mirror of
https://github.com/autc04/Retro68.git
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273 lines
7.8 KiB
Go
273 lines
7.8 KiB
Go
// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
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// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
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// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
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// +build ignore
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package aes
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import (
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"crypto/cipher"
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"crypto/subtle"
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"errors"
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)
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// gcmCount represents a 16-byte big-endian count value.
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type gcmCount [16]byte
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// inc increments the rightmost 32-bits of the count value by 1.
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func (x *gcmCount) inc() {
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// The compiler should optimize this to a 32-bit addition.
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n := uint32(x[15]) | uint32(x[14])<<8 | uint32(x[13])<<16 | uint32(x[12])<<24
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n += 1
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x[12] = byte(n >> 24)
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x[13] = byte(n >> 16)
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x[14] = byte(n >> 8)
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x[15] = byte(n)
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}
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// gcmLengths writes len0 || len1 as big-endian values to a 16-byte array.
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func gcmLengths(len0, len1 uint64) [16]byte {
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return [16]byte{
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byte(len0 >> 56),
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byte(len0 >> 48),
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byte(len0 >> 40),
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byte(len0 >> 32),
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byte(len0 >> 24),
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byte(len0 >> 16),
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byte(len0 >> 8),
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byte(len0),
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byte(len1 >> 56),
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byte(len1 >> 48),
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byte(len1 >> 40),
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byte(len1 >> 32),
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byte(len1 >> 24),
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byte(len1 >> 16),
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byte(len1 >> 8),
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byte(len1),
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}
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}
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// gcmHashKey represents the 16-byte hash key required by the GHASH algorithm.
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type gcmHashKey [16]byte
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type gcmAsm struct {
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block *aesCipherAsm
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hashKey gcmHashKey
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nonceSize int
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}
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const (
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gcmBlockSize = 16
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gcmTagSize = 16
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gcmStandardNonceSize = 12
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)
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var errOpen = errors.New("cipher: message authentication failed")
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// Assert that aesCipherAsm implements the gcmAble interface.
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var _ gcmAble = (*aesCipherAsm)(nil)
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// NewGCM returns the AES cipher wrapped in Galois Counter Mode. This is only
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// called by crypto/cipher.NewGCM via the gcmAble interface.
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func (c *aesCipherAsm) NewGCM(nonceSize int) (cipher.AEAD, error) {
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var hk gcmHashKey
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c.Encrypt(hk[:], hk[:])
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g := &gcmAsm{
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block: c,
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hashKey: hk,
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nonceSize: nonceSize,
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}
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return g, nil
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}
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func (g *gcmAsm) NonceSize() int {
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return g.nonceSize
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}
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func (*gcmAsm) Overhead() int {
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return gcmTagSize
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}
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// sliceForAppend takes a slice and a requested number of bytes. It returns a
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// slice with the contents of the given slice followed by that many bytes and a
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// second slice that aliases into it and contains only the extra bytes. If the
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// original slice has sufficient capacity then no allocation is performed.
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func sliceForAppend(in []byte, n int) (head, tail []byte) {
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if total := len(in) + n; cap(in) >= total {
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head = in[:total]
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} else {
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head = make([]byte, total)
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copy(head, in)
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}
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tail = head[len(in):]
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return
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}
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// ghash uses the GHASH algorithm to hash data with the given key. The initial
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// hash value is given by hash which will be updated with the new hash value.
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// The length of data must be a multiple of 16-bytes.
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//go:noescape
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func ghash(key *gcmHashKey, hash *[16]byte, data []byte)
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// paddedGHASH pads data with zeroes until its length is a multiple of
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// 16-bytes. It then calculates a new value for hash using the GHASH algorithm.
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func (g *gcmAsm) paddedGHASH(hash *[16]byte, data []byte) {
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siz := len(data) &^ 0xf // align size to 16-bytes
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if siz > 0 {
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ghash(&g.hashKey, hash, data[:siz])
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data = data[siz:]
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}
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if len(data) > 0 {
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var s [16]byte
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copy(s[:], data)
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ghash(&g.hashKey, hash, s[:])
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}
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}
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// cryptBlocksGCM encrypts src using AES in counter mode using the given
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// function code and key. The rightmost 32-bits of the counter are incremented
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// between each block as required by the GCM spec. The initial counter value
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// is given by cnt, which is updated with the value of the next counter value
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// to use.
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//
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// The lengths of both dst and buf must be greater than or equal to the length
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// of src. buf may be partially or completely overwritten during the execution
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// of the function.
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//go:noescape
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func cryptBlocksGCM(fn code, key, dst, src, buf []byte, cnt *gcmCount)
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// counterCrypt encrypts src using AES in counter mode and places the result
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// into dst. cnt is the initial count value and will be updated with the next
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// count value. The length of dst must be greater than or equal to the length
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// of src.
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func (g *gcmAsm) counterCrypt(dst, src []byte, cnt *gcmCount) {
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// Copying src into a buffer improves performance on some models when
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// src and dst point to the same underlying array. We also need a
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// buffer for counter values.
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var ctrbuf, srcbuf [2048]byte
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for len(src) >= 16 {
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siz := len(src)
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if len(src) > len(ctrbuf) {
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siz = len(ctrbuf)
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}
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siz &^= 0xf // align siz to 16-bytes
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copy(srcbuf[:], src[:siz])
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cryptBlocksGCM(g.block.function, g.block.key, dst[:siz], srcbuf[:siz], ctrbuf[:], cnt)
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src = src[siz:]
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dst = dst[siz:]
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}
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if len(src) > 0 {
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var x [16]byte
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g.block.Encrypt(x[:], cnt[:])
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for i := range src {
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dst[i] = src[i] ^ x[i]
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}
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cnt.inc()
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}
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}
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// deriveCounter computes the initial GCM counter state from the given nonce.
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// See NIST SP 800-38D, section 7.1.
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func (g *gcmAsm) deriveCounter(nonce []byte) gcmCount {
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// GCM has two modes of operation with respect to the initial counter
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// state: a "fast path" for 96-bit (12-byte) nonces, and a "slow path"
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// for nonces of other lengths. For a 96-bit nonce, the nonce, along
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// with a four-byte big-endian counter starting at one, is used
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// directly as the starting counter. For other nonce sizes, the counter
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// is computed by passing it through the GHASH function.
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var counter gcmCount
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if len(nonce) == gcmStandardNonceSize {
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copy(counter[:], nonce)
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counter[gcmBlockSize-1] = 1
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} else {
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var hash [16]byte
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g.paddedGHASH(&hash, nonce)
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lens := gcmLengths(0, uint64(len(nonce))*8)
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g.paddedGHASH(&hash, lens[:])
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copy(counter[:], hash[:])
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}
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return counter
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}
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// auth calculates GHASH(ciphertext, additionalData), masks the result with
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// tagMask and writes the result to out.
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func (g *gcmAsm) auth(out, ciphertext, additionalData []byte, tagMask *[gcmTagSize]byte) {
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var hash [16]byte
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g.paddedGHASH(&hash, additionalData)
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g.paddedGHASH(&hash, ciphertext)
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lens := gcmLengths(uint64(len(additionalData))*8, uint64(len(ciphertext))*8)
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g.paddedGHASH(&hash, lens[:])
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copy(out, hash[:])
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for i := range out {
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out[i] ^= tagMask[i]
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}
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}
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// Seal encrypts and authenticates plaintext. See the cipher.AEAD interface for
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// details.
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func (g *gcmAsm) Seal(dst, nonce, plaintext, data []byte) []byte {
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if len(nonce) != g.nonceSize {
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panic("cipher: incorrect nonce length given to GCM")
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}
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if uint64(len(plaintext)) > ((1<<32)-2)*BlockSize {
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panic("cipher: message too large for GCM")
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}
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ret, out := sliceForAppend(dst, len(plaintext)+gcmTagSize)
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counter := g.deriveCounter(nonce)
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var tagMask [gcmBlockSize]byte
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g.block.Encrypt(tagMask[:], counter[:])
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counter.inc()
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g.counterCrypt(out, plaintext, &counter)
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g.auth(out[len(plaintext):], out[:len(plaintext)], data, &tagMask)
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return ret
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}
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// Open authenticates and decrypts ciphertext. See the cipher.AEAD interface
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// for details.
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func (g *gcmAsm) Open(dst, nonce, ciphertext, data []byte) ([]byte, error) {
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if len(nonce) != g.nonceSize {
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panic("cipher: incorrect nonce length given to GCM")
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}
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if len(ciphertext) < gcmTagSize {
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return nil, errOpen
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}
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if uint64(len(ciphertext)) > ((1<<32)-2)*BlockSize+gcmTagSize {
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return nil, errOpen
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}
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tag := ciphertext[len(ciphertext)-gcmTagSize:]
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ciphertext = ciphertext[:len(ciphertext)-gcmTagSize]
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counter := g.deriveCounter(nonce)
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var tagMask [gcmBlockSize]byte
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g.block.Encrypt(tagMask[:], counter[:])
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counter.inc()
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var expectedTag [gcmTagSize]byte
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g.auth(expectedTag[:], ciphertext, data, &tagMask)
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ret, out := sliceForAppend(dst, len(ciphertext))
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if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(expectedTag[:], tag) != 1 {
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// The AESNI code decrypts and authenticates concurrently, and
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// so overwrites dst in the event of a tag mismatch. That
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// behavior is mimicked here in order to be consistent across
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// platforms.
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for i := range out {
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out[i] = 0
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}
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return nil, errOpen
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}
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g.counterCrypt(out, ciphertext, &counter)
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return ret, nil
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}
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