length());
#else
domainPtr = domain.get();
domainLen = domain.Length() * 2;
#endif
}
else
{
NS_CopyUnicodeToNative(domain, oemDomainBuf);
domainPtr = oemDomainBuf.get();
domainLen = oemDomainBuf.Length();
}
//
// get user name
//
if (unicode)
{
#ifdef IS_BIG_ENDIAN
ucsUserBuf = username;
userPtr = ucsUserBuf.get();
userLen = ucsUserBuf.Length() * 2;
WriteUnicodeLE((void *) userPtr, reinterpret_cast<const char16_t*> (userPtr),
ucsUserBuf.Length());
#else
userPtr = username.get();
userLen = username.Length() * 2;
#endif
}
else
{
NS_CopyUnicodeToNative(username, oemUserBuf);
userPtr = oemUserBuf.get();
userLen = oemUserBuf.Length();
}
//
// get workstation name
// (do not use local machine's hostname after bug 1046421)
//
rv = mozilla::Preferences::GetCString("network.generic-ntlm-auth.workstation",
&hostBuf);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
if (unicode)
{
ucsHostBuf = NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(hostBuf);
hostPtr = ucsHostBuf.get();
hostLen = ucsHostBuf.Length() * 2;
#ifdef IS_BIG_ENDIAN
WriteUnicodeLE((void *) hostPtr, reinterpret_cast<const char16_t*> (hostPtr),
ucsHostBuf.Length());
#endif
}
else
{
hostPtr = hostBuf.get();
hostLen = hostBuf.Length();
}
//
// now that we have generated all of the strings, we can allocate outBuf.
//
//
// next, we compute the NTLM or NTLM2 responses.
//
uint8_t lmResp[LM_RESP_LEN];
uint8_t ntlmResp[NTLM_RESP_LEN];
uint8_t ntlmv2Resp[NTLMv2_RESP_LEN];
uint8_t ntlmHash[NTLM_HASH_LEN];
uint8_t ntlmv2_blob1[NTLMv2_BLOB1_LEN];
if (ntlmv2) {
// NTLMv2 mode, the default
nsString userUpper, domainUpper;
nsAutoCString ntlmHashStr;
nsAutoCString ntlmv2HashStr;
nsAutoCString lmv2ResponseStr;
nsAutoCString ntlmv2ResponseStr;
// temporary buffers for unicode strings
nsAutoString ucsDomainUpperBuf;
nsAutoString ucsUserUpperBuf;
const void *domainUpperPtr;
const void *userUpperPtr;
uint32_t domainUpperLen;
uint32_t userUpperLen;
if (msg.targetInfoLen == 0) {
NS_ERROR("failed to get NTLMv2 target info, can not do NTLMv2");
return NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
}
ToUpperCase(username, ucsUserUpperBuf);
userUpperPtr = ucsUserUpperBuf.get();
userUpperLen = ucsUserUpperBuf.Length() * 2;
#ifdef IS_BIG_ENDIAN
WriteUnicodeLE((void *) userUpperPtr, reinterpret_cast<const char16_t*> (userUpperPtr),
ucsUserUpperBuf.Length());
#endif
ToUpperCase(domain, ucsDomainUpperBuf);
domainUpperPtr = ucsDomainUpperBuf.get();
domainUpperLen = ucsDomainUpperBuf.Length() * 2;
#ifdef IS_BIG_ENDIAN
WriteUnicodeLE((void *) domainUpperPtr, reinterpret_cast<const char16_t*> (domainUpperPtr),
ucsDomainUpperBuf.Length());
#endif
NTLM_Hash(password, ntlmHash);
ntlmHashStr = nsAutoCString(reinterpret_cast<const char *>(ntlmHash), NTLM_HASH_LEN);
nsCOMPtr<nsIKeyObjectFactory> keyFactory =
do_CreateInstance(NS_KEYMODULEOBJECTFACTORY_CONTRACTID, &rv);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
nsCOMPtr<nsIKeyObject> ntlmKey =
do_CreateInstance(NS_KEYMODULEOBJECT_CONTRACTID, &rv);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
rv = keyFactory->KeyFromString(nsIKeyObject::HMAC, ntlmHashStr, getter_AddRefs(ntlmKey));
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
nsCOMPtr<nsICryptoHMAC> hasher =
do_CreateInstance(NS_CRYPTO_HMAC_CONTRACTID, &rv);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
rv = hasher->Init(nsICryptoHMAC::MD5, ntlmKey);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
rv = hasher->Update(reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*> (userUpperPtr), userUpperLen);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
rv = hasher->Update(reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*> (domainUpperPtr), domainUpperLen);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
rv = hasher->Finish(false, ntlmv2HashStr);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
uint8_t client_random[NTLM_CHAL_LEN];
PK11_GenerateRandom(client_random, NTLM_CHAL_LEN);
nsCOMPtr<nsIKeyObject> ntlmv2Key =
do_CreateInstance(NS_KEYMODULEOBJECT_CONTRACTID, &rv);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
// Prepare the LMv2 response
rv = keyFactory->KeyFromString(nsIKeyObject::HMAC, ntlmv2HashStr, getter_AddRefs(ntlmv2Key));
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
rv = hasher->Init(nsICryptoHMAC::MD5, ntlmv2Key);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
rv = hasher->Update(msg.challenge, NTLM_CHAL_LEN);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
rv = hasher->Update(client_random, NTLM_CHAL_LEN);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
rv = hasher->Finish(false, lmv2ResponseStr);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
if (lmv2ResponseStr.Length() != NTLMv2_HASH_LEN) {
return NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
}
memcpy(lmResp, lmv2ResponseStr.get(), NTLMv2_HASH_LEN);
memcpy(lmResp + NTLMv2_HASH_LEN, client_random, NTLM_CHAL_LEN);
memset(ntlmv2_blob1, 0, NTLMv2_BLOB1_LEN);
time_t unix_time;
uint64_t nt_time = time(&unix_time);
nt_time += 11644473600LL; // Number of seconds betwen 1601 and 1970
nt_time *= 1000 * 1000 * 10; // Convert seconds to 100 ns units
ntlmv2_blob1[0] = 1;
ntlmv2_blob1[1] = 1;
mozilla::LittleEndian::writeUint64(&ntlmv2_blob1[8], nt_time);
PK11_GenerateRandom(&ntlmv2_blob1[16], NTLM_CHAL_LEN);
rv = hasher->Init(nsICryptoHMAC::MD5, ntlmv2Key);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
rv = hasher->Update(msg.challenge, NTLM_CHAL_LEN);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
rv = hasher->Update(ntlmv2_blob1, NTLMv2_BLOB1_LEN);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
rv = hasher->Update(reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*> (msg.targetInfo), msg.targetInfoLen);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
rv = hasher->Finish(false, ntlmv2ResponseStr);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
if (ntlmv2ResponseStr.Length() != NTLMv2_RESP_LEN) {
return NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
}
memcpy(ntlmv2Resp, ntlmv2ResponseStr.get(), NTLMv2_RESP_LEN);
ntlmRespLen = NTLMv2_RESP_LEN + NTLMv2_BLOB1_LEN;
ntlmRespLen += msg.targetInfoLen;
if (!ntlmRespLen.isValid()) {
NS_ERROR("failed to do NTLMv2: integer overflow?!?");
return NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
}
} else if (msg.flags & NTLM_NegotiateNTLM2Key) {
// compute NTLM2 session response
nsCString sessionHashString;
const uint8_t *sessionHash;
PK11_GenerateRandom(lmResp, NTLM_CHAL_LEN);
memset(lmResp + NTLM_CHAL_LEN, 0, LM_RESP_LEN - NTLM_CHAL_LEN);
nsCOMPtr<nsICryptoHash> hasher =
do_CreateInstance(NS_CRYPTO_HASH_CONTRACTID, &rv);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
rv = hasher->Init(nsICryptoHash::MD5);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
rv = hasher->Update(msg.challenge, NTLM_CHAL_LEN);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
rv = hasher->Update(lmResp, NTLM_CHAL_LEN);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
rv = hasher->Finish(false, sessionHashString);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
sessionHash = reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*> (sessionHashString.get());
LogBuf("NTLM2 effective key: ", sessionHash, 8);
NTLM_Hash(password, ntlmHash);
LM_Response(ntlmHash, sessionHash, ntlmResp);
} else {
NTLM_Hash(password, ntlmHash);
LM_Response(ntlmHash, msg.challenge, ntlmResp);
// According to http://davenport.sourceforge.net/ntlm.html#ntlmVersion2,
// the correct way to not send the LM hash is to send the NTLM hash twice
// in both the LM and NTLM response fields.
LM_Response(ntlmHash, msg.challenge, lmResp);
}
mozilla::CheckedInt<uint32_t> totalLen = NTLM_TYPE3_HEADER_LEN + LM_RESP_LEN;
totalLen += hostLen;
totalLen += domainLen;
totalLen += userLen;
totalLen += ntlmRespLen.value();
if (!totalLen.isValid()) {
NS_ERROR("failed preparing to allocate NTLM response: integer overflow?!?");
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
*outBuf = moz_xmalloc(totalLen.value());
*outLen = totalLen.value();
if (!*outBuf) {
return NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
}
//
// finally, we assemble the Type-3 msg :-)
//
void *cursor = *outBuf;
mozilla::CheckedInt<uint32_t> offset;
// 0 : signature
cursor = WriteBytes(cursor, NTLM_SIGNATURE, sizeof(NTLM_SIGNATURE));
// 8 : marker
cursor = WriteBytes(cursor, NTLM_TYPE3_MARKER, sizeof(NTLM_TYPE3_MARKER));
// 12 : LM response sec buf
offset = NTLM_TYPE3_HEADER_LEN;
offset += domainLen;
offset += userLen;
offset += hostLen;
if (!offset.isValid()) {
NS_ERROR("failed preparing to write NTLM response: integer overflow?!?");
return NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
}
cursor = WriteSecBuf(cursor, LM_RESP_LEN, offset.value());
memcpy((uint8_t *) *outBuf + offset.value(), lmResp, LM_RESP_LEN);
// 20 : NTLM or NTLMv2 response sec buf
offset += LM_RESP_LEN;
if (!offset.isValid()) {
NS_ERROR("failed preparing to write NTLM response: integer overflow?!?");
return NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
}
cursor = WriteSecBuf(cursor, ntlmRespLen.value(), offset.value());
if (ntlmv2) {
memcpy(reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*> (*outBuf) + offset.value(), ntlmv2Resp, NTLMv2_RESP_LEN);
offset += NTLMv2_RESP_LEN;
if (!offset.isValid()) {
NS_ERROR("failed preparing to write NTLM response: integer overflow?!?");
return NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
}
memcpy(reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*> (*outBuf) + offset.value(), ntlmv2_blob1, NTLMv2_BLOB1_LEN);
offset += NTLMv2_BLOB1_LEN;
if (!offset.isValid()) {
NS_ERROR("failed preparing to write NTLM response: integer overflow?!?");
return NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
}
memcpy(reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*> (*outBuf) + offset.value(), msg.targetInfo, msg.targetInfoLen);
} else {
memcpy(reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*> (*outBuf) + offset.value(), ntlmResp, NTLM_RESP_LEN);
}
// 28 : domain name sec buf
offset = NTLM_TYPE3_HEADER_LEN;
cursor = WriteSecBuf(cursor, domainLen, offset.value());
memcpy((uint8_t *) *outBuf + offset.value(), domainPtr, domainLen);
// 36 : user name sec buf
offset += domainLen;
if (!offset.isValid()) {
NS_ERROR("failed preparing to write NTLM response: integer overflow?!?");
return NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
}
cursor = WriteSecBuf(cursor, userLen, offset.value());
memcpy(reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*> (*outBuf) + offset.value(), userPtr, userLen);
// 44 : workstation (host) name sec buf
offset += userLen;
if (!offset.isValid()) {
NS_ERROR("failed preparing to write NTLM response: integer overflow?!?");
return NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
}
cursor = WriteSecBuf(cursor, hostLen, offset.value());
memcpy(reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*> (*outBuf) + offset.value(), hostPtr, hostLen);
// 52 : session key sec buf (not used)
cursor = WriteSecBuf(cursor, 0, 0);
// 60 : negotiated flags
cursor = WriteDWORD(cursor, msg.flags & NTLM_TYPE1_FLAGS);
return NS_OK;
}
//-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS(nsNTLMAuthModule, nsIAuthModule)
nsNTLMAuthModule::~nsNTLMAuthModule()
{
ZapString(mPassword);
}
nsresult
nsNTLMAuthModule::InitTest()
{
static bool prefObserved = false;
if (!prefObserved) {
mozilla::Preferences::AddBoolVarCache(
&sNTLMv1Forced, "network.auth.force-generic-ntlm-v1", sNTLMv1Forced);
prefObserved = true;
}
nsNSSShutDownPreventionLock locker;
//
// disable NTLM authentication when FIPS mode is enabled.
//
return PK11_IsFIPS() ? NS_ERROR_NOT_AVAILABLE : NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsNTLMAuthModule::Init(const char *serviceName,
uint32_t serviceFlags,
const char16_t *domain,
const char16_t *username,
const char16_t *password)
{
NS_ASSERTION((serviceFlags & ~nsIAuthModule::REQ_PROXY_AUTH) == nsIAuthModule::REQ_DEFAULT,
"unexpected service flags");
mDomain = domain;
mUsername = username;
mPassword = password;
mNTLMNegotiateSent = false;
static bool sTelemetrySent = false;
if (!sTelemetrySent) {
mozilla::Telemetry::Accumulate(
mozilla::Telemetry::NTLM_MODULE_USED_2,
serviceFlags & nsIAuthModule::REQ_PROXY_AUTH
? NTLM_MODULE_GENERIC_PROXY
: NTLM_MODULE_GENERIC_DIRECT);
sTelemetrySent = true;
}
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsNTLMAuthModule::GetNextToken(const void *inToken,
uint32_t inTokenLen,
void **outToken,
uint32_t *outTokenLen)
{
nsresult rv;
nsNSSShutDownPreventionLock locker;
//
// disable NTLM authentication when FIPS mode is enabled.
//
if (PK11_IsFIPS())
return NS_ERROR_NOT_AVAILABLE;
if (mNTLMNegotiateSent) {
// if inToken is non-null, and we have sent the NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE (type 1),
// then the NTLMSSP_CHALLENGE (type 2) is expected
if (inToken) {
LogToken("in-token", inToken, inTokenLen);
// Now generate the NTLMSSP_AUTH (type 3)
rv = GenerateType3Msg(mDomain, mUsername, mPassword, inToken,
inTokenLen, outToken, outTokenLen);
} else {
LOG(("NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE already sent and presumably "
"rejected by the server, refusing to send another"));
rv = NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
}
} else {
if (inToken) {
LOG(("NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE not sent but NTLM reply already received?!?"));
rv = NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
} else {
rv = GenerateType1Msg(outToken, outTokenLen);
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
mNTLMNegotiateSent = true;
}
}
}
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv))
LogToken("out-token", *outToken, *outTokenLen);
return rv;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsNTLMAuthModule::Unwrap(const void *inToken,
uint32_t inTokenLen,
void **outToken,
uint32_t *outTokenLen)
{
return NS_ERROR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsNTLMAuthModule::Wrap(const void *inToken,
uint32_t inTokenLen,
bool confidential,
void **outToken,
uint32_t *outTokenLen)
{
return NS_ERROR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
}
//-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
// DES support code
// set odd parity bit (in least significant bit position)
static uint8_t
des_setkeyparity(uint8_t x)
{
if ((((x >> 7) ^ (x >> 6) ^ (x >> 5) ^
(x >> 4) ^ (x >> 3) ^ (x >> 2) ^
(x >> 1)) & 0x01) == 0)
x |= 0x01;
else
x &= 0xfe;
return x;
}
// build 64-bit des key from 56-bit raw key
static void
des_makekey(const uint8_t *raw, uint8_t *key)
{
key[0] = des_setkeyparity(raw[0]);
key[1] = des_setkeyparity((raw[0] << 7) | (raw[1] >> 1));
key[2] = des_setkeyparity((raw[1] << 6) | (raw[2] >> 2));
key[3] = des_setkeyparity((raw[2] << 5) | (raw[3] >> 3));
key[4] = des_setkeyparity((raw[3] << 4) | (raw[4] >> 4));
key[5] = des_setkeyparity((raw[4] << 3) | (raw[5] >> 5));
key[6] = des_setkeyparity((raw[5] << 2) | (raw[6] >> 6));
key[7] = des_setkeyparity((raw[6] << 1));
}
// run des encryption algorithm (using NSS)
static void
des_encrypt(const uint8_t *key, const uint8_t *src, uint8_t *hash)
{
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE cipherMech = CKM_DES_ECB;
PK11SlotInfo *slot = nullptr;
PK11SymKey *symkey = nullptr;
PK11Context *ctxt = nullptr;
SECItem keyItem, *param = nullptr;
SECStatus rv;
unsigned int n;
slot = PK11_GetBestSlot(cipherMech, nullptr);
if (!slot)
{
NS_ERROR("no slot");
goto done;
}
keyItem.data = (uint8_t *) key;
keyItem.len = 8;
symkey = PK11_ImportSymKey(slot, cipherMech,
PK11_OriginUnwrap, CKA_ENCRYPT,
&keyItem, nullptr);
if (!symkey)
{
NS_ERROR("no symkey");
goto done;
}
// no initialization vector required
param = PK11_ParamFromIV(cipherMech, nullptr);
if (!param)
{
NS_ERROR("no param");
goto done;
}
ctxt = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(cipherMech, CKA_ENCRYPT,
symkey, param);
if (!ctxt) {
NS_ERROR("no context");
goto done;
}
rv = PK11_CipherOp(ctxt, hash, (int *) &n, 8, (uint8_t *) src, 8);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
NS_ERROR("des failure");
goto done;
}
rv = PK11_DigestFinal(ctxt, hash+8, &n, 0);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
NS_ERROR("des failure");
goto done;
}
done:
if (ctxt)
PK11_DestroyContext(ctxt, true);
if (symkey)
PK11_FreeSymKey(symkey);
if (param)
SECITEM_FreeItem(param, true);
if (slot)
PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
}
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